What's Wrong with Tonkin Gulf Incident "History" at 49
by Jim Treanor

Prevailing historical and public opinion holds that the reported night attack in the Tonkin Gulf by North Vietnamese PT boats on the American destroyers USS Maddox (DD-731) and USS Turner Joy (DD-951) on August 4, 1964 never occurred and that the resulting Tonkin Gulf Resolution which authorized the escalation of U.S. participation in the Vietnam war was based on a false premise. This view is based largely on two written works considered to be the standard references on the events of that night--Edwin E. Moise's *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*¹ and National Security Agency historian Robert J. Hanyok's 2001 *Cryptologic Quarterly* article, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Tonkin Gulf Mystery, 2-4 August 1964”—and an assertion by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the 2003 film documentary, *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*.

Moise's book is at first blush impressive in terms of its scope and the exhaustive detail it musters to make its case that weather conditions in the Tonkin Gulf, reflections off ocean waves, schools of fish near the surface, or the flight of seagulls misled USS Turner Joy's radarmen into interpreting “phantom” radar images as genuine contacts. But the work is a victim of questionable assumptions and selective methodology which render its account incomplete and its resulting analysis flawed. Hanyok's article relies on U.S. intercepts of North Vietnamese radio communications traffic and radar emissions (collectively known as “SIGINT”) as its primary sources to assert that the reported attack did not occur and that the handling of the intercepted messages was improperly manipulated to support the report of an attack when NSA presented its findings to the Lyndon Johnson White House. But Hanyok's account is flawed in its assumption that the intercepted traffic “proves” that no attack occurred on 4 August. McNamara's terse assertion ignores contrary evidence, some of which was obtained by his own team of fact finders.

What follows is a critical analysis of the Moise and Hanyok accounts and the McNamara assertion. My comments reflect in part my perspective as USS Turner Joy's Electronics Materiel Officer at the time of the incident. My General Quarters assignment that night was as Radar Control Officer in the destroyer's Combat Information Center (CIC), tasked with evaluating the "friendly" or "bogey" status of contacts acquired by our SPS-29 air search radar. In performing that assignment I was seated at a radar repeater near both the Dead Reckoning Tracer (DRT) on which the movement of the ship and all surface contacts (including USS Maddox) was being plotted and the Radarman Chief responsible for providing shipboard air control to supporting aircraft.

**Background**

Tasked with gathering electronic intelligence in an operation designated the DESOTO Patrol, USS Maddox commenced steaming in international waters off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on July 31, 1964 with special intercept equipment and technicians aboard. The patrol was under the tactical command of Captain John J. Herrick, USN, Commander of Destroyer Division 192. On the afternoon of 2 August Maddox was attacked in the Tonkin Gulf by a squadron of North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats. Supported by aircraft from the carrier
USS Ticonderoga, Maddox repelled the attack without sustaining casualties and suffered only inconsequential material damage, a single bullet. The captain of one of the three attacking PT boats was killed in the action.

The Forrest Sherman-class destroyer USS Turner Joy, then on radar picket duty at the northern end of the South China Sea, was ordered to join up with Maddox, and the two ships rendezvoused on the evening of 2 August. The DESOTO Patrol resumed the next morning near the North Vietnamese coast with Maddox about 1000 to 2000 yards ahead of Turner Joy. The August 3rd patrol was relatively uneventful, although a heavy concentration of fishing and cargo junks in the path of the destroyers required careful maneuvering and prompted concern by Turner Joy's General Quarters officer of the deck, Lieutenant Jerry Palmer, that one or more junks could get close enough to plant Claymore mines or other explosive devices on the destroyer's hull. That evening, the destroyers proceeded out into the gulf for night steaming.

The destroyers followed the same routine on 4 August, patrolling near the North Vietnamese coast during daylight. The weather had worsened, and junk traffic had slackened considerably. At around sunset, the destroyers secured from General Quarters and headed east to their night steering area near the center of the gulf. Following receipt of a message warning of possible hostile action the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy returned to General Quarters. Radar contacts were detected northeast of the ships' position. Shortly thereafter, the contacts were taken under fire for two hours in action reported as an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against the destroyers. Supplementing the radar contacts were visual sightings by Turner Joy crew members of a number of phenomena indicating a PT attack.

The Moise Book

Radar “Phantoms”

Historian Moise's no-attack scenario rests in part on the oft-cited theory of atmospheric-, wave-reflection-, or seabird-caused radar "phantoms," a phenomenon known as the “Tonkin ghost,” triggering the reporting by USS Turner Joy's radarmen of contacts approaching Maddox and Turner Joy at high speed that night. What Moise and others who propound that theory have failed to do, however, is to distinguish between the operating characteristics (such as frequency, pulse width, and pulse repetition rate) of Turner Joy's SPS-10 surface search radar and those of the Mark 35 fire control radar employed in the ship's fire control systems (Directors 51 and 52) to acquire and lock on to targets. The surface search radar might be "spooked" by atmospherics as well as by the heavy seas and related artifacts which existed that night in the gulf. That was less likely with the fire control radar. There is even less probability that, given the differences in their operating characteristics, both radar types would have acquired and held spurious targets simultaneously for any appreciable length of time.

When, shortly after the incident, I asked Director 52 officer LTJG Wayne Whitmore whether he and his fire control technician might have acquired sea return, whales, bubbles, the ship's wake, or other phenomena that could have created false "contacts" on the Mark 35 fire control radar employed in the ship's fire control systems (Directors 51 and 52) to acquire and lock on to targets. The surface search radar might be "spooked" by atmospherics as well as by the heavy seas and related artifacts which existed that night in the gulf. That was less likely with the fire control radar. There is even less probability that, given the differences in their operating characteristics, both radar types would have acquired and held spurious targets simultaneously for any appreciable length of time.

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Although its normal 30,000-yard acquisition range was reduced by a compromised radar feed horn, Director 51 likewise was able to lock on to the targets acquired by Director 52 and track them out to 15,000 yards, holding rock-solid images.  

One of the spurious-contact theories that Moise has advanced is that what Turner Joy reported as high-speed radar contacts were actually low-flying U.S. carrier aircraft sent out to support it and Maddox once a radio message had been transmitted that warned of an imminent surface attack on the destroyers. That explanation, however, encounters an immediate and insuperable problem. The slowest supporting aircraft that night was the propeller-driven Douglas A-1 Skyraider, nicknamed "Spad," and its stall speed of 68 to 70 knots is considerably higher than the 50-knot maximum speed of the Soviet-designed P-4 PT's and the slower Swatow-class gunboats of the North Vietnamese navy that were reported to have attacked Maddox and Turner Joy. An A-1 traveling at low altitude even just above stall speed (an unlikely scenario under moonless- and overcast-night combat conditions at sea where safety considerations warrant a higher speed) would track across a surface-search radar display at a much faster rate than any Soviet-designed PT of that era and would not be mistaken for a surface vessel by an experienced radar operator.

Moise cites post-Incident instances of carrier-escorting destroyers in the Gulf reporting air contacts as surface contacts as possible evidence that Maddox and Turner Joy made the same mistake on 4 August, but the distance-over-time tracks of the surface radar contacts and the report of one of the A-1 pilots at the scene that night that the aircraft were flying at 150 knots do not bear that possibility out.  

It should also be noted as an indication that Turner Joy's radarmen were not easily spooked that an early apparent surface radar contact, designated "Skunk Sierra", was quickly determined to be weather and scrubbed as a possible threat.
Finally, the popular assertion that *Turner Joy* shot at “phantoms,” seabirds, or—as inelegantly expressed in President Lyndon Johnson’s “dumb, stupid sailors” remark—flying fish that night implies that there were no visual sightings verifying the nature of the surface contacts detected by radar. Aside from the aforementioned torpedo wake (about which more below), there were a number of sightings by personnel at several topside locations of tangible indications of a PT attack. One of the most compelling is what members of the exposed-to-the-elements crew of Mount 32, the aft dual 3-inch/50 gun mount, witnessed in the light provided by an illumination flare dropped by a supporting aircraft. One of them, Boatswain’s Mate Third Class Donald V. Sharkey, reported seeing a PT boat between the destroyer and a flare dropped on its starboard side. The day after the incident he sketched what he had seen, making a drawing of a craft he had never seen before, either live or pictured. It featured the distinctive long bow of the P-4.10 Two other members of the gun crew also reported seeing a PT boat under flare illumination, one of them, Seaman Kenneth E. Garrison, reporting that he held the boat in view for about two minutes.11

There was more. The director operator of *Turner Joy*’s Director 31 reported sighting “what appeared to be a mast with small cross piece in the light of one of our exploding shells” off the destroyer’s port quarter, a configuration consistent with that of the P4 PT.12 Two signalmen reported sighting a light several thousand yards off the starboard bow, a light which did not emanate from *USS Maddox*, which at that point was steaming dead ahead of *Turner Joy*. Through the signal bridge’s large binoculars, Signalman Third Class Gary D. Carroll evaluated the light as a searchlight, noting that it moved around “and at times skyward” as well as making “a couple of sweeps at us [*Turner Joy*]” before going out.13 It should be noted that these petty officers were experienced in distinguishing illumination or signaling lights from other phenomena and that the light was extinguished when a supporting aircraft sent to investigate it approached its source. In addition, crew members reported black smoke rising from a target taken under fire and automatic weapons fire originating from a surface craft not the *USS Maddox*.

Complementing the sightings by *Turner Joy* personnel, two Marine thirty-caliber machine gunners aboard *Maddox* observed a light they interpreted as a small-craft cockpit light pass up the port side and then down the starboard side of that destroyer, while a Navy gunner’s mate manning a machine gun aft of the signal bridge reported seeing the outline of a boat silhouetted by exploding three-inch bursts being fired at it.14

Given the dismissiveness accorded by historians to on-scene witnesses, it is pertinent to indicate the circumstances and conditions under which that eyewitness testimony was acquired aboard *Turner Joy*. In order to obtain information that was both first-impression fresh in the mind of participants and untainted by the possibility that crewmen could discuss their observations with each other prior to testifying, the ship’s executive officer, LCDR Robert Hoffman, interviewed key personnel, including those who witnessed the torpedo wake discussed below, immediately after the destroyer secured from General Quarters on the night of the incident.15 Despite suggestions in some historical accounts, that first-impression testimony by crew members was remarkably consistent, with observations made at one GQ station complementary to and reinforcing those reported at another.
The Moise history misses the boat on another key issue, namely whether or not any torpedoes were actually fired at either of the US destroyers that night. Moise did report what the Turner Joy's forward director (Director 51) officer and his range finder operator described as a high-speed torpedo wake about 500 feet off the destroyer's port side after the two men received a warning of a possible torpedo and left the director to try to get a visual sighting. He also reported that the torpedo wake was seen by the port side lookout and, as indicated earlier, Seaman Bergland, whose position in Director 52 gave him, as Moise acknowledges, “a good view aft and to the sides” of the destroyer. But Moise downplayed those visual sightings, citing the inability of the ship's AN/SQS-23 sonar to detect a torpedo at the time both men reported seeing the wake. He did indicate that the ship's sonar had failed during an exercise to detect a torpedo as well, but he failed to mention the after-action evaluation by a U.S. Seventh Fleet officer, Commander Andy Kerr, an experienced submarine officer familiar with torpedo characteristics, who interviewed the forward director crew for details. When the interviews were concluded, Kerr stated that there was no doubt in his mind that what the director officer, LTJG John Barry, saw was a torpedo wake.

In this context it’s appropriate to quote an excerpt from the official action report, dated 24 August 1964, of Maddox's 2 August daylight engagement with North Vietnamese P4 PT's:

The torpedoes fired by the DRV P-4 boats were easily avoided since they were launched at about 27000 yards,* from a relative bearing 150, and they were set shallow enough so the wakes could be seen. One was running on the surface but it was not porpoising. Their wakes permitted the conn to judge the time to turn and course to change to in order to evade. Sonar did not hear the torpedoes even though they passed close aboard (100-200 yards) to starboard. The Maddox was at 27 knots throughout the action. [Emphasis mine.]

* “27000” appears to be a typo, as it is not likely that a torpedo would have been launched at that distant range at that relative bearing.

Note that in this instance more than one torpedo was launched, that Maddox personnel could see their wakes, and that none of them was heard by Maddox's sonar despite their proximity to the destroyer even at the point of closest approach. What we have here is not a case of "one was heard, but the others weren't," a condition where one might argue that a "fluke" obscured the sonar detection of some but not all of the torpedoes launched. The failure to hear any is likely attributable to the fact that Maddox was steaming at 27 knots and creating enough interference with her wake to mask sonar acquisition of the torpedoes. During the reported action on the night of 4 August, Turner Joy was steaming at 30 knots.

It is surprising that Moise did not take Maddox's 2 August experience explicitly into account in his discussion of the inability of Turner Joy's sonar to detect the torpedo whose wake was reported by that destroyer's personnel two nights later. That may be because, in a passage questioning an assertion made in Maddox's 4 August action report, he terms Turner Joy's AN/SQS-23 sonar "substantially superior" [emphasis his] to that of Maddox and is reluctant to accept the real-world possibility that Turner Joy's maneuvering astern of Maddox at 30 knots to evade the reported torpedo would have created sufficient disturbance in the water to mask torpedo detection. One other factor Moise did not take into account is that, unlike Maddox's
sonar, *Turner Joy*’s “substantially superior” AN/SQS-23 lacked a passive “hydrophones” capability, rendering it less effective in torpedo detection.¹⁹

**The Stockdale “Best Seat in the House” Assertion**

The reliance of Moise and other historians on the memoir of then-Commander James Stockdale²⁰ is similarly problematic. Commander Stockdale had flown against the North Vietnamese vessels engaged with *USS Maddox* on 2 August and—as he stated in his memoir—knew how to "hose" PT boats. Stockdale reported that when he flew to the scene of the reported action in his F8U fighter on the night of 4 August he saw no evidence—under a moonless overcast and in heavy seas—of any vessels other than the two U.S. destroyers. But it wasn't certain that he could even see *USS Turner Joy*, in part because—and he bragged in his memoir about his "hosing" ability as the reason—he refused to accept shipboard radar control to vector him to any target the destroyer’s radar had acquired, much to the chagrin of Radarman Chief Robert Johnson, who during GQ was the ship’s air support controller. Johnson's chagrin was warranted. Stockdale asked *Turner Joy* to turn on its truck lights so he could see it—thereby illuminating a hostile PT boat’s potential target. And his ability to "see" *Turner Joy* was further in question when he nearly launched what he says in his memoir was a Sidewinder missile at the destroyer.²¹ Note that *Turner Joy*’s length is 418 feet 6 inches, more than six times that of the P-4 PT’s 63-foot length.

How much could the pilots on the scene actually have expected to see in the Tonkin Gulf on August 4th? James A. Barber, a retired Navy captain with nearly 30 years' service as a surface warfare officer, provides a reality-based perspective seemingly ignored by Moise, Hanyok, John Prados, and other historians who put great weight in Stockdale’s account. While Barber sees no reason to question the assertion that aviators on the scene that night “did not see any torpedo boats,” he offers a compelling example of the difficulty they would have had in spotting PT’s—compelling in part because the event he recounts occurred in Vietnamese waters:

> What is worth examination is the assertion “they were certain that they would have seen them had they been there.” [Emphasis Barber’s.] My own experience leads me to doubt this certainty. When we ran night exercises with the Nasty boats [Norwegian-designed PTF’s used by the Navy in Vietnam] from Da Nang, we had much difficulty talking our assigned Combat Air Patrol...onto the targets, despite positive knowledge of the identification and location of the boats. The pilots were unable to locate the targets in the dark a high percentage of the time even when vectored directly on top.²² [Emphasis mine]

Add to that the observation in 2011 of former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward:

> To those who would fall back on the testimony of the airborne observer(s) that he/they saw nothing, and therefore nothing happened, let me proclaim that as an old F8U fighter pilot with more than adequate night flying experience, the odds of even the sharpest eagle eye reliably seeing what was transpiring on the surface of the sea while cruising at 700-1500 feet under a solid overcast on a black night is nil.²³

At that, two pilots flying propeller-driven A-1 attack aircraft on the scene that night did see something in addition to the two U.S. ships. Commander George Edmonson and his wingman,
Lieutenant Jere Barton, reported seeing a “snakey wake” a mile-and-a-half ahead of Maddox, which was the lead destroyer. That is the type of wake a vessel steering an evasive course could be expected to leave behind it. Barton also reported that on a second pass he saw a “dark object” approximately midway between the destroyers, an object which was no longer visible on a subsequent run.

Captain Herrick’s “Doubts”

Moise and others who insist that there was no attack make much of the message expressing doubts sent by the task group commander and Officer in Tactical Command, Captain John J. Herrick, who was aboard USS Maddox that night. They conveniently ignore his final message which explained that he doubted the validity of only some of the contacts, not the fact of an attack. His true assessment at the time is reflected in the following:

1. He submitted an official statement dated 7 August 1964 detailing an engagement with enemy combatants on the night of 4 August;
2. he recommended Turner Joy’s commanding officer, Commander Robert C. Barnhart, Jr., for a Silver Star (Barnhart was awarded the Bronze Star);
3. on 8 August 1964 he sent an unclassified message to USS Turner Joy commending its captain and crew for their performance in the “night action of 4 Aug 1964 against Communist North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats”; and
4. during the first post-Tonkin Gulf Incident underway replenishment of Turner Joy by the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga on which Herrick was aboard and linked via ship-to-ship communication with Barnhart, Herrick was heard by a Personnelman First Class monitoring their conversation on Turner Joy’s bridge to utter, “Thanks, Bob, you saved my ass out there!”—hardly the reaction expected from someone who doubted that combat had taken place.

He followed up these initial actions in February 1968 with testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and subsequent interviews reported in the New York Times, stating on each occasion that there was “no doubt” that an attack had occurred on 4 August.

Critics point to a 1981 interview with journalist Robert Scheer in which Herrick, after reviewing logs of the action, stated that he doubted that an attack had occurred on 4 August 1964. The problem is that the doubts Herrick indicated on that occasion conflict with the judgment of the officer who signed USS Maddox’s deck log that night, the destroyer’s Operations Officer and General Quarters Officer of the Deck, now-retired Commander William Buehler. In a letter published in the April 2008 issue of Naval History, Buehler is unequivocal in his assessment of a Maddox-acquired radar contact approaching at high speed that suddenly turned hard left when it was 6000 yards from and abeam of the destroyer. “We knew it had launched,” states Buehler.

Buehler’s assessment reflects knowledge of a fundamental PT tactic whereby a boat whose maximum speed matches or approximates that of its torpedoes turns away and makes what amounts to a U-turn immediately following launch to avoid a collision with its hot-running “tin fish.” In this instance, Maddox’s hydrophones detected “noise” or a “hydrophone effect” evaluated as a torpedo shortly after and close to the bearing on which the U-turn had been detected. Approximately three minutes later, and following a warning transmitted by Maddox that prompted a standard torpedo evasion maneuver by both destroyers, topside crew on Turner Joy spotted the thin wake described by LTJG Barry as a phosphorescent “vee” originating below
the surface.

"Overeager Sonarmen" and the 26 "Torpedoes"

One further piece of Moise's "evidence"—at least as he has construed it—that an attack did not occur is in fact a breathtaking leap of speculation. The historian's contention is that although the reported 4 August 1964 engagement lasted some two hours, the torpedo payload aboard the number of P4 PT boats reported as attackers should have been expended in 20 minutes. That scenario might apply in ideal conditions such as those presented in primitive video games where the target is always visible, moving on a predictable course at a constant speed, and not firing on the attacker, forcing the latter to adjust course, speed, and tactics to avoid being hit. The 4 August engagement was a night action with the PTs' targets maneuvering evasively at 30 knots and, in *Turner Joy*'s case, taking the attackers under fire with two five-inch guns, each of which could unleash upwards of 40 rounds per minute, as well as rolling shallow-set depth charges at various points to keep the attackers at bay. The attack problem the Chinese-trained PT commanders were confronted with was considerably more complex and fluid than a game of Pong.

A related issue which has generated considerable skepticism about the 4 August incident is the number of “torpedoes”—up to 26—reported by *USS Maddox* and attributed to “overeager sonar men.” What really transpired is more complex.

In the wake of the daylight attack on *Maddox* on 2 August, her commanding officer, Commander Herbert L. Ogier, ordered his General Quarters officer of the deck to assume that every hydrophone effect reported by that destroyer’s sonar was a possible torpedo to be evaded accordingly. The OOD indicates that while he could easily evaluate whether a reported hydrophone effect was his own ship’s noise or an artifact generated by low-flying aircraft or *Turner Joy*, he evaded as ordered in every instance, and each such maneuver was reported by radio up the chain of command. Hence, the 26 “torpedoes”, the reporting of which caused Daniel Ellsberg, the Pentagon analyst who was on duty at the time, to doubt the validity of any of the reports of an attack.

The Hanyok Article

Robert J. Hanyok's 55-page *Cryptologic Quarterly* article, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Tonkin Gulf Mystery, 2–4 August 1964,” on the relationship between SIGINT (signals intelligence) and the reported second attack in the Tonkin Gulf is viewed generally as the door slammer on the question of whether what the officers and crew of *Turner Joy* saw, heard, experienced, and reported that night actually occurred, an exclamation point to historian Edwin Moise's thesis that the destroyer's crew members engaged in a trigger-happy atmospherics-induced hallucination. Hanyok's core position can be summed up as follows:

- Content and analysis of communications intercepts by U.S. monitoring stations aboard *Maddox* and in South Vietnam and the Philippines demonstrated that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter DRV) Navy exercised tight command and control prior to, during, and following its attack operations against *Maddox* on 2 August via HF Morse and tactical VHF voice communications;
• ELINT (electronic intelligence or intercepts) of DRV coastal radar emissions and those of vessel-borne Skin Head radars indicated close surveillance of U.S. Destroyer movements on 2 and 3 August;

• DRV radar surveillance slackened to “sporadic” during the day on 4 August;

• No conclusive communications intercept evidence exists of DRV intentions to attack Maddox and Turner Joy on the night of 4 August or of the positioning of vessels to conduct an attack;

• No intercept evidence indicates that the DRV navy had up-to-date information on the location of the destroyers after they steamed eastward away from the coast once the Officer in Tactical Command of the destroyer task group, Captain John J. Herrick, received a message warning of a possible attack;

• DRV P-4 PT's and Swatow-class patrol boats would have had to have sped from their North Vietnamese bases at either Port Wallut or Quang Khe at 70 knots (i.e., well above their top speeds) to reach the position where radar contacts were detected east of Maddox and Turner Joy (i.e., in the direction of China’s Hainan Island) at the time they were first detected that night;

• No SIGINT or ELINT evidence exists that the alleged attackers coordinated, controlled, or executed attacks using either manual Morse communications or Skin Head radars (although Hanyok acknowledges that the intercept by the DSU communications hut aboard Maddox of VHF voice communications would have been masked by the activation of that destroyer's fire control radar).

On the face of it, Hanyok has presented an open and shut case. Well, not quite. Admiral Lloyd Vasey's August 2010 Naval Institute Proceedings article on the Tonkin Gulf Incident rightly criticizes Hanyok's facile dismissiveness of radar and visual eyewitness reports supporting the contention that an attack occurred. But Hanyok's no-attack conclusion is also subject to challenge based on assumptions he makes using SIGINT as essentially a sole-source determinant of what could or couldn't have taken place on the night of August 4th and on a glaring internal inconsistency which appears to be related to that methodology.

Hanyok begins his analysis with a nod to Captain Herrick’s “doubts” and then-Commander Stockdale’s “best seat in the house assertion” as casting doubt on what shipboard eyewitnesses reported. He then posits the correlation of SIGINT and ELINT intercepts received prior to, during, and following the 2 August attack on Maddox with what actually occurred as establishing a profile of DRV command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) that would be followed in the succeeding days as the destroyer patrol plied the Tonkin Gulf. Included in the intelligence component is the DRV's apparent reliance on active radar surveillance, by either coastal radar sites or Skin Head-equipped Swatows, to track the U.S. destroyers.

The intelligence component of such a tight command-and-control C3I profile must of necessity include comprehensive surveillance of any potential enemy. On both 2 and 3 August that profile was maintained, with ELINT intercepts indicating constant radar tracking (on 3 August largely by patrol-boat Skin Head radar shadowing) of Maddox's and Turner Joy's movements. But
Hanyok states that DRV radar surveillance became “sporadic” on 4 August.

Had the DRV suddenly become less interested in the two destroyers?

Hardly. To begin with, Hanyok's assertion that DRV radar surveillance on that date was “sporadic” is at substantial variance with what is reported in Edwin Moise's book on the incident. So is the conclusion contained in a 3 September 1964 NSA report that “The evidence is still inconclusive [about the extent of DRV radar surveillance on 4 August] in light of the virtual absence of trackings on 3-4 August before the second attack.” Moise, based on an interview conducted with Turner Joy radarman Chad James, reports that James “recalls that shore radar locked onto the Turner Joy often during this period” (i.e., on 4 August). This is a recollection that corresponds to my own of hearing numerous “hump freq” callouts—verbal alerts by the radarman manning the passive ECM receiver in Turner Joy's CIC of RF emission intercepts—throughout that day. In addition, Moise notes, Maddox and Turner Joy were shadowed by a Skin Head-equipped vessel (probably a Swatow-class patrol boat) for at least four hours, beginning at somewhere between 0900 and 0930 local time. Finally, Hanyok's own account of events during the daylight hours of 4 August indicates a number of instances of “shadows” being detected throughout the day. Their purpose, as suggested by their reported positions and movements? The logical conclusion is to provide information that enabled the tracking of the movements of the DESOTO patrol destroyers.

In light of this information, why would NSA characterize DRV surveillance activity on 4 August as “the virtual absence of trackings?” And why would Hanyok follow that same line of reasoning despite the countervailing evidence in his own account of indications of substantial tracking activity on that date?

One possibility—a strong one, in my view—is that both the NSA report and Hanyok’s self-contradictory assertion define “tracking” in an extremely narrow sense, namely one confined to DRV radar acquisition of the destroyers that was reported via communications intercepted by the U.S. SIGINT teams in South Vietnam and the Philippines. In other words, if the SIGINT teams didn't intercept messages reporting what was being picked up on DRV radar, the DRV wasn't “tracking” the destroyers.

In view of the tight command, control, communications, and intelligence profile posited in light of the actions of the DRV navy prior to, during, and following the 2 August attack on Maddox, the non-tracking scenario constitutes an extraordinary deviation from previously-observed DRV operational behavior, especially given the presence in near-territorial waters of hostile forces in the form of two U.S. destroyers, one of which the DRV had already engaged in combat just two days before. Moreover, the position taken by both the NSA report and Hanyok's account leads one to wonder if there was a “hole” in U.S. SIGINT capability in 1964, perhaps specifically within Southeast Asia or Vietnam itself. Even more pertinent to a discussion of the events of 4 August 1964, were there DRV military/naval communications that were not intercepted or could not, for whatever reason, be processed, decrypted, translated—or made public?

Absent the ability to access DRV records, if such exist, of all of its naval message transmissions during that period, no conclusive answer to that question can be given. Hanyok reports that on 4 August there was one message communicating to DRV units a several-hours-old position report of Maddox and Turner Joy late in the day, citing this as an indication that the DRV—contrary to the tight C3I profile observed earlier—did not have a good handle on where the destroyers were.
What is not clear from his account, however, is whether this was a retransmission of an earlier, more timely location message not intercepted by U.S. SIGINT when originally sent—or whether it was a “dummy” message the DRV command might expect to be intercepted.

Hanyok reports that no messages were intercepted on 4 August ordering DRV naval commands or units to change their communications frequencies. This buttresses his (and much of the historian community's) argument that the reported 4 August attack never occurred, since no DRV message traffic indicating attack unit dispatch, deployment, approach, execution, or after-action analysis was ever intercepted—on, of course, the frequencies already being monitored by U.S. SIGINT.

But if he and the contemporaneous NSA report postulate “sporadic” tracking by the DRV on that day based, as it appears, primarily on the interception of transmissions on those frequencies when there was demonstrable evidence from other sources of essentially continuous tracking, there are a couple of problems. For one, tracking information is useless if something isn't done with it, and the relaying of timely contact tracking to field commands and units is an essential component of the tight command, control, communication, and intelligence profile attributed to the DRV navy. Not to have communicated that tracking information in a timely manner to pertinent units simply does not seem plausible, especially in the post-2 August environment. Hanyok's suggestion that the DRV naval command had “lost control” of the situation must be measured against the continued presence on 4 August of shadowing Swatows. The second problem, already alluded to, is the disconnect between the unreliability of the “sporadic” assessment and the assumption that U.S. SIGINT had intercepted all pertinent DRV communications transmitted on 4 August.

That assumption lies at the core of two related issues key to the 4 August controversy, namely: (1) the absence of intercepted orders that would have precipitated the movement of DRV P-4 PT's (and possibly Swatows) from their ports in time to reach their reported attack positions well out into the Tonkin Gulf at speeds they could actually achieve; and (2) the absence of message intercepts that would have communicated to the attacking force the positions and tracks of Maddox and Turner Joy after the destroyers had moved eastward away from the North Vietnamese coast and well out into the gulf following the receipt of a message alerting them to a possible attack.

Could the U.S. SIGINT effort have failed by missing or misconstruing a message that ordered a change in DRV operational messaging frequency? Or was it possible that DRV command had communicated frequency change or operational orders either on a frequency not monitored by the U.S. intercept teams or by other means not as easily susceptible to detection?

What Hanyok does not mention is that on the same day that DRV tracking of Maddox and Turner Joy became, in his words, “sporadic,” daylight fishing junk traffic along the DESOTO patrol track reduced to a trickle compared to the heavy junk concentration encountered by the destroyers the day before. Somewhat worsening weather may have accounted for some of the reduction, but for whatever reason the dropoff was dramatic enough to be noticed by Turner Joy bridge personnel. Notably, this traffic was extremely heavy on the day following the 2 August attack on Maddox. Apparently that engagement had not deterred junk masters from taking to the sea off North Vietnam the day after it occurred. Yet on 4 August, most of the junks had virtually melted away. What—or who—had scared them off? And how?
Implicit in Hanyok's characterization of DRV tracking of the DESOTO patrol destroyers on 4 August as “sporadic” is skepticism that the North Vietnamese knew the destroyers' location once they concluded that day's patrol by heading east and ultimately into darkness. But it wouldn't be difficult to determine where the U.S. ships were if the North Vietnamese employed passive ECM (electronic countermeasures) to track the destroyers. Hanyok's only mention of that possibility occurs in the context—a strictly tactical one—of refuting any suggestion that attacking PT's could have used passive ECM to determine a potential target's location, since all the PT commander would have to work with would be a bearing, with no indication of range.

That proposition is true as far as it goes, but it does not rule out the possibility that the DRV could have used land-based passive ECM—a technology not susceptible to SIGINT detection, certainly not in 1964—as an operational (as opposed to tactical) tracking tool.

Consider that both U.S. destroyers possessed surface search and air search radars which, out of operational necessity, were “on” the entire time the ships were in the Tonkin Gulf. The AN/SPS-29 air search radar aboard Turner Joy was capable of detecting air targets well beyond 200 miles away—typically beyond 250 and on a “good” day (i.e., one with the most favorable atmospheric conditions) beyond 275. In order to do so, it had to emit a tremendous amount of RF (radio frequency) energy—enough so that when, during an in-port test of its antenna's rotational movement, the radar itself was inadvertently switched on, it wiped out reception of TV channel 11 in and around Long Beach, California for nearly an hour. Clearly, given its RF emission range, the SPS-29 was susceptible to detection by virtually any passive ECM installation in or around the Tonkin Gulf (including mainland China's Hainan Island across the gulf from North Vietnam).

While Hanyok is correct that detection by a single passive ECM installation will provide only a bearing, detection by two or more installations will provide a fix, the precision of which is determined by the simultaneity of the intercepts, the distance separating the intercepting stations (the wider the separation the better), and the number of stations (the more the better). It's reasonable to assume that, given the length of North Vietnam's coastline, and buttressed by the U.S. ELINT (including DRV emissions intercepted by Turner Joy's passive ECM) indicating a multiplicity of active DRV radar tracking stations and the likely existence of passive ECM intercept stations as well to enable analysis and source identification of the signals being emitted in their direction, the DRV could determine at least the general location and track of the DESOTO patrol even far out into the gulf. (As indicated earlier, Hanyok cites an intercepted late-in-the-day DRV message specifying the patrol's location as of a couple hours' earlier than the message's time stamp, suggesting to him that the North Vietnamese were not aware of the destroyers' current location. Whether that's plausible given all the RF energy being radiated by Maddox and Turner Joy that night is another matter.)

So whatever the validity of the assertion of “sporadic” tracking, the North Vietnamese had the capability to locate and track the two destroyers even when they were well out into the gulf following their daylight coastline patrols. That is a reality that received at least tacit acknowledgment by whoever was privy to SIGINT intercepts on 7 August 1964, two days after the U.S. conducted carrier- and land-based air strikes on North Vietnam in response to reports of the 4 August night attack on Maddox and Turner Joy. At 1409 local time on 7 August, the destroyers patrolling in the Tonkin Gulf received warning of a probable air attack on them that night.
The warning appears to have resulted from a SIGINT intercept indicating that the Chinese were delivering MiG jet fighters to the DRV. That in fact was the case, though it was later established that, following the 5 August U.S. air strikes, the fighter regiment of 36 MiGs was intended for DRV air defense, not offensive operations. What is significant about the alert which prompted the destroyers' return to General Quarters on 7 August is that the warning presupposed the ability of the DRV to locate and track the destroyers sufficiently to direct MiGs to the ships when they were well out into the gulf—and at night.

Much has been made of the alleged inability of either SIGINT stations or the destroyers themselves to detect either communications or radar emissions from the presumably attacking PT boats during the reported engagement. But, as already noted, Hanyok himself acknowledges that the activation of Maddox's fire control radar would have masked the interception of VHF voice communications—the type of communication one would expect between cooperating tactical units in a fluid, fast-moving combat scenario, especially at night—by the SIGINT communications hut installed on that destroyer.

With respect to communications intercepts (COMINT), it's appropriate at this point to mention a 5 December 2005 analysis (approved for release by NSA on 3 January 2006) of Hanyok's article by Louis F. Giles, NSA's Director of Policy and Records. While not disputing Hanyok's conclusion that the reported 4 August attack did not occur, Giles comments:

> Nevertheless, while Mr. Hanyok's analysis of the available COMINT evidence is convincing on its own, the COMINT does not prove that an attack did or did not occur. Unlike the 2 August COMINT where an actual attack message was intercepted, circumstantial evidence and the absence of a 4 August COMINT attack message cannot conclusively prove there was not an attack. [Emphasis mine.]  

In discussing Hanyok's concern over the "unexplained disappearance" of the original decrypted text of a translation of a pertinent intercepted message from NSA's archives, Giles indicates that many original translations of messages from the Tonkin Gulf Incident period are missing. He explains that under the provisions of NSA records disposition schedules which existed at the time (and continue to this day) raw COMINT material was allowed to be destroyed once a final report on its contents was issued. The practical consequence of this, of course, is that the raw primary source material on which the NSA's contemporary assessments were based (and on which in turn subsequent historians' conclusions have been rooted) is not available for examination or evaluation.

The failure to detect Skin Head radar emissions during the reported approach and attacks by the PT's is also not as conclusive as appears at first blush. Quoting Hanyok's own account of the 2 August engagement between DRV P-4's and Maddox: “There is no SIGINT evidence that their Skin Head radars were active, though the Vietnamese claimed their boats used it. Pictures from the action appear to show the radar masts upright and not lowered in a combat position.” [Emphasis mine.]

> “Combat position” refers to a design feature of the P-4's radar-mounting mast which allowed it to be lowered or “folded out of the way.” In that lowered position the craft's Skin Head radar's search and navigation functions were effectively disabled. While that may suggest an operational liability, the feature was actually practical for a couple of reasons. During a high-speed torpedo run in the open sea, the shallow-draft P-4 could be expected to bounce and vibrate significantly,
posing the risk that components of the Skin Head radar would malfunction or fail. In that
eventuality, the radar would be useless, anyway. Shutting down the radar would also eliminate
the possibility that electronic emissions from the craft would give away its bearing to an enemy
listening for such signals on passive ECM equipment.

It is true that the 2 August action was a daylight affair offering good to excellent target visibility
without the use of radar, while the reported 4 August engagement occurred at night, which would
seem to place a premium on the use of radar to acquire a target and launch an attack. But if
SIGINT did not detect Skin Head emissions on 2 August when the Vietnamese said they used
it—and their radar masts were upright—what happens to the no-attack argument based on the
inability of SIGINT or either of the two destroyers to detect Skin Head emissions on the 4th?

So the case put forth by the Hanyok article is not as cut-and-dried as it might seem at first
glance. It is surprising that it has not been subjected to more thorough scrutiny by the historical
community. As a final observation on the Hanyok article, I would refer to a 2 August 1964 DRV
naval command message attempting to abort the attack on Maddox, a message that the Hanyok
article indicates was transmitted but either ignored, missed, or interpreted as superseded by the
subordinate units receiving it. It succinctly summarizes the DRV naval command's assessment of
the existing tactical situation. Whether it also reflects an intention in light of subsequent events is
something I leave to the reader. Note that "135" designates a specific DRV squadron of three P-4
PT boats (the squadron involved in the 2 August battle). The message reads:

Order 135 not to make war by day.38

Secretary of Defense McNamara and “The Fog of War”

In the 2003 film documentary, The Fog of War, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense at
the time of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, states that the original “judgment” that the 4 August attack
occurred was “wrong.” What he cited as evidence for his newfound position was a two-word
phrase. What he omitted was glaring.

Following the incident, eyewitnesses from both destroyers were flown to Subic Bay to be
interviewed by a Department of Defense team headed by Alvin Friedman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Far East and Latin America). The chief
of staff to Commander Seventh Fleet, who sat in on the interviews, was given a copy of the
Defense team’s report following the interviews and noted that it concluded that an attack had
occurred on 4 August.39

The testimony received during that interview process, consisting of the observations of the A-1
pilots who saw a “snakey wake” and the destroyer crewmen who reported a variety of indicators
of a PT attack, constituted the basis for Secretary McNamara’s February 1968 testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee attesting--three-and-a-half years after the event--to the
occurrence of the attack.40

McNamara omits mention of that investigating team, its conclusion that an attack had occurred,
and the pertinent portion of his 1968 testimony in both his 1995 memoir, In Retrospect, and the
2003 film documentary, where he declared that “events afterward” rendered the Johnson
Administration’s judgment about an attack on 4 August “wrong.”41 One such event which shaped
his comment is his November 1995 meeting with North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap,
who, when asked by McNamara what happened on 4 August 1964, responded “absolutely nothing”—a terse, unelaborated-on comment McNamara accepts, uncritically, as coming from a “pretty damned good source.” Based on his comments in his 1995 book—at which time he still deemed the 4 August attack “probable”—the “events afterward” also refer to statements in 1972 by then-National Security Agency deputy director Louis Tordella and in 1984 by Central Intelligence Agency deputy director Ray S. Cline that the intercepted message originally evaluated as the 4 August “attack message” actually referred to the 2 August engagement between USS Maddox and North Vietnamese PT’s. In that same section of the book McNamara also cites then-Commander Stockdale’s assertion that he saw nothing other than the U.S. destroyers on the night of 4 August—without mentioning what the A-1 pilots saw.

The Methodological Problem

There is a common thread which unites the methodology and thrust of the Moise and Hanyok accounts as well as the assertion in 2003 by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that his department’s initial judgment about the 4 August attack was “wrong.” Both authors and the Secretary dismiss, discount, disregard, downplay, or ignore the evidence presented by on-scene participants aboard USS Turner Joy supporting the report of an attack on 4 August. What neither historian acknowledges is that in every instance where an example of the “Tonkin ghost” or similar apparition, whether from 1944 or 1964, has been cited to cast doubt on the validity of the radar contacts acquired by Turner Joy that night, there was no visual sighting to confirm the actual existence of the contact. That is not the case here. There were eyewitnesses on Turner Joy’s maneuvering bridge, on the deck alongside Director 51, in Director 52, and on the signal bridge who saw everything from post-target-explosion smoke to a searchlight to a torpedo wake to a PT silhouette. And there were three topside gunners aboard Maddox who likewise saw substantive evidence of an attack, including in one case the sighting of a vessel silhouette.

Secretary McNamara ignores his own department’s investigating team’s assessment that what the eyewitnesses, including the A-1 pilots, reported was accurate, but rather accepts the absence of NSA intercepts of any North Vietnamese message indicating a 4 August attack as evidence that an attack did not occur. In evaluating that assessment, one should bear in mind the issued-in-2005 caution of the NSA’s own policy and records director against considering the absence of such an intercept as conclusive proof that no attack occurred.

In contrast, the rigor and timing of the initial post-action investigation aboard Turner Joy, the conclusions rendered by both the independent Seventh Fleet and Department of Defense fact finding teams, the explanation of what lay behind the 26 “torpedoes” evaded, the timing of the witnessed torpedo wake’s appearance following the detection of a radar contact’s U-turn, and the day-after sketch of a long-bow P-4 observed during flare illumination warrant far more consideration than has been accorded them. Had there been only one eyewitness who saw only one possible tangible indication of an attack beyond what appeared on radar, it might be possible to dismiss that reported sighting as “evidence.” But that does not apply here. A multiplicity of eyewitnesses at different locations aboard Turner Joy and Maddox saw a variety of credible indications of a night attack on the two destroyers. Ignoring, disregarding, or dismissing their testimony is, at minimum, an unreasonable skewing of the historical account of the 4 August 1964 incident in the Tonkin Gulf.

Endnotes:
1 Edwin E. Moise, *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*, University of North Carolina Press, 1996. For a more cavalier expression of the no-attack position, see Richard Reitano, “LBJ Goes to War,” *OAH Magazine of History*, 18 No. 5 (October 2004), 27, where the author states: “It is now clear that there was no attack on August 4, and the attack, involving a single bullet hole of 'damage', on the Maddox on August 2 was exaggerated by the U.S.”


3 A concern expressed by Palmer to this writer as we steamed astern of *Maddox* during daylight on 3 August 1964.


5 Moise, 107-109. One problem with the seabird theory—and this appears to be a problem no one who supports the theory has addressed—is that it is highly questionable that seabirds would have remained in the vicinity of the ships or continued to fly on a course toward *Turner Joy* once the destroyer opened up with sustained fire from two of its 5”/54 guns. Nonetheless, Moise considers the seabird hypothesis “especially good”, citing an example from 1944 off Okinawa where a submarine's radar tracked clearly-defined radar blips moving at a speed of 24 knots, which his source characterizes as “too close for a plane, too fast for anything but a PT boat—or a hostile seagull.” The problem here is that 24 knots is roughly half the speed at which *Turner Joy* at times tracked the radar contacts which approached it on the night of 4 August 1964.


7 Moise, 169-170.

8 John J. Barry, “Individual Shipmate Incident Report Form for August 4, 1964, April 25, 2011,” 1. This is a response to a questionnaire sent to USS *Turner Joy* crew members who were aboard the destroyer on 4 August 1964.

9 This writer was one of *USS Turner Joy*’s two qualified antisubmarine air controllers tasked with radar monitoring and direction of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft during underway training exercises and actual operations involving the detection and tracking of submarines. I used the AN/SPS-10 surface search radar for this air control function, since Magnetic Anomaly Detection-equipped aircraft (typically the Lockheed P2V Neptune) and sonar-dipping helicopters flew at low-enough altitudes during these operations to be seen on the surface-search display. A helicopter hovering during a sonar-dipping evolution or moving between dipping points could be mistaken for a surface contact if a radar operator were not aware of its presence or function or had not been tracking it as such. But the tracked-by-surface-search-radar movement, and consequent relative speed, of an airplane not being stalled out over the water would clearly distinguish it on a radar screen from a valid surface contact. No helicopters flew in support of the DESOTO Patrol destroyers on the night of 4 August 1964.
Statement of Sharkey, Donald V., BM3, USN, 7 August 1964. This and subsequently cited personal statements of *Turner Joy* crew are viewable at http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/vietnam/tonkin-1.htm#turnerjoy1

Statement of Garrison, Kenneth E., SN, USN, 7 August 1964; Statement of Jones, Delner, GMGSN, 7 August 1964

Statement of Anderson, Arthur B., FTGSA, USN, 7 August 1964

Statement of Carroll, Gary D., SM3, USN, 7 August 1964; Statement of Bacino, Richard M., SM2, USN.


Barry, Incident Report, 3

Statement of LTJG John J. Barry, 7 August 1964; Statement of Larry O. Litton, SN, USN, 7 August 1964. As *Turner Joy*’s Antisubmarine Warfare Officer, Barry had seen torpedoes before during ASW exercises.

Kerr, who had in 1947 experienced the “Tonkin ghost” as temperature inversions that rendered the gulf “a weird place, with frequent radar and visual anomalies,” was at first skeptical upon hearing the initial report of an attack on 4 August. He concluded otherwise following his interviews of *Turner Joy* and *Maddox* crew and a review of pertinent tracks and other records of the action. Andy Kerr, *A Journey Amongst the Good and the Great*, Naval Institute Press, 1987, 177-178. See also Barber, 325-326.

USS *Maddox* "Report of Action, Gulf of Tonkin, 2 August 1964" dated 24 Aug. The entire report can be viewed at http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/vietnam/tonkin-2.htm#maddox002 . Compare Moise’s certainty that “there is ’no way’ the [*Turner Joy*’s] sonar could have failed to pick it [the torpedo whose wake was reported by the Director 51 crew] up.” Moise, 173.

Moise, 174. The torpedo whose wake was observed by *Turner Joy*’s LT(jg) Barry, Seaman Bergland, Seaman Litton, and Seaman Sentel was initially detected by hydrophone and reported by *USS Maddox*.


An apparent discrepancy. What I heard the Radarman Chief responsible for shipboard air control report to the CIC Evaluator (*Turner Joy*’s Executive Officer, Robert Hoffman) was that F-8 pilot Stockdale announced that he was commencing a *Zuni* (rather than Sidewinder) firing
run--an attack aborted when the RDC waved Stockdale off with a frantic "No, no, airplane, you're making your run on us!"

22 Barber, 324. Moise could not have been unaware of Barber's comments, made nine years before the publication of Moise's book. They were originally delivered at a 1987 U.S. Naval Institute-sponsored symposium at which Moise and Navy historian Edward Marolda presented papers on the Tonkin Gulf Incident. Barber, who was then the Institute's Executive Director and Publisher, offered his remarks, including the account of the night exercise with Nasty PTF's, in response to those papers. What is curious is that Moise's book did not reference that particular example, but did cite (on page 157) an observation Barber made about surface-search and fire control radars in those same remarks.

23 Admiral Thomas Hayward, USN, ret., letter to Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2011, 87


25 Memorandum, CTG 72.1 to CTF 77, “Personal Statements of 4 August Action,” 7 August 1964, viewable at http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/vietnam/tonkin-1.htm#personalstate. Note in particular the references to the sound of "torpedo noises" picked up by the sonar stack and the emphatic "However, it is my opinion that certainly a PT boat action did take place." Hanyok and Prados likewise ignore this official statement and instead follow Moise in emphasizing Herrick's "doubts." Hanyok, “Skunks”, 1. Prados, “Essay”.

26 Message CTG 72.1 to USS Turner Joy, DTG 080830Z. Copy addressees on this message were Commander Destroyer Squadron 19, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla 3, and Commander Cruiser Destroyer Force Pacific.

27 Related to me by PN1 Carrell on the day following the underway refueling with USS Ticonderoga. Confirmed to me by Barnhart on 23 September 2010.


30 Buehler, 6. Buehler states that he has not been interviewed “by any Navy source since that time”, i.e., since the immediate post-incident interviews.

31 Vasey, “Tonkin: Setting The Record Straight,” 66-71. As chief of staff to the Commander Seventh Fleet, Admiral Roy Johnson, in August 1964, Vasey was tasked by his superior to conduct an independent investigation to determine what actually happened in the Tonkin Gulf on the night of 4 August. The investigation, which included access to all of the destroyers' eyewitnesses, tracks, logs, and other pertinent documents, concluded that PT's attacked Maddox and Turner Joy. Curiously, in his online bibliography of published material on the Tonkin Gulf Incident, Edwin Moise characterizes Vasey's presentation of the evidence in the article as “very selective, and overly dependent on unreliable secondary sources”--a charge to which Moise himself is not immune.
One earlier such hole, a gaping one, became glaringly evident in April 1962. As recounted in the Hanyok-authored NSA history of U.S. SIGINT operations in Indochina from 1945 to 1975, “the roof fell in on Allied SIGINT operations in South Vietnam when the Viet Cong executed a major, nearly total communications and cryptographic change on their military and political-military networks.” This change reflected “the culmination of a two-year upgrade to communist communications, COMSEC [communications security] procedures, and, more importantly, its codes, ciphers, and associated materials such as authenticators,” a technical and procedural response indicating Hanoi’s recognition of “the threat posed by the high level of American cryptanalysis and the sophistication of its technical intelligence collection.” Robert J. Hanyok, *Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975*, National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History, 2002, 146-147. This is a heavily-redacted history, but even in its pruned-for-public-consumption state it makes clear that Hanoi was both aware of U.S. SIGINT capabilities and able on occasion to counter them.

Given the imperatives governing the release of information on intelligence sourcing and methods, that last-posed question is one that perhaps cannot be answered even now. Interestingly, Hanyok’s article, sprung from its Top Secret cocoon nearly 41 years after the events it recounts and analyzes, contains a number of redacted-out sections screened from public view—presumably for national security reasons that authorities deem still vital.

A wire requiring resoldering following the buildup of heat during the action caused Turner Joy’s AN/SPS-29 air search radar to operate intermittently and then lose power before being repaired and brought back online late on the night of 4 August. This would not have affected the ability to use the radar’s emissions to initially locate the DESOTO patrol’s bearing, since the first symptom of an SPS-29 malfunction occurred at 2215 hours local time, a little over an hour after acquisition of the first positive surface-search radar contact evaluated as a vessel on a course to intercept Maddox and Turner Joy. Turner Joy CIC Watch Supervisor’s Log 4 Aug 64.


Louis Giles, “The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery: The SIGINT Hounds Were Howling,” 5 December 2005. While supporting Hanyok’s analysis of the 4 August Tonkin Gulf Incident, Giles disputes Hanyok’s “assertion that SIGINT was mishandled, deliberately skewed, or not provided to the Johnson administration.”


Vasey, 70


McNamara, film documentary produced by Errol Morris, 2003. McNamara’s “our judgment was wrong” comment appears at approximately one hour and nine minutes into the film.


43 McNamara, In Retrospect, 135-136.

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