Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Policy Particularism's Effects on Racial Policy Attitudes

Abstract
Political science has paid a great deal of attention to sources of intergroup conflict. The discipline has focused less on forces that bring people together and that transcend group boundaries. This study presents evidence that attachment to a shared superordinate identity can improve intergroup by reducing the social distance between people of differing racial groups. In study 1, a survey experiment shows that making a superordinate identity salient increased support for a proposed tax increase. The effects of the identity salience treatment are compared to a policy particularism treatment. The size and direction of the identity salience effect is affected by the degree of respondents' acceptance of the proffered identity. Implications for social identity theory, racial policy attitudes, and American national identity are discussed. Study 2 holds particularism constant and varies identity salience and the racial match or mismatch between respondents and the race of the recipients. Study 2 shows a similar interaction between identity salience and the application of particularism to policy attitudes, but in this case the effect is observed only in nonwhites.

NOTE: THIS IS A WORKING PAPER. COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ARE VERY WELCOME.

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¹ I’d like to thank the following people for advice on this paper: John Aldrich, Charles Franklin, Amy Gangl, Larry Grossback, Bill Jacoby, Paul Kellstedt, Eric Lawrence, Greg McAvoy, Mike Munger, David A. M. Peterson, Dick Potthoff, Wendy Rahn, Jason Reifler, Dan Stevens, and John Sullivan.
Political science pays a great deal of attention to the social forces that divide people and increase intergroup conflict. The discipline has paid less attention to the social forces that unite people and transcend group boundaries. This state of affairs is particularly true of the literature on race and American politics. In this article, I present evidence that attachment to a shared identity can help people to do just this: transcend group boundaries when judging policy options.

The social identity (e.g., Tajfel 1982) and self-categorization (e.g., Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1994) literatures in social psychology offer promising mechanisms for transcending group boundaries. The idea that attachment to broad, or superordinate, identities can improve intergroup relations is well established by research in social psychology. Social identity and self-categorization theories say that when people identify with broader groups they deemphasize competition, conflict, and negative evaluations among the members of subgroups nested within those broader groups. Obviously these theories are highly relevant to politics, but much of the evidence for these theories is based on laboratory experiments where artificial identities were created (Huddy 2001). For political scientists, this begs the question, "Do these effects extend to real-world identities and politically consequential decisions?"

This paper reports results from two studies of the relationships among identity salience, policy particularism, and racially-relevant policy preferences. The first study is a survey experiment conducted on a large random sample in a major metropolitan area that varied the salience of real world identities (racial/ethnic identity and American national identity) and examined the effect of changing identity salience on attitudes toward important policies. The second study was a traditional experiment conducted on a convenience sample which varied identity salience and race of recipient while holding policy particularism constant. In both studies, the dependent variables were measures of support for policies that concern racial issues.
and taxation, and thus pertain to deeply-held beliefs and attitudes, making this a stringent and realistic test of the identity hypotheses. To provide a metric of the strength of these identity effects, the identity treatment was compared with the effect of policy particularism, an empirically established cause of racial policy attitudes (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). The results suggest that varying the salience of a superordinate identity moderates policy particularism’s influence, and provides an explanation for particularism's effects (Baron and Kenny 1986). Indeed, the data presented in this paper suggest that making a person's attachment to a superordinate identity that they embrace salient can eliminate the effects of policy particularism, and thereby remove the differential influence of racial divisions. In the next section, I provide a brief synopsis of relevant findings from the identity literature, and briefly summarize the policy particularism argument. Then, using data from a survey experiment, I show how making certain identities salient affected respondents' attitudes toward a proposed tax.

Theory

Social Identity

Early work in social identity theory demonstrated that people automatically categorize everybody in their social environment into ingroups (groups to which they belong) and outgroups. Laboratory experiments consistently and robustly show that once people feel part of a group, their affect towards that group and its members becomes more positive (Kramer and Brewer 1984; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999). Even when the attachments are to temporary, superficial, and even explicitly meaningless identities, people tend to evaluate the performance of ingroup members more highly and tend to distribute rewards and positive performance evaluations in ways that elevate their group. Experimental subjects manifest this effect even
when imposing an intergroup differential comes at the expense of lowering the total amount of
rewards that they distribute (Brewer and Kramer 1985; Billig and Tajfel 1973).

Social identity theory spawned many intellectual descendants. One, self-categorization
theory (Turner 1985), emphasizes the multiplicity of identities that people can adopt, and how
easily different identities can become salient. Later work made an extremely important
discovery. When people recategorize others from being members of an outgroup to being
members of a shared ingroup, the same biases that increase the positive evaluations of ingroup
members will be directed toward these new members of their ingroup. This is particularly
important for intergroup relations because it is much more feasible for people to emphasize
certain identities than for people to cease perceiving and using social categories. Gaertner et al.
(1989) make the point well:

when the salience of the categorized boundary is reduced but members are left
with a superordinate or one-group representation, the cognitive and motivational
processes that initially brought in-group members closer to the self could be
redirected toward the establishment of more positive relations with the former
out-group members. With a one-group representation, bias should be reduced
primarily because the social distance with former out-group members has
decreased and the social distance with former in-group members has remained
relatively close. (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio. 1989, p. 240)

Similarly, based on several studies, Kramer and Brewer (1984, p. 1045) conclude that “salience
of a collective or common social identity may result in greater weight being given to joint
(collective) gains over individual gains alone. Inclusion within a common social boundary acts to
reduce social distance among group members, making it less likely that they will make sharp
distinctions between their own and others’ welfare.” Other research also shows that ingroup
biases can be redirected to benefit those who were previously considered part of an outgroup by
forming or emphasizing a broad identity that encompasses both the previous ingroup and outgroup(s) (Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, and Banker 1999; Smith and Tyler 1996).2

The conceptualization and operationalization of identity used in this research is drawn from an intellectual descendant of both social identity and self-categorization theories: the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) (Gaertner et al. 1999). The Common Ingroup Identity Model distinguishes between *subgroup* identities and *superordinate* identities (see figure 1).3

*Subgroup* identities have boundaries that define other people as members of outgroups (i.e., exclusive boundaries, as in the dotted line ovals in the left panel of figure 1, instead of shared or nested identities). Research shows that when subgroup identities are salient, people will evaluate distributional decisions from the perspective that only one group will benefit (Smith and Tyler 1996), and they will want that group to be their own. *Superordinate* identities are broad identities with potential outgroup identities nested within them, such as the large solid circle in the left panel of figure 1. Identity-based theories predict that when a superordinate identity is salient, people will emphasize whether the proposal will benefit the group as a whole when making decisions about common resources and policies (Smith and Tyler 1996; Kramer and Brewer 1984). These predictions have important implications for political attitudes and choices.

[Insert figure 1 about here]

For example according to these theories when a subgroup identity is salient (e.g., one's home state) people will focus their considerations of spending on bridges and highways on how much will be spent in their state. If the public works will be in their state, they are more likely to support the spending, and if the public works will not, they are more likely to oppose it. When superordinate identity is salient (e.g. the nation), people will focus on whether the spending will

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2 Gibson and Gouws (2002) find that for white South Africans, the superordinate South African national identity reduces intergroup antipathy.

3 Smith and Tyler (1996) find similar effects for subgroup and superordinate identities as described here.
improve the infrastructure and efficiency of the country as a whole. Support and opposition to the spending will be based on the proposal itself rather than on the location of the direct beneficiaries (Smith and Tyler 1996).

The subgroup/superordinate framework maps nicely onto American race relations. Black and white racial identities can operate as subgroup identities or be subsumed under a superordinate American identity. The left and right panels of figure 1 show the correspondence between the theoretical categories of subgroup and superordinate identities and their operationalization in the form of racial/ethnic subgroup identities and a superordinate American national identity.

Policy Particularism

Applying social identity theory to American race relations is especially interesting because it may provide an explanation of the psychological processes underpinning policy particularism. The politics-centered approach to explaining racial policy preferences claims that most Americans do not process racial issues very differently from other political issues (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Instead, this approach claims that racial policy attitudes are best understood as extensions of the common struggle in American politics between liberalism and conservatism. According to their argument, in the case of racially relevant policies like affirmative action, it is the design and implementation of the programs that generates opposition. Specifically, research by Sniderman and Carmines (1997) suggests that policy particularism is the driving force behind white opposition to programs like affirmative action. The authors point out that many of the programs intended to implement racial equality restrict their benefits to African-Americans. They argue that this exclusive quality causes the gap between whites’

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4 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that this research helps to illuminate policy particularism.
principled commitments to racial equality and their relatively low support for the programs intended to implement those principles (Schuman et al. 1997). In Sniderman and Carmines’ (1997) terms, the programs lose support because they are particularistic. From a social identity perspective, this makes perfect sense. Exclusivity supports the perception of group boundaries. The following two studies reexamine some research that shows the effect of policy particularism, specifically Sniderman and Carmines (1997) School Tax Experiment and Helping Hand Experiment.

Study 1

Background: The School Tax Experiment

The School Tax Experiment is one of the empirical building blocks of Sniderman and Carmines’ (1997) theory of policy particularism. During a telephone survey, respondents were informed that they were about to be asked a question concerning whether “taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs.” Half of the respondents were then randomly assigned to be asked whether they would be willing to have their taxes raised “to improve educational opportunities for minorities.” The other half of the respondents were asked if they would be willing to have their taxes raised “to improve education in public schools.” Sniderman and Carmines (1997) found that 65% of their white respondents supported the tax in the public schools condition and 46% supported the tax in the minority opportunity condition. They argue

5 Other theories claim that the gap between whites’ principles and their support for the relevant public policies is generated by negative affect toward African-Americans and/or negative stereotypes of African-Americans and/or the relative position of blacks and whites in American society and/or a preference for a hierarchical society. For an excellent overview of recent work from these and other approaches to race and politics see Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo (2000).
6 The 1991 Race and Politics Survey.
that the particularism of the minority policy proposal creates the difference because the public schools version is “race-neutral” but the version that mentions minorities is “race-specific.”

Study 1 tests the relationship between identity salience and policy particularism. If a positive attachment to American national identity can diminish the salience and importance of subgroup boundaries, then that attachment has important implications for the study of racial policy preferences. Specifically it implies that particularism's effects can be moderated (Baron and Kenny 1986) by identity salience.

**Hypotheses**

Synthesizing these theories leads to an interesting question. If a person with a salient superordinate identity faces a decision about a particularistic program, which factor will have more influence, particularism or the superordinate identity? This research varies both of these influences, and tests whether the identity salience effect is a fragile and/or weak effect that only matters in the lab, or is potent enough to erase an established causal influence on a deeply entrenched division in American society: race. The survey experiment described below was designed to sort out these theoretical expectations by testing the following hypotheses:

H1: (Superordinate Identification Salience) When a superordinate identity is salient there will be more support for the proposed tax because each respondent’s ingroup biases will be applied more broadly.

H2: (Particularism) There will be less support for the particularistic version of a program than for a broader version to the extent that the particularistic version does not directly benefit the respondent’s subgroup.

H3: (Identity-Particularism Interaction) When a positive attachment to a superordinate identity is salient, the difference in support caused by policy particularism will be diminished (or erased).

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7 Sniderman and Carmines (1997) use evidence based on a battery of negative stereotype items to conclude that racial prejudice is not the source of the difference between the two conditions. See chapter 4 of *Reaching Beyond Race* for details.
H3a: (Increased Closeness) The gap between support for the broader and particularistic programs will close because of gains in support for the more particularistic program, not by reducing support for the broader program.

Hypothesis H1 follows from the CIIM and other identity-based approaches by expecting broader identification to lead to more willingness to contribute to public goods, common resources and other collective resources (Kramer and Brewer 1984). Hypothesis H2 states that I expect to replicate the particularism effect as Sniderman and Carmines (1997). H3 concerns the interaction between identity salience and particularism. This hypothesis claims that American identity will operate as a superordinate identity, and as predicted by the CIIM, whites' national ties to minorities will be accentuated over racial and ethnic differences. H3a is derived from the process of recategorization described by Gaertner et al.'s work (1989, 1999). Specifically when members of an outgroup are recategorized into a shared superordinate identity, affect and attitudes toward the (newly recognized) ingroup members become more positive. Additionally, De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) find that superordinate identities increase support for public goods by increasing the value that people place on the public goods. H3a would be disconfirmed if the gap closed because affect and attitudes toward the members of the initial ingroup became less positive and affect and attitudes toward the former members of the outgroup remained the same.

The Survey Experiment

The data come from a survey experiment embedded in the Minnesota Multi-Investigator Survey (MMIS), which was a random sample of a major metropolitan area (Minneapolis-St. Paul and the surrounding counties) in the summer of 1998 (see Appendix A).\(^8\) To ensure comparability with the School Tax Experiment and the validity of the identity treatments, the

\(^8\) It is important to note that this survey was conducted before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
analyses that follow were restricted to respondents who self-identified as whites and as American citizens.9

**Design and procedure.**

Priming the different identities was done by randomly assigning the respondents to one of two questions designed to prime the respondents' identification with either a subgroup identity or a superordinate identity (see Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001 for a similar use of questions-as-treatments as well as the School Tax experiment itself).10 Half of the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked, “How close do you feel to your ethnic or racial group?” in order to make a subgroup identity salient.11 The other half were randomly assigned to be asked, “How close do you feel to other Americans?” to make a superordinate identity salient.12

Using questions-as-treatments accomplished two things. First, by asking people to think about their closeness to a certain group, it brought the respondents' thoughts and feelings about

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9 There are two reasons for restricting the analysis to whites. First, the School Tax Experiment’s results are only from white respondents, so this restriction facilitates comparing the two experiments. Second, for white respondents, their ethnic and racial identities do not include African-Americans and other “minorities,” which is vital for the ethnic or racial group treatment to prime a subgroup identity. Similarly, I discarded non-citizens because “other Americans” may not induce a credible superordinate identity that non-citizens share with African-Americans and other American “minorities.” The total N for the survey is 407. Restricting the analysis to self-identified whites removed 55 cases (Latino/Hispanic was one of the options on the race question, but there was not a separate Latino ethnicity question). Restricting the analysis to US citizens removed 2 additional cases, and item nonresponse ruled out 11 more cases under listwise deletion of missing data. The maximum N for the analyses is 339.

10 It is important to note that this is not about creating and destroying identities. People have multiple identities; they have varying degrees of attachment to many groups and traits. These theories discuss variation in salience, that is variation in what attachments people are most likely to feel and/or apply when making political decisions. The experiment reported here operates by varying the salience of the relevant identities.

11 Because the analysis that follows is restricted to respondents who self-identified as white, it is likely that the respondents who report feeling close to their ethnic or racial group are thinking of some form of white identity. The theory only requires a subgroup identity that excludes the recipients (the colloquial usage of the word ‘minorities’ accomplishes this for white respondents). Thus, from a theoretical perspective it does not matter whether the respondents are thinking of their closeness to Germans, Swedes, or whites in general. The theoretical expectation and the contrast to a superordinate identity remains the same.

12 Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) suggests that attachment to other members of an ingroup is associated with identification with that category (see also Wong (1998) for a discussion of the use of the ‘how close’ wording in the National Election Study). It is critical to note that the theoretical framework of this paper requires that the subgroups be nested within the superordinate identity. This is not an argument about national identity per se, but about the implications of attachment to national identity for subgroups of that nation. When the target group is outside the national identity boundary, as in Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior's (2004) work on immigrants in the Netherlands, identity-based theories generate different theoretical expectations.
their relationship to that group to the 'top of their heads' (Zaller 1992), and in doing so raised the salience of that identity. Second, by asking people whether they feel close to that identity, each question-as-treatment measured the degree to which people felt attached (very close, somewhat close) to the identity they were asked about.

Figure 2 shows the intended effect of the identity treatments. The left side of figure 2 shows that when people’s racial or ethnic group is made salient, the boundary between their racial subgroup and other racial subgroup is more salient, as signified by the dark lines of the identity boundaries. The border of the shared national identity still exists, but it is not salient. The right side of figure 2 shows the intended effect of the American national identity treatment. Here the national identity boundary is thick and heavy. By making national identity salient, the subgroup boundaries fade from perception and in importance.

[Insert figure 2 about here]

This identity treatment was immediately followed by the question that served as both the particularism treatment and as the dependent variable. These questions are exact copies of the stimuli used in the School Tax Experiment. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the following two questions: “Some people have said that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How willing would you be to have your taxes raised to improve education in public schools?” or “Some people have said that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How willing would you be to have your taxes raised to improve educational opportunities for minorities?” Respondents had four response options: very willing, somewhat willing, not very willing, or not at all willing. The content of the question

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13 In the Race and Politics Study there is an additional treatment that varies the source that of the claim that there are “pressing national needs.” That treatment did not significantly affect the outcome of the School Tax Experiment, and thus it was collapsed in Sniderman and Carmines’ (1997) analysis. The MMIS did not contain a source treatment and used the same version of the stem as one of the source treatments (i.e., “Some people say, because of pressing national needs...”).
(mentioning public schools or minorities) serves as a particularism treatment, and their response to the question serves as the dependent variable in the analyses that follow. Thus, the 2X2 design (identity by particularism) was operationalized as seen in figure 3, with each respondent assigned to one of the four conditions at the bottom of the figure.

[Insert figure 3 about here]

The stem shared by both versions of the dependent variable made the proposals rather challenging to support. The question explicitly mentions an unpopular feature: taxes (Schuman, et al. 1997; Edsall and Edsall 1992). Additionally, the respondents are not reacting only to taxes in the abstract; they are asked how willing they would be to see their own taxes increased. Compared to the weighty matters of race and taxes, the mere difference of thinking about a certain identity seems unlikely to be able to influence these decisions, yet it does.

Results

Identity and Particularism Treatments

The four-category dependent variable was recoded to range from zero to one. Figure 4 shows the mean levels of the respondents’ willingness to pay the new taxes across the two identity conditions. As hypothesized (H1), there is greater willingness to have taxes increased among the people who were asked how close they feel to other Americans (ordered probit b = .19, s.e. = .12, p = .098).15

[Insert figures 4 & 5]

Figure 5 shows the means across the particularism treatment. Interestingly, the means are a mirror image of those generated by the identity treatment. The difference in support is

14 “Easier” version of these questions would only ask respondents if they would support improving the public schools or improving educational opportunities for minorities, and would not mention the costs of support.
15 Since the dependent variable has only four categories, an ordered probit is an appropriate test of the treatment effects.
marginally significant (ordered probit b = -.19 s.e. = .12, p = .100). This pattern of results replicates the School Tax Experiment, and there are several important points to be drawn from this analysis. First, hypothesis H2 is supported. Second it shows that the treatment succeeded in creating a particularism effect with which the identity salience effect can be compared.\(^{16}\) Figure 6 shows the effects of both of the experimental treatments. The highest and lowest levels of support are in the cells that one would expect after synthesizing identity- and politics-centered explanations. These are the only two cells that significantly differ from each other. That is, the mean score (.46) for the respondents who received the subgroup identity treatment and the minority opportunity condition of the particularism treatment is significantly less than the mean score (.57) of the respondents who received the superordinate identity treatment and the public schools condition of the particularism treatment (two-tailed \(t = 2.22, p < .05\)). The other mean differences are not statistically significant.

[Insert figure 6 about here]

**Acceptance of the Identity Treatments and Interactive Experimental Effects**

The purpose of the identity treatment was to induce one of two mental states in each respondent: either closeness to the respondent’s ethnic/racial group, or closeness to the respondent’s national identity. The pattern of results in figure 6 masks an important interaction between the treatment to which people were assigned and the respondents’ reactions to the identity treatments. Since the treatments were done as questions, we know both to which treatment they were assigned and how they reacted to the treatment they were given. The data reveal that the intended mental state (attachment to either a subgroup or superordinate identity)

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\(^{16}\) Since the stimuli were the same as the School Tax Experiment, the low level of statistical significance reveals that we have the bare minimum amount of statistical power (Cohen 1992). If the MMIS had the same sample size as the School Tax Experiment, the same means and standard deviations observed in the MMIS and shown in figures 4 and 5 would be statistically significant at the \(p < .05\) level. This analysis is available from the author.
was not always induced. Some respondents\textsuperscript{17} said that they felt “not very close” or “not at all close” to the identity to which they were assigned. This creates an opportunity to study both attachment to, and rejection of, a given identity. When people express an attachment to the group which they were offered, the predictions of the CIIM should hold. When people deny an attachment, they instead regard the group in question with indifference or perhaps as an outgroup. If the latter is the case, we do not expect to see the ingroup effects predicted by the CIIM; in fact rejecting an identity should have the opposite effect of embracing one (see Huddy 2001).

A hypothetical example illustrates why respondents’ reactions to the identity questions-as-treatments are relevant to testing hypotheses about identity salience. Consider a study that randomly assigned half of its subjects to eat a low-carbohydrate diet, and left the other half as a control group. If some of the subjects in the low-carbohydrate treatment condition fail to follow the diet under study, their results will obscure rather than illuminate the effects of the diet being studied. Researchers can learn about the combined \textit{feasibility and effectiveness} of implementing the diet by analyzing the treatment group as a whole, but to isolate the effects of the diet they should focus on the subjects who complied with their assignment to the diet under study. In this example, mean differences between the treatment and control conditions (or the lack thereof) conflate the feasibility and the effectiveness of the diet being studied.

The situation in the MMIS experiment is actually more stark than the scenario described above. The respondents who denied feeling close to their assigned identity did not simply fail to accept the primed identity, they explicitly rejected it. They are not just untreated, as in the hypothetical diet study; if anything they entered the opposite of the intended mental state. To

\textsuperscript{17} The vast majority of respondents indicated some closeness to the identity to which they were assigned. Only 9\% said they feel “not very” or “not at all” close to their ethnic/racial group, and only 4\% said they feel “not very” or “not at all” close to other Americans. For whites, the percentages are 8\% and 4\% respectively.
continue the diet-study analogy, they did not just fail to follow the low-carbohydrate diet; instead they binged on carbohydrates. Looking back at figure 2, people who do not express closeness to the primed identity are denying an attachment to the group.

Figure 7 isolates the effects of identity salience (rather than just exposure to an identity prime), by showing the means for the respondents who said that they feel very or somewhat close to the identity to which they were assigned. Figure 7 shows exactly the effect predicted by hypothesis H3. In the subgroup identity condition, the particularism treatment induces lower support for minority opportunity (.44) than for the public schools (.54). In the superordinate identity condition, there is very little difference. Mean support for minority opportunity is .55 and .53 for the public schools. Moreover, across the two identity conditions, there was almost no change in support for the public schools wording.

The particularism effect was eliminated by an increase in support for the minority opportunity condition (from .44 to .53, two-tailed \( t = 1.63, p = .11 \)). As predicted by hypothesis H3a, it appears that when people felt attached to the superordinate identity the former outgroup members came to be psychologically processed more like ingroup members. Importantly, this shows that the identity effect is not the product of a zero-sum game. The increase in support for the ‘new’ ingroup members does not mean losses for the former ingroup members.

**Modeling experimental effects and controlling for identity acceptance.**

My claim is that embracing or rejecting an identity that has become salient matters. Therefore I hypothesize that acceptance of an identity prime modifies the prime’s effect. While isolating cases is one way to test this hypothesis, another way is to explicitly model an interaction between prime-acceptance and the identity effects.

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18 Two-tailed \( t = 1.80, p = .07 \)
19 Two-tailed \( t = .40, p = .69 \)
I began by creating a prime-acceptance variable by combining responses to the two identity questions-as-treatments into one variable that measures the intensity of each respondent’s attachment to the identity to which they were assigned.\textsuperscript{20} Regardless of which identity question a respondent encountered, the prime-acceptance variable indicates the degree to which that respondent reported that s/he was experiencing the intended positive association with that identity.\textsuperscript{21} In Jaccard’s (2001) nomenclature, the focal variable is policy particularism. Identity treatment is a first order moderator (testing whether identity salience affects the strength of policy particularism), and acceptance of the identity treatment is a second order moderator (testing whether acceptance of the assigned identity affects identity's effect on policy particularism). The coefficient on the three-way interaction term tests whether accepting (prime-acceptance is positive) the superordinate identity prime (Identity = 1) alters the effect of the particularism treatment when respondents decide whether to support minority opportunity (Particularism = 1).

The prime-acceptance variable was used in the following model, which was estimated with ordered probit:

\[
\text{Support for Tax Increase} = b_0 + b_1 \text{Identity Condition} + b_2 \text{Prime-Acceptance} + b_3 \text{Particularism Condition} + b_4 \text{Prime-Acceptance} \ast \text{Identity Condition} + b_5 \text{Prime-Acceptance} \ast \text{Particularism Condition} + b_6 \text{Identity Condition} \ast \text{Particularism Condition} + b_7 \text{Prime-Acceptance} \ast \text{Identity Condition} \ast \text{Particularism Condition} + \text{controls (in models 2 & 3)} + \text{error.} \quad (1)
\]

The treatments are dummy variables. The acceptance variable is centered on the mean for white citizens as are the control variables (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard 2001). Recall that H3

\textsuperscript{20} The acceptance variable preserved the 4 categories of the identity questions and was recoded to range from 0 to 3, with 3 indicating the highest level of acceptance (“Very close”), and 0 indicating the lowest (“Not at all close”), then was centered around the mean for self-identified white citizens (Aiken and West 1991).

\textsuperscript{21} Creating a single prime-acceptance variable from the two identity questions would not be appropriate if the prime-acceptance process differs across the two conditions. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (StataCorp 2003) was run to test the null hypothesis that the distributions of acceptance of the two identity primes do not differ. The null cannot be rejected (corrected p-value = .584). Of course, one cannot prove the null hypothesis, but combining responses to the two treatment questions does not appear to be an egregious error.
predicts that superordinate identity will increase support in the minority opportunity condition, but only for compliers. Therefore H3 can only be properly tested by making a superordinate identity salient, so the three-way interaction term, which is positive when the three conditions are met and zero otherwise, is a critical test of the hypothesis.

The results are shown in model 1 of table 1. The positive and significant coefficient on the three-way interaction supports hypothesis H3. The coefficient means that willingness to pay the proposed tax in the minority opportunity condition increases when respondents received the superordinate identity treatment and complied with that treatment. (Since three-way interactions are difficult to visualize. The pattern of results will become more clear when the predicted probabilities are graphed in the next section of the paper after a brief discussion of the validity of the prime-acceptance analysis.)

[Insert table 1 about here]

Isolating the respondents who accepted the identity to which they were assigned has the advantage that it more directly tests whether the effect of attachment to an identity interacts with the particularism treatment. However, the disadvantage is that it introduces a variable, acceptance of the assigned identity, that is not randomly assigned. There is a possibility that effects that appear to be results of the experimental treatments are actually the result of

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22 A full test of these effects requires working through all of the terms of the model. The needed test is whether the superordinate versus subgroup treatment is a significant predictor when people accepted the identity prime and were in the minority opportunity version of the particularism treatment. A likelihood-ratio test was run by testing a constrained model that set identity to zero (since the identity variable is coded subgroup = 0, superordinate = 1). The LR test revealed that null hypothesis that this constraint does not reduce the explanatory power of the model can be rejected (LR Chi²(3) = 6.49, p < .10). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test.

23 The bivariate correlation between prime-acceptance and the dependent variable also fails to reach statistical significance (r = -.03, p = .55).
preexisting attitudes. Fortunately, the MMIS measured variables that allow me to test for threats to the internal validity of the survey experiment.

It could be that the experimental effect is actually a product of stable differences in group identification and that it is the strength measure, not the assignment to one identity or another, that drives the identity findings. By treating the data as two parallel surveys, I can examine the direct effects of strength of attachment to each identity on willingness to support the tax. Using only the cases that were asked about how close they feel to other Americans, an ordered probit shows no evidence of a significant relationship between closeness to other Americans and support for the tax increase (ordered probit $b = -0.17$, s.e. $= 0.38$, $p = 0.66$). Similarly, white citizens’ closeness to their ethnic or racial group does not significantly predict support for the tax increase (ordered probit $b = -0.15$, s.e. $= 0.29$, $p = 0.61$).

It could also be the case that the acceptance variable is serving as a proxy for some other construct. Models 2 and 3 of table 1 add control variables to model 1 in order to address concerns about the prime-acceptance variable being confounded with preexisting attitudes. Model 2 (“Full Model”) contains all of the plausible control variables that were available in the MMIS. Specifically, egalitarianism, the respondent’s age, their ideology, a scale of factual political knowledge, party identification, and the respondent's favorability toward whites, blacks, Americans, and the Federal Government were added. Model 3 is a trimmed model designed to give the most efficient estimates of the experimental and control variables’ effects.

24 Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2002) make the point that valid theory-testing should be a higher priority than restricting data analysis to strict random assignment, especially when statistical procedures and controls allow analysts to test their hypotheses despite departures from pure random assignment.
25 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for suggesting that I more carefully consider the dispositional and situational aspects of this experiment and for suggesting this analysis.
26 Ideology is measured by subtracting the respondent’s favorability toward liberals from their favorability toward conservatives.
27 All of the control variables were centered on their mean for white citizens (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard 2001).
Both the full and the trimmed models show no evidence that identity acceptance is serving as proxies for the effects of preexisting attitudes. Highly plausible candidates like favorability toward whites, blacks, and “Americans” are not significantly related to the dependent variable.\(^{28}\) The threeway interaction variable changes little across the three specifications. In all three models it is positive and significant. This suggests that even though some of the control variables are significantly correlated with identity-acceptance, these correlations did not drive the relationship between the identity treatment and the dependent variable.\(^{29}\)

[Figure 8 about here]

Figure 8 shows the predicted probabilities generated from model 3 in table 1 (the trimmed model). The various panels show the relationship between the particularism treatment and the probability of supporting the tax increase across both identity treatments and by prime-acceptance. The identity-acceptance variable was dichotomized for ease of presentation, and the control variables were set to their mean values.\(^{30}\) The y-axis shows the probability of a respondent saying that they are somewhat willing or very willing to have their taxes raised.

Taken as a whole, figure 8 supports the hypotheses drawn from the CIIM and self-categorization theory (H1, H3, and H3a). Panel 4 (the lower right) is the critical condition. It

\(^{28}\) There is no significant bivariate relationship between the favorability measures and the dependent variable. The favorability variables are also not significant when they are regressed as a block on the dependent variable. However, the favorability variables are related to the identity questions-as-treatments in the manner that one would expect. For white citizens, the "How close do you feel to your ethnic or racial group," item was positively correlated ($r = .17$ $p < .05$) with favorability toward whites, and the "How close do you feel to other Americans," was positively correlated ($r = .33$ $p < .01$) with favorability toward Americans.

\(^{29}\) To test the degree to which the final trimmed model is robust, I tried removing the insignificant variables in several different orders. The omitted variables never achieved statistical significance, regardless of specification. Additionally a Wald test on the entire block of variables removed from the full model shows that the entire set did not significantly improve the model’s fit ($p = .89$).

\(^{30}\) As one would expect from the invariance of the experimental coefficients, the pattern of results does not change across different specifications. The three-way interaction shown in figure 4 is not dependent on the control variables or the coding of the prime-acceptance variable.
shows the degree to which the particularism treatment affects the probability of supporting the
tax for respondents who received and embraced the superordinate identity; unlike the other
panels, there is barely any change across particularism conditions. As hypothesized, attachment
to the superordinate identity eliminates the particularism effect. When a positive association with
American identity is salient, support for taxes on behalf of minority opportunity barely differs
from support for taxes on behalf of the public schools. The particularism effect that is so
apparent in past research and in the other conditions disappears. As predicted by H3a, the line in
the lower right hand panel is flat because of an increase in the willingness to support the taxes in
the minority opportunity. Comparing the two panels on the right, the probability of supporting
the tax for the public schools is just over .6 in both identity conditions. However, the probability
of supporting the tax in the minority opportunity condition climbs from about .5 in the subgroup
condition to about .6 in the superordinate condition.

The other panels reveal how the content of the primed identities and the respondents’
acceptance of those identities affects attitudes toward the proposed tax. The upper left panel
shows the predicted probabilities when white respondents reject their racial or ethnic group
identity. In this identity condition, respondents are more supportive when the proposed taxes are
for minority opportunity than when they are for the public schools. Perhaps rejecting whiteness
induces solidarity with non-whites. Conversely, when whites embrace an ethnic or racial identity
(upper right panel), they are less likely to support the proposed taxes when they are targeted for
minorities. The lower left panel is quite striking, whites who reject their bonds with other
Americans show much less support for the proposed taxes in the minority opportunity condition
than they do in the public schools condition, again supporting hypothesis H4.
The two panels on the left (1 and 3) should be interpreted with caution because the estimates are based on far fewer cases than panels 2 and 4. However, they support several of Huddy’s (2001) contentions. As Huddy suggests, there are individual differences in receptivity to identity priming. Additionally, real-world identities bring with them history and ‘baggage.’ Some people do not feel positively toward some identities, and it appears that rejecting an identity is more powerful than embracing one. However the small number of cases in panels 1 and 3 means this almost purely speculation. Further research is needed before drawing this conclusion.

Study 1: Discussion

These results suggest several substantive points. First, emphasizing a superordinate identity reduced the differences in support for the two policies that was created by the particularism treatment. This suggests that when the perceived relationship between whites and minorities is one of a shared identity, particularism loses its power to diminish whites’ support for programs that benefit only minorities. That is, the particularism effect is contingent on the salient identity of the respondents. Second, the importance of particularism has been reinforced by this replication in a fresh data set.31

Advantages vis-à-vis laboratory experiments.

This study draws on social identity theory and research from social psychology, but is designed to have greater external validity than laboratory experiments. This addresses some of the concerns of political scientists who have noted that social identity theory’s applicability to politics may be limited by the existing literature’s heavy reliance on laboratory experiments and

31 The MMIS did not contain the stereotype items that would be needed to precisely replicate Sniderman and Carmines’ analysis of the School Tax Experiment. It did contain a question that asked respondents how favorable or unfavorable they felt toward blacks. As model 2 of table 1 shows, this variable did not come close to statistical or substantive significance (the standard error exceeds the coefficient). There is no evidence that explicit negative affect is driving the difference between support for the two policies.
relative neglect of existing (and politically potent) identities (Huddy 2001). The artificiality and low stakes of the identities in laboratory studies raises concerns about the degree to which findings will generalize to the actual practice of politics.\textsuperscript{32} This study, on the other hand, uses ‘real-world’ identities, including racial, ethnic, and American national identity. Thus, the identity treatments used in this survey experiment lends greater external validity to claims about political implications of changes in identity salience. In addition to working with real-world identities, this research did not pit identity against a null hypothesis that it would have no effect whatsoever. Instead the survey experiment compared the strength of identity effects with the influence of an empirically established causal factor: policy particularism (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Since the particularism effect was so thoroughly removed by the identity effect, there is some support for the idea that social identity processes underpin particularism.

The sample used in this study also gives this research several advantages over much of the work done on identity in social psychology. Unlike laboratory studies done with samples of convenience in unfamiliar settings (Sears 1986), this sample is a random sample of a major metropolitan area and the experimental treatments were administered to people in their typical milieu. Thus we have good reason to believe that variation in the salience of different identities matters for mass opinion and for policy attitudes.

Study 2

\textit{Background: The Helping Hand Experiment}

The School Tax Experiment demonstrated that policy particularism matters in public opinion. However, since only one condition contained racial cues, Sniderman and Carmines's (1997) realized that another experiment would be needed to test whether the penalty for policy

\textsuperscript{32} However, there is work in social psychology that looks at real-world identities and/or in field settings (e.g., Eller and Abrams 2004; Smith and Tyler 1996; Kowalski and Wolfe 1994; Gaertner et al. 1999).
particularism falls evenly on programs that benefit whites and blacks. As Sniderman and Carmines (1997) say, “[t]he key idea is to compare support for government assistance for blacks and for an equivalently particularistic group of whites.” They conducted the Helping Hand Experiment to address precisely this question.

Respondents were randomly assigned to several treatment conditions across three different experimental manipulations. One manipulation varied the type of program the respondent was asked if they would support. Half of the respondents were asked about their support for job training programs and half were asked about their support for welfare. A second manipulation varied the beneficiary of the program. Half of the respondents were asked whether they would support the program (job training or welfare) for “new immigrants from Europe” (implying that the immigrants are white) and half were asked if they would support the program for “blacks.” Finally, the respondents were randomly assigned to be told one further piece of information about the potential beneficiaries. Half of the respondents were told that the potential beneficiaries are “people who show they want to work out their own problems,” and the other half were told that the potential beneficiaries are “people who have trouble hanging onto jobs.”

The experiment’s results show that white respondents are more likely to support both job training and welfare for blacks than for “new immigrants from Europe.” Sniderman and Carmines (1997) interpret this as clear evidence that the race of a program’s recipients does not affect support, or at least that blacks are not disadvantaged. However, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the attitude object “new immigrants from Europe,” is not equivalent to the attitude object "blacks."

Using immigrants as a comparison group is problematic.

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33 This is not a complete account of the experiment’s findings. The welfare v. job training and “people who show they want to work out their own problems” v. “people who have trouble hanging onto jobs” manipulations revealed subtler finding than described in this paper (see Sniderman and Carmines (1997) for a full discussion).
Does the Helping Hand Experiment definitively answer whether particularism evenly penalizes whites and blacks? There are reasons to doubt that ‘new immigrants from Europe who have problems with poverty’ constitutes a group of whites that matches ‘blacks and minorities who have problems with poverty’ in every way but the factor the treatment was intended to vary. Recall that the purpose of the Helping Hand Experiment is to find out whether programs that benefit blacks are opposed for racial reasons. To isolate the effects of race, the comparison group must match blacks on all other dimensions, otherwise one of these other dimensions could be causing the results. New immigrants and African-Americans differ in many, many ways. For example, the U.S. government’s moral responsibility to people who have voluntarily come to the United States is not the same as the government’s responsibility for the descendants of people who were forcibly brought to America.

The Helping Hand Experiment assumes what is being asked. To say that immigrants from Europe are equivalent to blacks in public opinion implies that only skin color matters in drawing identity boundaries. That is, the white skin of the new immigrants from Europe is enough to put them on an even footing with any group of native-born whites that has the same number of members. This is the criterion that must be satisfied for this experiment to inform the debate about particularism per se. However, if nationalism and/or American identity influences where people perceive boundaries, then African-Americans may be part of the ingroup and the immigrants categorized as members of an outgroup.

The idea that shared skin color means instant solidarity runs against a great deal of historical research and social science theory. Historical work demonstrates that many European immigrants faced discrimination, sometimes with racial justifications, in the 20th century (Higham, 1963), so skin color does not necessarily confer the full privileges of ‘whiteness.’
Moreover, skin color is neither a necessary nor sufficient trigger for discrimination and prejudice (Horowitz, 1985). At times some European groups have been closer to African-Americans in terms of social status than to ‘native’ whites (Ignatiev, 1995).

To advance our understanding of particularism, the Helping Hand Experiment needs to be refined. Ideally, there would be a comparison between a group of white beneficiaries and a group of black beneficiaries. The two groups would be equally particularistic, and they would be matched in all other ways as well (to avoid confounds with other factors). If these conditions were met, then comparing the level of support for the two groups would illuminate the extent to which particularism *per se* is the key causal factor. If it is indeed particularism, regardless of the race of the beneficiaries, then there will be no significant difference in support across two equally particularistic and deserving (or undeserving) groups.

Study 2 solves the problem of equivalent particularism while also investigating the effects of race and identity. The experiment operationalizes situational particularism by asking the respondents to decide whether to confer benefits on a single needy town and operationalizes race of beneficiary by indicating the predominant race of the residents of the town. Particularism is held constant because the town is described identically in both conditions; the size of the benefiting group, the justifications for the benefits, and the likelihood of the subjects benefiting are the same. A pre-test question was also used to measure particularism as a standing decision.

With particularism held constant and equivalent, this experiment allows me to test whether the opposition generated by policy particularism accrues equally when the beneficiaries are black or white. Additionally, with policy proposals held truly equal, the experiment reported in this paper tests identity’s apparently ability to overcome policy particularism more rigorously.
The experiment reported in this paper also attempts to create and validate an item that measures particularism.

Procedure

Study 2 was analyzed as a 2 (Identity) X 2 (Race of Town) design. The respondents began by filling out a pre-test questionnaire, then immediately received two treatments (see Appendix A), and a post-test (see Appendix B). 24 of the subjects were recruited through the Duke Department of Psychology subject pool. 114 subjects were recruited from a street corner in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. After answering 42 multiple choice opinion questions, respondents encounter first the identity treatment then the particularism treatment, and then answered 25 post-test items. They were then debriefed and thanked. The self-reported race of the respondents is shown in Appendix B, table B.1.

Identity treatment.

The first treatment was a writing task designed to affect each respondent’s salient identification (see Appendix A). Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three identity treatments. In one condition, asked each respondent was asked to write down a few sentences describing why he or she feels proud of other Americans (a superordinate identification). The respondents who were randomly assigned to the second condition served as a control group. They were not given any identity stimulus and instead skipped straight to the race of town treatment. The remaining third of the respondents were asked to write some sentences about why they were proud of their ethnic or racial group (a subgroup identity) and to list some of that group’s contributions to history and culture. Study 2 asked the respondents to write about what

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34 The original design had three identity conditions (subgroup, control, and superordinate). Unfortunately a secretarial error left the subgroup –white town cell empty so the subgroup identity condition was not included in any analyses.
they felt proud of about the primed identity in order to minimize negative reactions to the primed identities that were observed in Study 1.

**Particularism treatment.**

Immediately following the identity treatment, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions of the particularism treatment. All of the respondents were asked to read a newspaper editorial. Both versions of the editorial described an economically depressed town called Spencerville and proposed remedies for the town’s problems. One version (the ‘black town’ condition) described the town as predominantly black. The second version (the ‘white town’ condition) described the town as predominantly white. The town’s decline was described as partly a result of unfair political processes and decisions (the town received fewer economic development resources than surrounding communities); today the town is faced with diminished opportunity despite the general prosperity of the late 1990s. Both of the editorials end by advocating some form of federal spending and programs to help the town (see Appendix B for the complete text of the editorials).

The editorial avoids any explicit mention of whether the residents of Spencerville are lazy or hard working (as if such a generalization about an entire town could be valid). If the stereotype of laziness, which Gilens (1999) finds to be such a potent predictor of welfare policy preferences, was summoned by the editorial, it was a result of inferences by the respondents.

The experiment concluded with a post-test that measured the policy preferences that served as dependent variables. The post-test began with a statement that said a local

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35 The manipulations were subtle, perhaps too subtle. As readers can see, only two out of about 820 words were changed in the editorials.

36 This is meant to serve as an allegory of some of the experience of the African-American community. Unfair and discredited political practices (slavery, Jim Crow) put them in a disadvantaged position. Today, many controversies of race center on finding the appropriate ways to redress for these wrongs and the best ways to improve blacks’ future opportunities.
organization, the Spencerville Development Board (SDB), crafted a series of recommendations for how to put Spencerville back on its feet.

Immediately following the particularism treatment, the respondents were asked a series of question about whether they support various recommendations of the SDB. Some were policy prescriptions such as universities making an extra effort to admit students from Spencerville. Some were taxation questions that began with the same stem as the School Tax Experiment, ‘Would you be willing to have your taxes raised in order to …’ As in study 1, this question stem sets a high threshold for support. In addition to explicitly mentioning that money is going to be spent on the attempt to fix Spencerville, the stem asks whether the respondent herself is willing to have her taxes raised. The text of the items used in this paper are in Appendix B. Since the respondents overwhelmingly live in North Carolina, and the editorial mentioned that Spencerville is in Illinois, there is very little reason why a narrowly self-interested respondent would support the requested spending.

The dependent variable was a scale of support for the policies proposed by the SDB. The 10-item scale created was created from several of the items that proposed remedies for Spencerville's poverty and asked the respondents if they would be willing to have their taxes raised to support those remedies. This policy attitudes scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .89 and was recoded to range from zero to one.

Experimental Results

Race of town treatment.

There are at least two ways to think about the race of town treatment. One is to focus on the comparison between a black town and a white town *per se*. Another is to think more generally, and focus on whether the predominant race of the town matches or differs from the
The following analyses are based on the match/mismatch aspect of the treatment because it fits more closely with Gaertner et al.'s CIIM (1999). In their model, the relationship of the respondent to the resource is the critical question, not the race of the respondent.

Figure 9 shows the effect of the race of town treatment in the full sample and by race of respondent. In the full sample, the mean support for the index barely varies ($M_{s} .59$ v. $M_{s} .62$, n.s.) across the race of town treatment. However, the reaction was quite different for whites and nonwhites. Nonwhites were much more supportive of the policies in the index when the town matched their racial self-identification ($M_{s} .71$ v. $M_{s} .54$, $t = 2.14$ $p<.05$). The interaction between race of town match and race of respondent was statistically significant ($b = -.20$, $p < .05$).

Identity treatment.

Figure 10 shows results from the identity treatment. Looking at the sample as a whole, there is barely any difference across identity conditions ($M_{s} .61$ v. $M_{s} .59$, n.s.). Again we see a sharp difference between white and nonwhite respondents. After being asked to write some sentences about positive aspects of America's past and future, whites show no significant difference compared to those who were not given an identity task ($M_{s} .63$ v. $M_{s} .58$, $p = .22$, n.s.). The identity treatment does not create significant differences among nonwhites either ($M_{s} .54$ v. $M_{s} .68$, $p = .24$, n.s.). The interaction between race of respondent and identity treatment is significant at the .10 level ($b = -.19$, $p = .07$).

Race of town and identity interactions.

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37 Nonwhite and nonblack respondents were always coded as non-matches.
The original hypothesis driving this experiment was that particularism would decrease support for the Spencerville programs and that identity would remove or reverse this penalty (i.e., an interaction between the two treatments). From study 1, I was particularly interested in the degree to which whites apply particularism even-handedly. As mentioned earlier, the two treatments make particularism constant in order to isolate the effect of race of town and the extent to which identity salience can overcome the particularism and/or race of town effects.

Figure 11 shows that this expectation is borne out, but not in the expected portion of the population. Part of the interest in identity, especially American national identity, stems from its potential to serve as a bridging identity.

Against expectations based on study 1, the right panel of figure 11 shows that whites were unresponsive to the American identity task. Nonwhites, on the other hand, were extremely responsive to the identity treatment, and were uneven in their application of particularism in the control identity condition. When given the control (i.e., no identity treatment at all) treatment, there is a massive difference between support for the programs when Spencerville is described as white and when it is described as black (Ms .31 v .82, p < .01). In the American identity condition, there is little difference across the different towns (Ms .67 v .69, n.s.). Running a regression with the treatments and race of respondent entered, two-way interactions among these three variables, and a threeway interaction term among all three, every coefficient is significant at p < .05.

These results suggest that nonwhites are more influenced by American identity than whites. It is also worth noting that most of the flattening of the particularism slope is caused by an increase in support for the mismatched town (i.e. the white version of Spencerville for these
nonwhite respondents), rather than a decrease in support in the matching condition. However, it is important to treat these results with caution and as preliminary. The nonwhite means are based on roughly 20 observations spread across 4 conditions.

Testing the Construct Validity of a Measure of Particularism

Past research on particularism has relied on experimental manipulations. To my knowledge, there is no scale of policy particularism. In order to work toward creating such a scale, I created an item designed to directly measure people’s evaluation of policy particularism. Question 26 of the pre-test asked, “Some people say that it’s wrong to have the federal government spend tax money on just one group of people. Other people say that there are times when only a specific set of people has a problem and those problems need specific solutions. How about you, do you agree with the first statement, the second statement or is your opinion somewhere in between these two?” The analyses that follow are drawn only from white respondents.38

According to the correlations reported in table 2, particularism appears to be more of a value than an ideological or policy position. It is highly correlated with egalitarianism and humanitarianism. Even though particularism was intended to be a different construct than racial resentment (Sniderman and Carmines 1997), it also highly correlated with racial resentment. It is also correlated with interpersonal trust (measured with the three widely-used GSS items).39 The particularism item and the other value scales were coded to range from zero to one in order to get

38 Future work will extend these analyses to nonwhites. Whites and nonwhites did not significantly differ on the particularism question that is discussed in the next section (Ms .32 and .35 respectively). Preliminary analyses show that the models in table 1 change little when nonwhites are included.

39 Interpersonal trust shows some promise for disentangling particularism from these other constructs. In this sample, trust is not significantly related to egalitarianism, racial resentment, ideology, and party identification, but it is significantly related to humanitarianism and particularism.
a sense of relative effect size. Unstandardized regression coefficients suggest that particularism is most strongly related to humanitarianism. Interestingly, particularism is only weakly related to ideological self-placement (b = .04, p = .03), and it is not reliably related to party identification.\footnote{This result could be an artifact of a lack of variation in the data. The sample was skewed heavily toward liberals. 73\% of the respondents self-identified as liberal to some degree. Only about 14\% of the sample self-identified as conservative.}

Particularism was also not reliably related to retrospective economic evaluations (both pocketbook and national), and was weakly related to prospective judgments of the national economy (b = .13, p = .09).

The next logical step is to test whether particularism affects policy attitudes, and whether whites apply the principle of particularism equally to blacks and whites. The particularism item is correlated with the policy scale at -.24 (p < .01) for the entire sample and -.23 (p = .02) for the white respondents. With both scales coded to range from zero to one, the unstandardized beta of particularism is -.18 (p < 01) for the entire sample and -.17 (p = .02) for the white respondents. Its effect size among white respondents is much smaller than racial resentment (-.41), egalitarianism (b =.61), and humanitarianism (b =.63), but overall, particularism is a reliable predictor of the policy items scale.\footnote{Throughout this discussion of the particularism measure, it is important to keep in mind that this single item is being compared against extensively developed multi-item scales with good psychometric properties (i.e., egalitarianism, humanitarianism (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996)).}

This brings us back to Sniderman and Carmines's critical point, that particularism is a source of general opposition and does so regardless of the race of the beneficiaries. Table 3 shows how particularism and other principles influenced whites' attitudes toward the proposed remedies. Models 1 and 2 show that particularism's effect varies depending upon whether Spencerville was described as white or black. When the target is a white town, particularism
does not reliably influence the amount of support, but for a black town higher levels of particularism diminish support for the proposed remedies.

[Table 3 about here]

Since particularism is related to racial resentment and part of the goal of the construct is to provide different insights than racial resentment, particularism was also compared to racial resentment. Models 3 and 4 show that racial resentment performs as expected and has the same pattern as particularism: no influence when the aid is for a white town, but a strong influence when the aid is for a black town (moving the full range of racial resentment is predicted to move respondents over 50% of the range of the dependent variable).

Models 5 and 6 show particularism and racial resentment entered simultaneously. The coefficients on racial resentment barely change, but particularism's coefficient in the black town condition sinks to insignificance. This suggests that racial resentment mediates (Baron and Kenny, 1986) the effect of particularism in the black town condition and neither variable influences willingness to aid the white town. Two-stage least squares also support this notion. Running each on the other suggests that particularism influences racial resentment (b = .77, p = .03), but racial resentment has no influence on particularism (b = .12, p = .583).42

Models 7 and 8 add egalitarianism, humanitarianism, interpersonal trust, and party identification. In these models, both particularism and racial resentment are crowded out by the new additions and sink to insignificance. These models show an interesting relationship between egalitarianism and humanitarianism. Humanitarianism and egalitarianism are both positively signed for both the white and the black towns, but they differ in statistical significance. Humanitarianism is significantly related to support when the town is white, but is about half as

42 Based on table 1, party identification served as the instrument for racial resentment and interpersonal trust served as the instrument for particularism.
strong in the *black* town condition. Egalitarianism is significantly related to support when the town is *black*, but is about half as strong in the *white* town condition. This bolsters Feldman and Steenbergen's (2001) contention that egalitarianism and humanitarianism serve different roles in policy attitudes and both constructs are needed to understand public opinion toward social welfare policies.

Finally, self-reported ideology is added to create models 9 and 10. Ideology itself is not statistically significant, but adding it to the models increases the coefficient on humanitarianism in the white town condition. Additionally, interpersonal trust, which hovered on the edge of statistical significance in model 8, achieves a reliably positive relationship with the policy index in the black town condition. Controlling for ideology also reveals an effect for party identification. Democrats are more likely to support the remedial programs in both the white and the black versions of the town.43

*Study 2: Discussion*

The unexpectedly uneven performance of the experimental treatments raises several questions about future research in this area. Specifically, the role of automaticity and the meaning of different identities need to be explored (Huddy 2001). Mendelberg's (2001) experiments show that when the racial implications of policy decisions are made explicit, the norm of racial equality blocks the effects of racial resentment. When race is introduced into a decision implicitly, racial resentment can become an important contributor to people's decisions. The evidence in this experiment is mixed. The race of the town, which was an explicit (but subtle) cue, did affect the degree to which certain values (most notably, racial resentment and particularism) affected people's policy decisions. However, the race of town treatment did not

43 The ideology and party identification items are on their original 1 – 7 scale. Higher values represent conservatives and Republicans respectively.
cause significant differences in policy support in the overall sample. The race of town treatment
did cause significant differences in non-whites's support for the proposed policies. This sharp
difference between whites and non-white suggests that social desirability is playing some role.
Perhaps the norm of racial equality, historical injustices and the predominantly liberal ideology
of the white subjects in this sample are overwhelming the particularism and identity treatments.
It would be useful to repeat this experiment on a more ideologically balanced sample.

Conclusion

Patriotism surged after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. American flags,
‘United We Stand’ bumper stickers, and other displays of American national identity became
ubiquitous. Popular culture and journalistic commentary was filled with references to
Americans’ new attachment to their identity as Americans. Some wondered how impulses
toward exclusion and impulses toward inclusion would be affected by the strengthened
attachment to American identity.

Either an increase in inclusion or exclusion would be plausible. Serious external threats
can exacerbate internal conflicts (e.g., Japanese internment and McCarthyism), and increased
threat is one of the most potent sources of intolerance (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and
and cause them to unite against a common enemy. When people unite, other disputes are
deemphasized (Traugott et al., 2002; Klinkner 1999; Kramer and Brewer 1984).

This research finds that priming American identity erased the difference between whites’
support for tax increases on behalf of the public schools and support for improving educational
opportunities for minorities for those who felt close to other Americans. In this case, the
evidence supports research from social psychology that shows that attachment to broader identities reduces intergroup bias rather than with theories that predict that raising the salience of national identity would lead to hostility toward outgroups. The general point that broader identities changing the perception of distributional policies also fits with research in political science that suggests that broader political units can reduce ethnic conflict when properly designed (e.g., Horowitz 1985). By no means does this research dispute that nationalism can lead to intolerance, but it does serve as a reminder that national identification can also be a force for inclusion.

These results also have interesting implications for the study of race and politics. When respondents’ bonds to their ethnicity or race (both of which are subgroup categories) are uppermost in their minds, the pattern observed by Sniderman and Carmines (1997) emerges: the broader goal of improving the public schools generates more support among whites than the narrower goal of improving educational opportunities for minorities.\(^{44}\) This finding is easily extended to the pessimistic conclusion that racially-relevant programs are always vulnerable if they are particularistic, and that targeted programs will always struggle. From this, one could conclude that public policy can only advance racial equality as a byproduct of broad programs and policies, and that principles are ignored if they lead to intergroup transfers.

However this research finds that when people are reminded of a legitimate superordinate identity that subsumes racial differences, and they do not reject that identity, the particularism effect can be erased. Further, closing the gap did not come at the expense of support for a broader program. This suggests that it is not just a matter

\(^{44}\) Note that these findings are also consistent with Sniderman and Carmines’ (1997) Helping Hand Experiment. In that study, a proposal to aid African-Americans generated more support than a proposal to support ‘new immigrants from Europe.’ These findings also suggest a similar point about national identity, namely that the bonds of common nationality can be as strong or stronger than the division of racial difference. Additionally, this is congruent with their finding that universal justifications for aid are more popular than specific or compensatory justifications.
of who benefits from programs, but a matter of the perceived relationship between a person bearing costs and the beneficiaries. A reminder of common nationality appears to blunt the distributional implications of targeted programs, perhaps by changing the perception of the program from a zero-sum transfer to one of a more cooperative relationship enhancing the shared national community.
Appendix A

MMIS: Question Wording

Identity Treatment:  
And now I have a few questions about other topics.

Subgroup (Identity=0):  
First, how close do you feel to your ethnic or racial group … very close, somewhat close, not very close or not at all close?

Superordinate (Identity=1):  
First, how close do you feel to other Americans … very close, somewhat close, not very close or not at all close?

Willingness to Raise Taxes:  
Public Schools (Particularism=0):  
Some people have said that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How willing would you be to have your taxes raised to improve education in public schools … very willing, somewhat willing, not very willing, or not at all willing?

Minority Opportunity (Particularism=1):  
Some people have said that taxes need to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How willing would you be to have your taxes raised to improve educational opportunities for minorities … very willing, somewhat willing, not very willing, or not at all willing?

MMIS: Sampling

The MMIS’s sampling frame was the 7 county Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota. By drawing cases from Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott and Washington counties, this survey was a random sample of a metropolitan area with approximately 2.5 million residents.

The sample was drawn from households by using random digit dialing (RDD). Business numbers were excluded from the sample. According to the Minnesota Center for Survey Research (MCSR) “Selection of respondents occurred in two stages: first a household was randomly selected, and then a person was randomly selected for interviewing from within the household. The selection of a person within a household was done using the Most Recent Birthday Selection Method. ... These selection procedures guaranteed that every telephone
household in the metropolitan area had an equal chance to be included in the survey, and that once the household was sampled every adult had an equal chance to be included."

The interviewing was conducted by interviewers who were trained in general interviewing techniques and were also specifically trained in administering the MMIS (most of the interviewers had previous experience; for at least one of the interviewers, the MMIS was the first time they had done interviews for MCSR). The interviewers used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). This allowed the computers to ensure random assignment of respondents to our various experimental conditions. Supervisors monitored some of the interviews. Additionally, supervisors called some of the respondents some to verify that the respondents were indeed surveyed. In all cases, the respondents confirmed that they had been interviewed. The total number of cases was 407 for a response rate of 64%. Interviews were conducted in July and August of 1998.
Identity Treatments

*Ethnic/Racial*

43) Many ethnic and racial groups are interested in their contributions to history. Looking back, what are some of the positive contributions that your ethnic or racial group has made? Please write 3 to 5 sentences.

44) Many ethnic and racial groups are interested in their future. Looking ahead, what are some of the positive contributions that your ethnic or racial group can and/or should make? Please write 3 to 5 sentences.

*American Identity*

43) Many countries are interested in their contributions to history. What are some of the positive contributions that Americans have made? Please write 3 to 5 sentences.

44) Many countries are interested in their future. Looking ahead, what are some of the positive contributions that Americans can and/or should make? Please write 3 to 5 sentences.
Race of Town Treatments

By W. P. GRIFFITH

My column today is about a bill that is making its way through Congress even as you read this. The purpose of the bill is to get the struggling community of Spencerville, Illinois on its feet. For those of you not familiar with it, Spencerville is a medium sized community in Morris County, which is in central Illinois. Today, Spencerville is a poor, predominantly white community with far more unemployment, more poverty, more crime and fewer businesses than the surrounding towns.

This whole part of Illinois used to be poor and underdeveloped. Then, several years ago, investment from the federal and state government poured into this area. For the rest of the towns, those resources were all they needed. New roads, tax breaks, low interest loans for businesses (even some enterprise zones), and betters schools were paid for by Washington and Springfield and those towns never looked back. They diversified their economies, new businesses sprang up, and the towns have grown nearly every year since. Today those are the towns that people want to live in. Spencerville did not receive any of this investment and it is poor and people don’t want to live there.

Now that it has fallen behind, people think of the town and its residents differently, more negatively. Take for example, the story of Oscar Jones. Mr. Jones, who now owns six profitable McDonald’s restaurants, remembers when he opened his first restaurant. He came across a Time magazine article about doctors and lawyers who were leaving their practices to open McDonald’s restaurants.

“I decided to give it a shot,” Mr. Jones said, “and I was accepted into the McDonald’s franchise owners’ training program.” Upon completing his training, he said, “I was told I could go anywhere, and Spencerville was where I wanted to go.”

The company had just built the Southgate store, at the corner of a shopping center, and Mr. Jones agreed to take it on. But he needed a loan to buy the franchise.

“Banks here did not want to give me a loan, even though I had solid financial statements,” he said. "Fortunately, I had a cousin who was a bank president in Chicago, so I went there to get it. I’m just a regular guy trying to make it as an entrepreneur. It happened again just a couple of years ago, even though I was successful with my first 4 restaurants; I still had to go outside the county for the financing for my newest two. Why is it that I can’t get a loan in my own community even after I had paid back the loan from the bank that did believe in me? With the way things are, an honest white guy in Spencerville just can’t make it.”

The town is also hurting for jobs. People from Spencerville have a bad reputation in the prosperous towns that surround it. Business owners and managers are reluctant to hire the people from Spencerville because they worry about them being ineffective, unreliable and perhaps even troublesome employees.

Spencerville has put together an impressive plan for pulling itself out of its doldrums. The town appointed a new board, the Spencerville Development Board (SDB), and it has come up with a well designed plan for getting the town on its feet. There are several reasons why this board has worked well. First, everybody in the town was represented on the board; this wasn’t one of those situations where only one set of interests got their people on the board. And everybody was treated with respect, it didn’t matter if people were on the board because they were lawyers or a regular person representing their neighborhood, everybody said what they had to say and put in their two cents. It was refreshing to see how level the playing field was in the board’s discussions. There weren’t any backroom deals, everybody’s opinion was heard and they hashed out a set of recommendations that everybody agreed to.

Now all the SDB needs is the money and clout to put it into practice. There is a bill in Congress now that asks the federal government to supply the funds and make the policy changes needed to carry out the board’s plan.

I say the only way that this town is going to get any better is to change the way things are going. We ought to make sure that everyone has an equal chance to succeed, and the present prosperity is the perfect time to right the wrongs that Spencerville faced in the past. This plan should be implemented so that we can root out the sources of Spencerville’s poverty and get the town on its feet. As we saw with Mr. Jones, it’s possible to succeed in Spencerville once people get started; it just happens to be very difficult to get the ball rolling here. Congress should fund the board’s plan.
Text of Black Spencerville Condition

By B. P. GRIFFITH

My column today is about a bill that is making its way through Congress even as you read this. The purpose of the bill is to get the struggling community of Spencerville, Illinois on its feet. For those of you not familiar with it, Spencerville is a medium sized community in Morris County, which is in central Illinois. Today, Spencerville is a poor, predominantly black community with far more unemployment, more poverty, more crime and fewer businesses than the surrounding towns.

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APPENDIX B:  
STUDY 2 QUESTION WORDING

PRE-TEST:  
Particularism  
26) Some people say that it’s wrong to have the federal government spend tax money on just one group of people. Other people say that there are times when only a specific set of people has a problem and it those problems need specific solutions. How about you, do you agree with the first statement, the second statement or is your opinion somewhere in between these two?

POST-TEST:  
Spencerville Policy Index Items  
45) The federal government should see to it that people from Spencerville are guaranteed jobs.

46) The federal government should see to it that colleges and universities *give preferences* in admissions to people from Spencerville.

47) The federal government should see to it that colleges and universities *make an extra effort* to admit students from Spencerville.

50) Would you be willing to have your taxes raised to improve the public schools in Spencerville?

51) Would you be willing to have your taxes raised in order to provide job training for the people of Spencerville?

52) Would you be willing to have your taxes raised in order to provide tax breaks for businesses that relocate to Spencerville?

53) Would you be willing to have your taxes raised in order to provide tax breaks for new businesses started in Spencerville?

54) Would you be willing to have your taxes raised in order to supply low interest loans for people to start businesses in Spencerville?

56) Some people believe that the government in Washington should increase spending to help people from Spencerville to get more jobs. Others believe that people from Spencerville should take care of their own problems. How about you? Do you think the government should do more or do you believe that people from Spencerville should rely only on themselves, or are you somewhere in between?

57) In general do you agree with or disagree with the recommendations made by the Spencerville Development Board?
Table B.1

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Note: Respondents could choose more than one race
References


StataCorp. 2003. *Stata Statistical Software: Release 8.0*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Experiment Only</th>
<th>Model 2: Full Model</th>
<th>Model 3: Trimmed Model</th>
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Notes: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data are from respondents who self-identified as whites and as US citizens in the 1998 Minnesota Multi-Investigator Survey (MMIS). Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Construct Validity of Particularism Question (N = 127, p values in parentheses, white respondents only)

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### Table 3: Particularism, Values, and Support for Spencerville Programs (white respondents)

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Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Figure 1: Theoretical Map of Subgroup and Superordinate Identities and the Operationalization of These Identities

Theoretical Identity Map

Operational Identity Map

Subgroup 1
Subgroup 2
Superordinate Identity

American National Identity

White Americans
African-Americans
Figure 2: Identity Treatments
Figure 3: Assignment to Experimental Conditions

Assignment to Identity Condition

Subgroup

Close to Ethnic/Racial Group?

Particular

Minority Opportunity (N=87)

Broad

Public Schools (N=87)

Superordinate

Close to Other Americans?

Particular

Minority Opportunity (N=83)

Broad

Public Schools (N=91)
Figure 4: Mean Support for Tax Increase
by Identity Treatments

Self-Identified white US citizens from the 1998 MMIS

Mean Support for Tax Increase

Ethnic Group

0.48

Other Americans

0.54
Figure 5: Mean Support for Tax Increase
by Particularism Treatments

Self-Identified white US citizens from the 1998 MMIS
Figure 6: Mean Support for Tax Increase
by Particularism and Identity Treatments

Mean Support for Tax Increase

Ethnic Group
Other Americans

Public Schools
Minority Opportunity

Self-Identified white US citizens from the 1998 MMIS
Figure 7: Mean Support for Tax Increase by Particularism and Successful Identity Treatments

Self-Identified white US citizens from the 1998 MMIS
Figure 8: Probability of Supporting Tax Particularism Treatment by Identity Condition and Compliance

Identity Condition = Racial or Ethnic Group

Embrace Identity

Rejection Identity

Identity Condition = Other Americans

Particularism Condition Panel 1

Particularism Condition Panel 2

Particularism Condition Panel 3

Particularism Condition Panel 4

Self-Identified white US citizens from the 1998 MMIS
Mean Support for Spencerville Programs
By Identity Treatment, Race of Respondent, and Race of Town

Figure 11: Support for Spencerville Programs
By Identity Treatment, Race of Respondent, and Race of Town

Identity: Control
By Race of Town:
Full Sample and by R’s Race

Identity: Americans
By Race of Town:
Full Sample and by R’s Race