At the national level, the struggle over control of meaning concerns making people’s life constructions coterminous with periodizations given by the state.
—John Borneman, *Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation*

Years ago now, writing about interactions between individuals and small-scale social groups, Pierre Bourdieu declared that strategies of power consist of “playing on the time, or rather the tempo, of the action,” mainly through managing delay and surprise. Yet this chronopolitics extends beyond local conflicts to the management of entire populations: both the state and the market produce biopolitical status relations not only through borders, the establishment of private and public zones, and other strategies of spatial containment, but also and crucially through temporal mechanisms. Some groups have their needs and freedoms deferred or snatched away, and some don’t. Some cultural practices are given the means to continue; others are squelched or allowed to die on the vine. Some events count as historically significant, some don’t; some are choreographed as such from the first instance and thereby overtake others. Most intimately, some human experiences officially count as a life or one of its parts, and some don’t. Those forced to wait or startled by violence, whose activities do not show up on the official time line, whose own time lines do not synchronize with it, are variously and often simultaneously black, female, queer.

More specifically, as numerous scholars have recognized, bourgeois-liberal entities from nations to individuals are defined within a narrow chronopolitics of development at once racialized, gendered, and sexualized. Western “modernity,” for instance, has represented its own forward movement against a slower premodernity figured as brown-skinned, feminine, and erotically perverse. On the material level, large-scale periodizing mechanisms have shaped what can be lived as a social formation, or an individual life. To take only one example: even before the hourly wage had quantified time, the colonial state intervened early into temporality, inscribing itself into and as the bodies of “the people” directly via the calendar, skewing indigenous rhythms of sacred and profane and

representing these rhythms as backward and superstitious. And, as John Borneman suggests in my epigraph, supposedly postimperial nation-states still track and manage their own denizens through an official time line, effectively shaping the contours of a meaningful life by registering some events like births, marriages, and deaths, and refusing to record others like initiations, friendships, and contact with the dead. In many places, the neoliberalist project continues to reconstruct time in these ways as it “develops” new regions for profit, and additionally depends upon the idea of capital’s movement as itself an inexorable progress that will eventually accommodate select women, people of color, and queers. Neoliberalism describes the needs of everyone else, everyone it exploits, as simply, generically, deferred: the phrase “No Child Left Behind” suggests that there is, indeed, a behind in which the unlucky shall dwell.

Homi Bhabha has elegantly described this unheimlich “place” of anteriority, where in the postcolony time is always several and any historical moment correspondingly consists of many. But it is also a crucial one within which queer politics and theory must dismantle the chronopolitics of development. If in 1990 or so, “queer” named a pressure against the state’s naming apparatus, particularly against the normalizing taxonomies of male and female, heterosexual and homosexual, now it must include pressure against state and the market periodizing apparatuses. I say “queer” not to overwrite postcolonial theory with a singular focus on sexuality—indeed, there is an emerging body of powerful work on the intersection of these two domains. Rather, my version of queer insists, following Cesare Casarino, that “we need to understand and practice time as fully incorporated, as nowhere existing outside of bodies and their pleasures.” Thus while this essay argues for a deviant chronopolitics obviously indebted to the work of postcolonial thinkers, it also insists that pleasure is central to the project—that queers survive through the ability to invent or seize pleasurable relations between bodies. We do so, I argue, across time.

I also emphasize a Foucauldian notion of pleasure and bodily contact over a Freudian model of pain and ego formation in response to recent reevaluations of negative affect in queer theory. So far, a simultaneously psychoanalytic and historicist loss—perhaps replacing or subsuming structuralist lack—has emerged as one of fin de siècle queer theory’s key terms. A number of scholars have tracked the way that queer subjectivity and collectivity demand, and take as their reward, particularly inventive and time-traveling forms of grief and compensation that neither the normalizing work of the ego nor the statist logic of sequential generations can contain. I would like to suggest, however, that this powerful turn toward loss—toward failure, shame, negativity, grief, and other structures of
feeling historical—may also be a premature turn away from a seemingly obsolete politics of pleasure that could, in fact, be renewed by attention to temporal difference. That is, melancholic queer theory may acquiesce to the idea that pain—either a pain we do feel or a pain we should feel but cannot, or a pain we must laboriously rework into pleasure if we are to have any pleasure at all—is the proper ticket into historical consciousness. Eroticism and materialist history, pleasure and the dialectic, are too often cast as theoretical foils: was it not the distinctly unqueer Fredric Jameson who wrote, albeit in a very different context, that “history is what hurts. It is what refuses desire”? Perhaps theorizing queerness on the basis of grief and loss acquiesces, however subtly, to a Protestant ethic in which pleasure cannot be the grounds of anything productive at all, let alone of such a weighty matter as the genuinely historical.

Against the chronopolitics of development, and also extending post-colonial notions of temporal heterogeneity beyond queer melancholic historiography, this essay advances what I call erotohistoriography: a politics of unpredictable, deeply embodied pleasures that counters the logic of development. Particularly in light of the liberal transformation of a queer sex revolution into gay marriage reform and Marxist condemnations of queer theory’s focus on matters libidinal, I would like to take the risk of the inappropriate response to ask: how might queer practices of pleasure, specifically, the bodily enjoyments that travel under the sign of queer sex, be thought of as temporal practices, even as portals to historical thinking? Freud’s “uncanny” has offered one powerful model for a dialectic between bodily feelings and temporal alterity, but its “feelings” are both unpleasant and at one remove from the body (with the exception of goose bumps). Perhaps more important, the productive sense of alternate times in the uncanny—so fruitful for postcolonial theory—centers on the distinctly heterosexualized chronotopes of home, family, and mother. In contrast, Foucault has famously written that queers should “use sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships,” while Bourdieu would insist that these relationships inevitably play with and on time. As a mode of reparative criticism, then, erotohistoriography indexes how queer relations complexly exceed the present. It insists that various queer social practices, especially those involving enjoyable bodily sensations, produce form(s) of time consciousness, even historical consciousness, that can intervene upon the material damage done in the name of development. Against pain and loss, erotohistoriography posits the value of surprise, of pleasurable interruptions and momentary fulfillments from elsewhere, other times.
Bind Me Up, Bind Me Down

Were I a writer, and dead, how I would love it if my life, through the pains of some friendly and detached biographer, were to reduce itself to a few details, a few preferences, a few inflections, let us say: to “biographemes” whose distinction and mobility might come to touch, like Epicurian atoms, some future body, destined to the same dispersion.

—Roland Barthes, Sade, Loyola, Fourier

As a way in, let me momentarily exhume a body all too familiar to queer theory, particularly the literary-critical sort: Frankenstein’s monster. The monster’s physique, a patchwork of remnants from corpses his creator robs from the grave, is itself an index of temporal nonsynchronicity—specifically, of dead bodies persisting in the present and the future, of non-reproductive, yet still insistently corporeal kinship with the departed. His body literalizes Carolyn Dinshaw’s model of the queer touch of time, of past bodies palpably connecting with present ones. But in a low-budget independent film I saw a few years ago, Frankenstein’s monster momentarily appeared to suggest the possibility of a sensual connection with futurity as well. In Hillary Brougher’s 1997 The Sticky Fingers of Time, a woman mentions a scene in a novel her best friend has written: “I love that part, when Frankenstein splits his stitches and he dies, fertilizing the earth where that little girl grows tomatoes.” In contrast to the original novel, here the monster secures his future, joining the human scheme of obligations and dependencies rather than escaping on an ice floe. Though he seems to inseminate the little girl (for his body fluids will indirectly enter the orifice of her mouth when she eats the tomatoes), he transcends both the supposedly natural pain of childbirth and the cyclical time of reproduction. Like Walt Whitman, he disseminates himself.

Together, his body and the act he performs with it suggest a historiographical practice wherein the past takes the form of something already fragmented, “split,” and decaying, and the present and future appear equally porous. Indeed, they seem to answer Roland Barthes’s call, in my second epigraph, for a model of dispersed but insistently carnal continuity, which I call binding. In this sense, the monster’s body is not a “body” at all but a figure for relations between bodies past and present, for the insistent return of acorporealized historiography and future making of the sort to which queers might lay claim.

The scene that this woman calls forth, then, figures almost everything I mean by this essay’s title “Time Binds.” At the simplest level, “binds” are predicaments: like Frankenstein’s monster, we cannot reproduce little queers with sperm and eggs, even if we do choose to give birth or parent:
making other queers is a social matter. In fact, sexual dissidents must create continuing queer lifeworlds while not being witness to this future or able to guarantee its form in advance, on the wager that there will be more queers to inhabit such worlds: we are “bound” to queer successors whom we might not recognize. “Binds” also suggests the bonds of love, not only attachments in the here and now but also those forged across both spatial and temporal barriers: to be “bound” is to be going somewhere. Yet even as it suggests connectivity, “binds” also names a certain fixity in time, a state of being timebound, belated, incompletely developed, left behind or not there yet, going nowhere. This nowhere has everything to do with sex, for “binds” is the present-tense English of a German verb employed by Freud, *Binden*, meaning to contain otherwise freely circulating libidinal energies. Yet there are pleasures here, too, for “binding” is, of course, one among many queer bodily practices, which include not only the painful enjoyment of bondage but also, in the scene I have described, the digestive work the little girl’s body will eventually do upon the tomatoes.

Binding, we might say, makes predicament into pleasure, fixity into a mode of travel across time as well as space. Like “dissemination,” it counters the fantasy of castration that subtends melancholic historiography, for it foregrounds attachments rather than loss. Furthermore, the monster’s body and bodily act provide a queer alternative to the two most heterosexually gendered figures for “progress”: the fecund maternal body that supposedly engenders natural history and the heroic male body that supposedly engenders national history. Consider the monster in terms of Freud’s theory that a bodily imago and eventually the ego itself bind, indeed are caused by the binding of, raw and unpleasant sensory effects into legible somatic and psychic form. Freud argues that subjectivity begins when the libido invests in an uncomfortable bodily sensation by means of which it doubles back upon itself to delineate body parts as such. His example is a toothache, though he suggests that the genitals are perhaps the most insistent locale for such libidinal fixations.18 From within this Möbius loop of attachment to sensitive areas, an increasingly unified sense of bodily contours emerges, and these contours materialize the ego that is “at first, a bodily ego,” an interconnected set of perceived surfaces and boundaries.19 Opening these terms out into the social, we can certainly think of engroupment—the collective form of the ego—as engendered by just this process. Here, the monster’s wounds become metonymic of any number of physical lacerations suffered by queer bodies: beatings, unwanted heterosexual sex, medical “corrections” to the intersexed. These injuries, among others, are the violent foundation of collective queer being, the morphological imaginary, as Judith Butler calls it, for a wounded socius whose very wounding enables its being at all.20
History thus emerges as textual, humanmade, and linear only in contradistinction to a mute female body laboring “naturally” and recurrently in childbirth. But even the scene as I have narrated it thus far succumbs to the logic that time binding would counter. As L. O. Aranye (Louise) Fradenburg has argued, history, coded as male, supersedes reproduction, coded as female, insofar as the former charts the work of men injured in war who tell tales to one another across generations.21 History thus emerges as textual, humanmade, and linear only in contradistinction to a mute female body laboring “naturally” and recurrently in childbirth. In The Sticky Fingers of Time, within a conversation between two women, the singular and irreplaceable event of a wounded male body installs the deep time of a “before” and an “after,” marks the potential historicity of this time and facilitates human agency over it in the form of a narrative that our fictional writer hands over to her friend and she hands over to the filmic audience. Significantly, one speaker is murdered soon after the conversation, suggesting that two women cannot be the bearers of a future thought outside the context of reproduction. Or, this is what you get when you look at the speakers and not at the little girl who does not actually materialize in this scene: as a figure for the queer undead, the monster is temporally linked—timebound—to the little girl who is not a child at all but a queer unborn, a future we cannot see but upon which we bet. Her speculated presence, I would argue, inaugurates a different reading of the monster, one leading to the “eroto-” in erotohistoriography.

Returning to Fradenburg’s and Freud’s analyses, both pivot on the transformation of a wound into phallic power. Authority over what counts as history, Fradenburg argues, compensates for bodily injury. As Butler has noted, Freud eventually recasts the originary bodily discomfort that creates the individual (and I would argue, social) imago as a tumescence or engorgement, the kind that only penises experience. Part of Butler’s project is to unglue the phallic ego from the penis by relocating the grounds for a morphological imaginary, a bodily ego, onto any number of possible bodily surfaces: the lesbian phallus might emerge in relation to “an arm, a tongue, a hand (or two), a knee, a thigh, a pelvic bone, an array of purposefully instrumentalized body-like things.”22 But where in this model is the toothache’s interestingly aching hole and other symptoms of a certain desire to be filled up, not all of which can be reduced to wounds? What is the morphological imaginary for that? Another essay about the lesbian phallus allows us to see that the Freudian hole seems to reappear in Butler’s work on and as the audience. Jordana Rosenberg has recently argued that in Butler’s essay, the audience’s hunger for lesbian presence, the dumb literalist dyke’s wish to be taken by the clumsy, dildonic visual referent, can only disgust and amuse the professional deconstructionist for whom the phallus is, of course, the very sign of nonpresence.23 Our monster’s extravagant bodily gesture similarly relocates the hole: the little girl, his

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“audience,” will have her hunger satiated directly by the tomato and indirectly by his blood, which also carries with it the DNA of multiple dead. Of course, her queer hunger for tactile contact with the past is open to similar charges of vulgar historicism, the ugly twin of vulgar homosexuality. But the monster’s wounds themselves pass over from his pain to her satisfaction, his openings to hers, without necessarily having to become either lack or presence. The monster’s transfer of energy across time appears not as masculine sacrifice but rather as a gender-undifferentiated but nevertheless localized bodily effusion: in short, holes beget holes.

The great surprise of this scene, then, lies in the missing feast it suggests: a taste of the idea that pleasure may be as potentially generative of a future as pain, trauma, loss, or foreclosure. In fact, Giorgio Agamben has suggested that pleasure could found a new concept of time, one presently missing from historical materialism. But he has more problematically located that pleasure in “man’s originary home,” which sounds, again, like a return to the plenitude of a maternal body. In contrast, the scene I have described offers neither mother nor father in its imagining of relations across time and between times, no original womb, but only a scarred and striated body on the one side, an absent prepubescent body on the other, and a dumb, juicy, not-yet-born vegetable in between, with no portable text mediating the transfer. And, crucially, it offers the mouth as a tactile rather than just a verbal instrument for temporal transactions, for temporal binding. The question is how this might become historical.

**Surprise! On the Inappropriate Response**

In its recorporealizing of the mouth and its use of this “hole” to bind a differential past to an uninevitable future, the figure of the little girl invokes Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’s description of melancholia—one that has the power to reinscribe pleasure into the melancholic historiographical interventions that queer theory is already making. Abraham and Torok describe melancholia in particularly corporeal terms, as a way to preserve a prior scene or object in the form of a symptom usually connected to the mouth—sometimes a set of behaviors like bingeing on food or starving, but most often a fetish word, even a way of speaking, that simultaneously preserves and obscures the loss. In this process, which they call incorporation, the subject mimes its repossession of a lost object by eating or speaking awry, attempting literally to embed the object into or make it part of the body itself. Incorporation, Abraham and Torok argue, is the pathological form of a process they call introjection, where the lost object serves as a means for the subject to rework its
In introjection, the object becomes a mere placeholder for the self, whom the subject must return to loving as in primary narcissism, but this time the self must be permeable enough to integrate new objects, too. This is, notably, a much less phallic model of the ego than Freud’s, or even Butler’s. In fact, opened out from individual psyche to collective process, both the process of incorporation and that of introjection suggest what might be called a “bottom” historiography. If our absent little girl is a receptacle for queer history, what she receives is not a transmission of authority or custom but a transmission of receptivity itself, of a certain pleasurably porous relation to new configurations of the past and unpredictable futures.

In Abraham and Torok’s model, melancholia is cured when the lost object finally disappears, when incorporation yields to introjection, and time synchs up again such that the uninterrupted present corresponds to an integrated self open to the future but over the past. Yet like melancholia itself, the so-called pathological form of incorporation seems eminently more queer; it preserves the past as past, in a crypt imperfectly sealed off from the present. Incorporation imagines a psyche with unpredictable leakages, a body at semiotically and sexually productive temporal odds with itself. Despite Abraham and Torok’s flattening of time in the “normal” model of introjection, the past they suggest interrupts the present to trigger eating and speaking is not wholly defined in terms of trauma. Instead, it consists of latent excitations not yet traversed by the binary between pain and pleasure. In this sense, what is preserved and suspended within the mouth is also capable of being released as pleasure rather than simply being repeated as incomplete mastery over pain.

In fact, Torok addresses the most opaque part of Freud’s essay on mourning and melancholia, in which Freud notes but fails to theorize the problem of the inappropriate response. While we would expect tears or numbness in the face of death, Freud remarks that the grieving subject often experiences a surge of frenzied joy: “The most remarkable peculiarity of melancholia, and one most in need of explanation, is the tendency it displays to turn into mania accompanied by a completely opposite symptomatology.” He notes that mourning does not have the same tendency, which eliminates the possibility that mania is simply energy unbound from the lost object once its loss has been recognized and worked through. Torok considers a series of letters in which Freud’s contemporary Karl Abraham pressed him to consider the question of this mania and suggested several times that it often consisted of a sudden influx of erotic feelings. But Freud seems not to have answered this call to examine the phenomenon. Taking up where he left off, Torok suggests that the melancholic’s entombed secret may not be a loss at all. Rather, it is an erotic effusion repressed and mnemonically
preserved: “The illness of mourning [i.e., melancholia] does not result, as might appear, from the affliction caused by the objectal loss itself, but rather from the feeling of an irreparable crime of having been overcome with desire, of having been surprised by an overflow of libido at the least appropriate moment, when it would behoove us to be grieved in despair.”

She goes on to claim that melancholic incorporation itself “perpetuates a clandestine pleasure,” a long-ago interrupted scene of erotic contact with the lost object. For Torok, then, the melancholic psyche is a doubled effect of pleasures past: first, pleasure is severed and remade as unpleasure or trauma; then, the object that gave pleasure itself disappears. The scene’s affect and object secret themselves in body and psyche, to be released in the grieving subject’s sudden feeling of carnal desire. In short, as a component of melancholia, mania revisits an inappropriate sexual response from the past.

With Torok’s sense of melancholia as a lost erotic encounter preserved, then, we can imagine the “inappropriate” response of eros in the face of sorrow as a trace of past forms of pleasure located in specific historical moments. A recent video by Nguyen Tan Hoang, an emerging artist, makes this possibility tangible: K.I.P. (2002) cuts between a 1970s pornographic videotape and an image of Nguyen’s face reflected in a television set. Speaking of this work recently, Nguyen described his fascination with the way that the original videotape had deteriorated in the places where viewers had rewound the tape to look at particularly sexy scenes, so that the tape now skipped and the action was punctuated by grainy blank spots. Reappearing in Nguyen’s video, these blank spots suggest the impossibility of returning to the short-lived era when gay men could have unprotected sex with multiple partners without fear. Floating over this scene, Nguyen’s face is the sign of his generation, born too late. At the same time, the image of Nguyen’s face indexes the fact that, given how Asian American men have been stereotyped as feminine in the United States, he would not necessarily have had access anyway to this particular sex scene or to the “scene” of urban macho man cruising: Nguyen’s reflection also looks like the ghosts of those condemned to watch from the sidelines during the era of the taping, waiting for their moment of inclusion. Yet this is not a tape about inclusion, ultimately, for a trace of pleasure is also visible: the surface of the television also simply reflects a voyeur taking his enjoyments where he finds them. Given the historical framing of this video by AIDS and racism against Asian Americans, it might seem politically inappropriate for the videomaker-character to experience any bliss by looking at white gay men barebacking. Yet there he is, watching. The audience cannot know for sure what personal or political experiences rush into his head to fill the gaps in the tape that once contained white gay men, to bind him to the surrounding scenes and bind these to events in his own life.
Nguyen’s video registers something akin to Toni Morrison’s concept of “skin memory, the body’s recollection of pleasure,” combined with the claim of her earlier works that the skin might index historical moments as well as personal encounters. But what Abraham and Torok describe as maniac memory is hardly emotion recollected in tranquility—instead, it is an irruption of strange plenitude in the present, like Nguyen’s bliss amid generational and racial grief. In this and other erotohistoriographical works, we see Walter Benjamin’s concept of the shock of modernity, which even he linked to ephemeral encounters with sexualized figures such as prostitutes and sailors, met by his concept of the past flashing up to illuminate the present. Following the lead of Abraham and Torok, of Benjamin, of works like these two films, we might imagine ourselves haunted by ecstasy and not just by loss; residues of positive affect (erotic scenes, utopias, memories of touch) might be available for queer counter- (or para-) historiographies. As I have argued elsewhere, within this paradigm we might see camp performance as a kind of historicist jouissance, a friction of dead bodies upon live ones, obsolete constructions upon emergent ones, which I have called “temporal drag.” Or, we might look for what Annamarie Jagose has called “the figure of ‘history’—its energizing of the very tropes of before and after” in queer patterns of courtship and cruising, in sexual and more broadly tactile encounters, even in identity formations such as butch/femme or FTM. Or (and), historicity itself might appear as a structure of tactile feeling, a mode of touch, even a sexual practice. In particular, we may want to glimpse traces of historically specific forms of pleasure—whether they have been lost, repressed, disavowed, or subsumed into institutional forms of supposedly benign supervision like marriage—in our present, precisely because they once counted in the lesbian and gay imaginary, if not the national one, as part of what it meant to have a life.

Notes

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2. Exemplary recent critiques of the intertwined racial, gendered, and sexualized politics of developmental time include Rod Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,


10. See, e.g., the work of Donald Morton.


