THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER
1877–1920

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The Making of America
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The Emergence of Foreign Policy

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the mind's eye of an American swept world affairs with marvellous freedom. So little obtruded upon the senses. The consciousness which centuries of abrasive contact had worked into men's psyches, the Weltanschauungen that bound "us" and "them," nation inextricably interlocked with nation, into bundles of hates and hopes, simply did not apply in the United States. East and west were the great buffer oceans, insulators against a jagged proximity. To the north, Canada—Britain's sparsely settled outpost, America's poor half-brother. To the south, Mexico—land of bright shawls covering lazy peons, and then jungles beyond. Or so at least it appeared from Wichita or Austin or Washington.

The very conditions inviting the imagination to soar kept its passage narrow. In a basic sense, what lay beyond the nation's boundaries did not exist. Almost nothing abroad had that immediacy, that imperative quality, which could force an American's recognition as he speculated about the world. He viewed the universe as an elementary extension of his everyday experience because that, essentially, was his only experience. As that experience changed—as the fragmented society of the nineteenth century gave way to the increasingly bureaucratic one of the twentieth—both the attitudes and the ambitions involving foreign lands altered markedly. Yet however radical these changes, the American was still using a strict domestic standard to interpret his world. Throughout these years, in other words, he remained remarkably undisciplined by an external reality.

The late nineteenth century did contain several protections against the effects of these flights into fancy. The national government treated foreign relations much as it did the rest of its business. In almost all cases the initiative lay elsewhere—with private citizens or foreign countries—and unless some event touched the political needs of the responsible officials, they usually did not react. The chances of missing the mark were always high. Little in the wide world had relevance in that parochial context. When issues did reach the government, it offered replies one by one. Foreign relations were composed of incidents, not policies—a number of distinct events, not sequences that moved from a source toward a conclusion. The same Grover Cleveland who sorted his domestic problems into niches and dropped simple, self-contained solutions after them gave an equally tidy moral answer to each matter coming from abroad. And so it went from administration to administration.

Of course these responses were not merely private whims. The government's officials, along with a great many Americans, shared certain predilections about their world which gave their decisions a general consistency. One of these separated the world into two parts. Above lay the civilized powers, principally Europe and the United States; below fell the subjects of their imperialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. If some nations straddled the line—Turkey, Japan, even Russia—by and large the nature of the division drew them either up or down. Thus Russia was generally regarded as a backward great power, whereas Japan was a sport, that one fascinating exception to the colonial rule. The first was scaled down from civilization, the second measured up from barbarism. This segregation involved much more than an allocation of status. Basically it concerned intrinsic worth and inherent capacities and carried with it a clear moral differential, one that not only attributed meager sensibilities to the barbarian but also freed advanced nations to deal with him by a code they would
never have dreamed of applying to each other. One would no
more accord China the same rights as Britain than one would
expect the same honor from a Chinaman as from an Englishman.

Give or take certain exotic peculiarities, barbarians all seemed
very much alike. Civilized peoples, on the other hand, differed
significantly, and a second American habit of mind managed
these distinctions by assigning each European nation one or two
dominant traits. Individuals often disagreed in their analyses:
France might be “radical” or “gallant,” Russia “treacherous” or
“romantic.” Yet for Presidents as much as for village editors,
just such stick-figure nations, each moved by an elementary little
motor, constituted an important portion of the American’s world
reality.

A third predisposition recast the matter of national character-
istics into a comparison between the United States and the whole
of Europe, and on the surface Americans everywhere arrived at a
common, unequivocal conclusion. Europe was old and tired and
decaying, America young and vigorous and rising. In fact,
Europe was not only decaying but decadent—jaded, a bit corrupt,
and enslaved by centuries of prejudice. America, on the contrary,
joined virtue with youth, moral vision with power, imagination
with thrust. “America is slowly but surely creating the ideal of a
broad and perfect equity,” announced Professor Franklin Gidd-
dings, “in which liberty and equality shall for all time be
reconciled and combined.” “Ours is the elect nation for the age to
come,” cried Josiah Strong’s friend, the Reverend Anson Phelps.
“We are the chosen people.” Yet just beneath the surface lay the
uncertainties of the braggart. Europe had a cunning that inno-
cent America could never match, or Europe had achieved levels
of culture that shamed its backwoods offspring, or Europe had
deadly attractions that must inevitably tangle America in its coils.
Each of these secondary themes expressed the worries, the self-
doubts, of an habituated dependent.

Moreover, there were the sacred principles, in particular the
Monroe Doctrine and Neutrality. Serving a function analogous
to Protection and Sound Money, these postulates had significance
because of their emotional power rather than their contents.
Neither had the precision to guide everyday affairs. Nor did the
official employ them for that purpose. Instead, he used them as
justification. These were the self-evident universals, the symbols
of the national will to which men were supposed to respond
much as they should to “democracy” or “Christianity.” If the
issues they sanctioned had touched vital interests throughout the
nation, these doctrines, like the principles surrounding the tariff
and the currency, would also have become the subject of endless
debates in exegesis. But until the very end of the century they
involved only marginal matters. Comfortable in their loose fit,
they supplied a warming sense of righteousness to foreign affairs.

More than irrelevance kept the United States from adventures
abroad later in the nineteenth century. The rare Secretary of State
who devised a broad scheme immediately faced two obstacles. If
he moved in private, he had no apparatus to support him. The
foreign service consisted of honorary ambassadors, inexperienced
ministers, and underpaid subordinates, men who came and went
according to the dictates of partisanship and the availability of
more attractive opportunities elsewhere. At home the Secretary
had a bare handful at his disposal, scarcely enough to fill the seats
at a small conference table, and it was only an exception like
Alvey A. Adee, Second Assistant Secretary from 1886 to 1924, who
provided continuity even in matters of procedure. The Secretary
himself was almost always a stranger to his field. No experts sat
close at hand to compensate for his ignorance, no network sent
him a regular flow of information, no professional system stood
ready to implement his wishes. Meanwhile, nothing encouraged
Congress to increase the department’s allotment; foreign affairs
had no firm constituency. The armed services, moreover, rotted
in disuse during most of these years. As officials discovered in
1881 when they contemplated intimidating Chile, that nation had
a better-equipped navy than the United States. And while the
Navy slowly improved, the Army remained static, a force of
about 25,000 forgotten regulars until 1898. The paraphernalia for
action simply did not exist.
The process by which the government opened its doors to world affairs and transformed discrete responses into policies properly belonged with the general contemporary movements to manage a disorderly environment. The same broad pattern prevailed here as well: the initial efforts to impose a crude order, the desire for regularity and predictability, the need for a government of continuous involvement, and the emphasis upon executive administration. Here also a basic qualitative shift occurred in those few critical years around 1900.

Yet a distinctive personnel operating in a unique setting gave this part of the story special significance. If a relatively few people directed domestic policy, then infinitesimally small numbers guided the changes in foreign relations. A great many Americans developed an interest in world affairs and expressed opinions about them. But only a tiny fraction combined the consistent concern with the power that would allow them to shape the nation’s commitments. Although this handful dealt in matters vastly more complex than America’s domestic affairs, they approached world problems with far less subtlety and far less restraint. They exemplified, in other words, that common American inclination to project familiar assumptions upon a huge and ill-perceived canvas. Neither dullards nor bunglers, they merely functioned within a singularly narrow framework of experience.

Two groups, the one profit-oriented and the other power-oriented, dominated the origins of foreign policy. The quest for profits abroad, which had continued since the seventeenth century, practically monopolized the nation’s foreign affairs during the late seventies, eighties, and early nineties. Trade was the most common concern. Americans had an extraordinary variety of goods to sell coming from all manner of farms and factories and warehouses, and in ones and twos and tens they cried out for the government’s assistance. Occasionally a major industry confronted the kind of challenge that required a definite response. When neo-mercantilism in Europe led to the exclusion of American pork early in the eighties, successive administrations did what they could to reopen the market until the crisis finally passed. Usually, however, the demands for government aid just dinned about the officials’ ears. Too many voices made an indeterminate sort of noise which might cause men to think generally about
commerce but not to work specifically for any one interest. Thus James G. Blaine, Secretary of State under both Garfield and Harrison, and Frederick T. Freylinghausen, Arthur's Secretary, pondered ways to extend the whole of the nation's trade in Latin America, and John A. Kasson, America's representative at the conference on the Congo in 1884, grandly insisted that the United States seize some port somewhere along that river as the first step in somebody's great commercial enterprise. That kind of concern lacked the precision to change customary ways.

A smaller number were concession seekers. Sometimes men of wealth, sometimes frank fortune hunters, collectively they had slight political influence. They themselves often travelled abroad in search of favors, soliciting for the right to develop mines, build small railways, and the like. In the process, they acquired close friends among America's languishing resident officials. Thousands of miles from Washington—in China or Korea or a Central American republic—these men could generate a passionate enthusiasm for the opportunities awaiting the timely intervention of the United States government; but far back home prudent politicians extinguished these flames one by one. None of the concession hunters had the power by himself to move his government, and unlike the commercial interests, their demands had no cumulative impact during the late nineteenth century. On occasion their intrigues did alter the nation's course. In 1891, for instance, the role of adventuring businessmen in Chile's civil strife had helped to precipitate an anti-American riot which for a time actually threatened war. Yet that merely demonstrated how plastic the government's responses were—no one ever thought of a policy with regard to Chile—and such freakish incidents passed as quickly as they arose.

Unquestionably the general fear after the mid-eighties that domestic opportunities were disappearing did encourage Americans to think more seriously about economic expansion abroad. Depression then gave these feelings a sudden urgency. The government showed a keener awareness of the requirements of trade, especially in Latin America, where it interfered several times during the mid-nineties to assist American commerce. More people talked yearningly about that limitless Asian market—"Four hundred million Chinese without shoes!"—and thought seriously about acquiring the Hawaiian Islands before some other power swallowed them. Yet the commercial crisis of the nineties, even more than the discussion preceding it, seemed to belong to everybody and, consequently, pointed nowhere in particular. Without someone to provide discipline and direction, these worries need not have produced anything more concrete than a headache. Certainly they demonstrated no capacity to force the birth of policy.

The men whose economic ambitions did make a critical difference bore a close resemblance to the handful directing the nation's new finance capitalism. In this case, banking establishments of lesser stature—powerful in their own right but inferior to the House of Morgan, the National City Bank, and Kuhn, Loeb—also belonged in the camp, and because no Morgan arose to take command, the group as a whole had less coordination than its smaller, tighter domestic counterpart. Particularly within this hemisphere, such names as Speyer and Co., Seligman and Co., and Brown Brothers would appear regularly as the competitors and colleagues of the greatest houses, autonomous agents in a common enterprise. All of these firms in varying degrees had access to the newly mobilized domestic surplus, and it was a number of decisions concerning its use that sent the financiers in an earnest quest for foreign profits. Trapped by the myth of waning prospects at home, they sought a far wider sphere for investment, and even after prosperity returned, they continued to find enough enticements to keep them looking abroad.

The bankers employed their funds in two ways. They invested in relatively large mining, manufacturing, and transportation projects, and they invested in governments. Often, though not always, the second came as a corollary to the first; the right administration would protect the fruits of their industrial enterprise. Both, in any case, required novel services from Washington. The needs of trade generally stopped at the port. If goods
were received and paid for without unusual restrictions, commercial interests had no reason to concern themselves about conditions beyond the border. While specific discriminations did necessitate specific interventions—witness the pork crisis of the eighties—by and large a decent set of rules, once established, left matters to the businessmen’s ingenuity. If some unexpected barrier did suddenly block commerce, the trader could without inordinate hardship take his goods elsewhere. The financier, on the other hand, could not pick up his railroad or mine and move on. Under duress he could only liquidate at a great loss. Consequently his investments involved him intimately and continuously in the foreign nation’s internal affairs. Taxation, currency, civil strife, the rights of laborers, these and much more immediately affected his interests, and to the degree that he could not manage his own claims, he looked to the government at home for help. In fact, bankers often refused to risk much without prior guarantees of that protection. In other words, these men demanded a predictable commitment from the United States—a foreign policy, in short, to parallel their economic policy. Over the years their ambitions abroad would wax and wane in response to the business cycle and to their interpretation of domestic prospects. Nevertheless, once their roots had sunk somewhere abroad, they would require their government’s uninterrupted support.

The financiers themselves could not implement a foreign policy. Nor around 1900 were they particularly well prepared to exert influence where they most needed it. Their political ties remained far stronger in legislative than executive circles. It was the extraordinary good fortune of a second, power-minded group to hold the strategic offices just at the sensitive moments of transition. Its membership included John Hay, Secretary of State under McKinley and Roosevelt; Elihu Root, his successor; Henry Cabot Lodge, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and, above all, Theodore Roosevelt. In a ring just beyond them were such men as Alfred T. Mahan, the Navy’s world-famous theorist; John Bassett Moore, adviser to the State Department on international law; Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York Tribune; and Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews. On the periphery sat Brooks Adams, the brooding metaphysician, as well as such prominent public figures as Lyman Abbott of the Outlook and Franklin Giddings of Columbia University. Short of a miracle, no coterie of like-minded men could have concentrated themselves more effectively in the seats of power and publicity than this one did. Equally important, most of them regarded the others as personal friends. An easy, informal cooperation gave them an inestimable advantage in working their will.

Despite variations in temperament, these men held in common a broad range of opinions about world affairs. At the root of international affairs, they believed, lay national power, a vague concept that mixed portions of a mystic social strength with large doses of force. While the conflict with Spain preoccupied them, they exalted war as power’s purest expression, “the last and most crucial test of a nation’s energy,” as Adams phrased it. “Nothing else in the same degree,” Giddings declared, “roused a people to positive action . . . [like] the unifying and stimulating influence of war.” In a calmer setting they talked more broadly about the massed military, economic, and cultural resources of the nation, what Mahan referred to in an additive way as “national efficiency.” Nations with power were obliged to use it, either because to waste it would constitute a crime against civilization or because fate decreed its use. Some, like Roosevelt and Lodge, felt a special calling to elicit America’s international greatness from a tradition-bound slough; others, like Adams, bluntly offered the alternatives of world supremacy or national catastrophe; and still others, like Giddings, saw American glory rising as naturally as “the advent of spring after winter.” All agreed with Shaw that the nation “must be strong for the sake of our destiny, our dignity, our influence, and our usefulness.” All, moreover, accepted Mahan’s dictum that “our rights should depend upon the will of no other state, but upon our own power to enforce them,” for the essence of national greatness was independent authority.

America, therefore, “must accept the responsibility of a great place among the nations,” ultimately, it was implied, occupying
the first chair. By the same token, the United States would have to extend its sway over the world's lesser peoples. As Hay, who sprinkled his official correspondence with references to "Chinks" and Latin American "Dagoes," once remarked, nothing could match imperialism as "a fine expression of the American spirit." Civilization directed the control of the inferior by the superior, and to hold back out of timidity or mistaken scruples only hindered progress. The question of the morality of expansion, Mahan said, was "as little to the point as the morality of an earthquake." "Barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect," Lyman Abbott proclaimed. More gracefully, Giddings explained the necessity of crushing the Filipino guerrillas in order to impose America's rule over the islands: "the legitimate and rightful appeal is always from any dissent of the governed now to that . . . consent which, we have sufficient reason to believe, will be freely given when all the facts are clearly seen, and when the reason and conscience of the governed [are] fully awakened and matured. . . ."

Although many of these men had travelled abroad—that is, to Europe—none of them depended upon a regular fund of information to sustain his visions. They were armchair theorists. Unlike the financiers, who at times gathered an impressive amount of data as the preliminary to an investment, the power-oriented allowed their imaginative faculties full scope. Sublime faith in first principles, coursing generalizations, and magnificently inclusive organic and mechanical analogies informed their thought. Nor did members with less of a philosophical bent like Root feel impelled to challenge these propositions. Understandably, then, their speculations had a tendency to spill over into the absurd. "The Germans cannot increase their velocity because they cannot extend their base, and augment their mass—we can and do," Brooks confided to his brother, Henry. "As long as we can increase our mass we can increase our velocity and so increase our advantage. . . . The pinch will come when all else has been absorbed and we must take China with its mines, or be undersold." Though that sort of thing might have been dismissed as the ravings of a bedeviled patrician, Presidents indulged in parlor
games almost as weird. Roosevelt could contemplate England and Germany allied in a military attack on an American canal, or talk emptily about "taking" Canada in a phantom war against England he was playing in 1901 with Lodge. The fantasies of power, with nations as tokens on a worldwide board, led most of them to dream in that fashion about shadowy thrusts and counterthrusts.

Still, it was this inner circle that actually executed the change from itemized responses to policy. And if ever a group were inclined toward policy, these power-minded strategists qualified. No nagging surplus forced strange lands on their attention. Nor did they stretch outward because the world was impinging upon the United States. They quite simply wanted the United States to master that world. Obviously a nation did not claim its place with the leaders by waiting for others to move. The United States would have to plot its own special course, then calculate each step according to that guide. The most able among them were capable of learning as they acted. The earliest grand designs of such geopoliticians as Mahan, like the far more modest projects of a Blaine, showed the usual self-contained, self-fulfilling characteristics of late-nineteenth-century thought. The end resided in the outlines of the master plan. But as Roosevelt and Root in particular acquired a new sense of interrelationships and fluid process, they applied it to foreign relations, infusing their policies with a crucial flexibility. The general goals had not altered, but their means had come to include the fundamentals of bureaucratic management.

As divergent as the approaches by way of profits and power had been, these two elites seemed to have arrived at a common destination. Both sought a rapid and, in effect, revolutionary extension of America's international commitments, a government continuously involved throughout the globe. Both counselled an initial movement into vacuums; first of all the United States should fill those colonial areas not already occupied by the European powers. Both stressed the importance of stability, and both construed stability in a way that would draw them deep into the internal affairs of other countries. Almost all of them were
Eastern, urban Republicans who looked favorably upon the centralization of power and its rational disposition, and as they demonstrated in certain areas of domestic policy, they had at least a partial appreciation of their interdependence.

But as their domestic dealings also illustrated, cooperation between such men always remained tentative and uneven. The financiers were equally caught in a simplistic projection—in this instance, of assuming that the basic requirements of American capitalism would obtain everywhere in the world. Yet they were not conscious philosophers, and the grand schemes of the power-dreamers—the wars, the colonies, the bluffs, the endless projects—alternately irritated and frightened them. The designers, on their part, could not drown a feeling that bankers were at heart small men incapable of responding to the call of patriotism and glory. "Mankind knows that there is something better [than paper profits]," read Mahan's challenge. "Its homage will never be commanded by peace, presented as tutelary deity of the stock-market."

Indeed, their cycles of assertion and caution did not fit very well. When opportunities for greatness appeared to one group, the other might draw back because of uncertain business conditions, a special hazard, as it turned out, in the more ambitious schemes for American expansion in East Asia. When financiers believed support imperative, a national election or some ripening plan elsewhere might be distracting their political allies. Once again, it was the conundrum of who should lead and who follow—and to what end? The great bankers expected the government to act as their agent, a servant in behalf of its citizens' prosperity. The apostles of power, on the other hand, saw investment, like trade, merely as one piece in an elaborate game. Even those such as Mahan and Adams who gave economic forces great weight still subordinated them—in effect, nationalized them—in the quest for that ultimate good, American power.

Two additional clusters of ideas glided about the formation of America's new foreign policy. One was the general property of the new middle class; at least its members most often voiced the principles. Foreign relations from this perspective assumed a particularly benign cast because these men saw their ideals gradually materializing about them. They sought smoothness in the conduct of world affairs, an absence of violence and disorder and all wasteful conflict. A largely negative goal, it tended to place a high premium on the correct rituals. The forms of democratic procedure, the official guarantees of peaceful intent, were optimistically transmuted into the substance of a healthy world. For the new middle class believed in progress, and believing in it, they found it. Slowly, ineluctably, mankind was lifting itself upward: civilized nations were growing ever more enlightened, and barbarians were rising higher toward the standards set from above. Eventually—at some indeterminate point in the future—all nations would achieve unity in peace and brotherhood. Backward countries, of course, would require many more years of patient tutelage, but—in a way that contradicted the working assumptions of the guiding elites—they would some day graduate into full-fledged world citizens. In the meantime, advanced nations were rapidly approaching the ultimate stage. It was, in all, a misty extension of ideas that informed progressivism at home. The United States would fashion a paradise of middle-class virtues. In time the world would adopt America's democratic model. Before 1913 no one in high office inclined strongly toward these views, and before 1917 relatively few made them a fighting faith. Until then the new middle class was otherwise occupied.

The second cluster belonged primarily to the defenders of the community and, appropriate to its origins, presented an exaggerated version of American ambivalence toward a world of dangers and promises. On the one hand, it dwelt upon the evils of Europe, with particular reference to Britain. Lombard Street, after all, manipulated the international gold conspiracy, that "soulless despot of alien origin," which was blocking the introduction of a people's currency in the United States. Governor Altgeld, in fact, believed that England was dictating each step in
America's foreign relations, including what he regarded as a sham crisis over the Venezuelan boundary in 1895. Others extended the pattern of jeopardy far across the Channel. Julius Wayland, a leading spokesman for farmland socialism, pictured all of Europe's masters, from "Crazy Bill," the German Kaiser, to England's smug Prime Ministers, conniving against the United States. Henry Demarest Lloyd imagined that "on the day Manila fell to American troops] the Philippine Catholics transferred their property to Cardinal Gibbons" of Baltimore as one move in a black plot against the natives' liberty.

At the same time, they could speak with sweeping assurance about America's ultimate triumph. Between assaults on the international goldbugs Bryan reminded his audience, "There is a hardy race of people between the Rockies and Alleghenies who will organize themselves and declare the financial independence of the country." The Atlantic Coast, alas, had been captured, but the great hinterland would rescue democracy. No Americans envisioned a grander destiny for their nation. Edward Bellamy saw utopia in the year 2000 spreading irresistibly from the United States around the globe, with some lag among the "backward races, which are gradually being educated up to civilized institutions." Lloyd and Josiah Strong wrote ecstatically about the "Anglo-Saxon mission," by which they meant a purely American imperialism. None ever questioned the absolute good of a purified American democracy.

After 1896 the spokesmen for the community lost what little cohesion they had once had, and with that went the tenuous balance they had achieved. Threat clearly became the dominant motif, and their vacillations from crouching defense to grandiloquent expansiveness grew even sharper. Arguing to the very last minute against any foreign venture, they could then swing violently in its favor, only to return as abruptly when their inflated hopes were punctured. Voices in the debate over foreign policy rather than forces in its making, they still constituted an element of instability that would have its effect in the crisis of the First World War.

The Emergence of Foreign Policy

A variety of ethnic groups contributed a final lesser factor in the emergence of foreign policy. Although immigrants certainly carried deep prejudices with them as they crossed to America, the first generation had essentially no opportunity to apply them beyond their neighborhoods. Politically impotent and nationally inarticulate, they could only pass a legacy to their sons. The rising second and third generations did insist that politicians respond to these special claims, demands that Americans of both Irish and German descent were making in the eighties and nineties. As long as foreign relations were conducted piecemeal, they sometimes influenced a particular situation. Yet to the degree that their general drive for recognition succeeded, their cry lost its shrillness. By and large, that was precisely the stage at which their American journey crossed the beginnings of foreign policy. These groups—and now their sons, yet another generation removed from Europe—had won enough early in the twentieth century to ease the passion, even to blur the lines of hate. Newer immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe had not gathered sufficient strength to strike out in their turn. Habituat responses and token declarations, rumblings and occasional outbursts, comprised the sum of their efforts during the formative years after 1900. Later the shock of a world war would disrupt the entire process of assimilation, not only eliciting acute Germanness and Irishness from reasonably well-established groups but also hastening the arrival of relative newcomers.

At its inception the heart of the nation's new foreign policy concerned Latin America and East Asia, largely because these were the territories available for expansion. Europe had already divided most of Africa into colonies and protectorates. A few American feelers early in the twentieth century did not expose very promising prospects. The Near East was too distant and, apparently, too sterile for the risks it would entail, and Britain's India dominated South Asia. Of the two major areas remaining, Latin America—by tradition, political condition, and proximity—presented a particularly inviting front. In a vague fashion Ameri-
cans had long considered the lands to the south as their peculiar province, and the Monroe Doctrine, despite its ambiguities and sporadic application, suggested that here, alone in the world, the United States held certain general prerogatives which might well be broadened into predominant rights. Latin America's many small republics, weak yet independent, provided an ideal setting for penetration with a minimum of formal responsibilities. Here, moreover, the nation's military power could operate most effectively.

East Asia, on the contrary, seemed to lack every advantage. America's slender interests there had in most cases come as a consequence of Britain's initiative, and customarily the United States moved behind a shelter of European power. Although East Asia had not been sliced into colonies, a host of nations had been collecting privileges for many years, and a newcomer would automatically begin with serious liabilities, including the rapid rise of a formidable local power, Japan. The United States simply could not muster the force at such a distance either to frighten or to fight its competitors. Nevertheless, Americans persevered. East Asia was still technically free territory, and especially as China lumbered in the direction of a modern economy, the possibilities in that huge, densely populated land appeared unlimited, regardless of America's handicaps.

In spite of the great separation between the two regions, and in spite of the very different approaches each required, the two did become entwined in American diplomacy because both were objects of a common national assertion. The Spanish-American War, a prelude to the development of foreign policy, illustrated how such a joining might occur. The United States entered the war in the usual late-nineteenth-century manner, treating the conflict with Spain as just one more item in foreign relations. Early in 1896 a dirty struggle between Cuban rebels and a decaying Spanish imperial administration began to attract a great deal of attention. For a variety of reasons—some humanitarian, some strategic, some diversionary, some economic—a large number of Americans grew convinced that the United States should resolve the issue by ensuring Cuba's independence. Under pressure, Spain slowly conceded America's secondary demands, but it would not humiliate itself by a clean, complete abdication. McKinley, always alert to the cries around him, decided that was not enough. He gave an eager Congress its cue to declare war, and with a whoop and a holler Americans fell over each other in a brief, blundering contest with a third-rate power. Because of the political support the Navy had recently enjoyed, a relatively well-equipped American fleet demolished its creaking opposition. Because months earlier the Administration's leaders had agreed with an ambitious Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, that in the event of war a portion of the fleet should move against Spain's Philippine colonies, the United States found itself with a fingertip hold on these islands when the war ended.

The men in power could not part with territory just gained, so in the treaty that followed they kept the Philippines, adding Puerto Rico for good measure. In the midst of the turmoil, Congress by joint resolution had also acquired Hawaii, to the relief of the American businessmen dominating its economy. A disorganized group of anti-imperialists, stressing tradition and the burden of barbarian lands, failed to defeat the treaty while it was before the Senate, and Bryan's half-hearted attempt to use the election of 1900 as a means of reversing that decision proved equally futile. Now the United States had an empire. For a time its proponents talked grandly about the nation's maturity, its pending services to backward humanity, and an endless commercial expansion in Asia. Crowing, however, did not construct policy. These colonies had not belonged to any previous plan, nor did they serve as the basis for a new one. In a routine fashion, the government set about administering its lands to no other end than their administration. Although the Army's incompetence in war led to a partial reorganization, McKinley anticipated returning it quickly to its usual size.

In fact, the whole dazzling venture lost its glow as promptly as it had come. Filipinos engaged Americans in a brutal jungle war of the type Cuba had recently experienced, two of the nation's
naval heroes bickered like schoolboys over their share of the glory, another made a fool of himself seeking the Presidency in 1900, and learned men split hairs over how few rights the United States should grant its dependents. Theorists who had once blessed the war as sign and source of a new national cohesion fretted about the ill effects from so many inferior people under the American flag. When foreign policies did emerge, the officials formulating them discovered that distant colonies were more than irrelevant. Their protection drained precious energies from the pursuit of long-term, wide-ringing influence in world affairs.

Leon Czolgosz's bullet had a greater effect upon the form of America's policy than the war with Spain. The assassination of McKinley, by elevating Roosevelt to high office, gave the management of foreign relations to men who did have designs and who also had the skill to implement at least a part of them. Systematically the new President sought to throw a net about the countries bordering on the Caribbean and to pry East Asia open to American influence. Identifying himself with the nation, Roosevelt showed an even greater inclination in foreign than in domestic affairs to answer questions of all magnitude precisely as his personal judgment guided him. Here, after all, he was expanding rather than originating an executive's prerogative. He demonstrated some of his usual tact with Congress, abandoning reciprocity treaties that irritated the Senate and relying upon his close friend Lodge to smooth the path for his projects. Moreover, he made the appropriate gestures toward such popular ideals as "peace" and "legality." (He must have approved the State Department's reference in 1912 to the "legally constituted good government" of Nicaragua directly after American troops had crushed its opposition.) Yet withal, he drove a private chariot abroad with a freedom he never dared to exercise in domestic affairs.

As in so many other areas, he bequeathed Taft an ongoing enterprise which his successor almost perforce had to manage. Because Taft relied heavily upon his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, who in turn leaned upon his assistants, particularly

Francis M. Huntington Wilson, American policy lost much of the integration Roosevelt's personal direction had supplied. In fact, these subordinates infused America's foreign relations with a belligerence that was alien to their chief's natural preference for measured legal procedure. Moreover, Taft, unlike Roosevelt, never did comprehend the basic distinction between commercial and financial involvement, and his confused efforts to assist all of American business abroad damaged both his own reputation and those interests he wanted to help.

Wilson, who then inherited the results of Taft's mismanagement, was the first President in charge of these young policies to incline toward the international ideals of the new middle class. Nevertheless, a combination of the policies' inertia and his own prejudices rendered these guidelines practically useless in East Asia and Latin America. He favored commercial over financial expansion; yet the former remained a fog, while the latter brought insistent, concrete matters to his doorstep. Seeking non-violent ways to further American interests, his mean opinion of men with yellow and brown skins left him without the patience to pursue them. It was all too easy for him, as it was for Bryan, his Secretary of State, to conclude in a particular crisis that whatever the future might hold for these lowly folk, at present they could only understand force. When Roosevelt undermined the foundations for these countries' independence, he merely acted upon a belief that barbarians were barbarians. When Wilson did the same, he destroyed the basis for an improvement he honestly wished to serve. As if half-aware of the contradiction, he and his subordinates made a fetish of the forms—the constitutions and elections and announcements of native thanks—that somehow never could cover the nakedness of the substance. In the end, the nation's policies in these portions of the world followed a remarkably steady course through their first two decades.

Latin America, the ripe fruit in the backyard, always occupied a preferential position in the nation's expansion, and here a foreign policy appeared most quickly, most clearly, and—accord-
ing to the design of its architects—most successfully. The first in a rapid succession of steps concerned a canal across the slender midriff of Central America. As Roosevelt assumed the Presidency, the United States was in the process of extricating itself from a treaty of 1850 with Britain which in effect had promised to share control over any such waterway. A stubborn Senate forced Hay to continue negotiations until Britain abandoned every one of its claims, and the Secretary and his new chief then set about realizing the ancient dream of a link between the Atlantic and Pacific.

Many had talked in general terms about the great commercial potential of a canal. The Spanish-American War had underlined its strategic value. To Roosevelt and his colleagues, however, the most important part of the venture was the swift, unequivocal assertion of America's will, a declaration to all the world that the United States would establish its own goals in Latin America and achieve them without any nonsense. When Colombia's legislature balked at an agreement for a canal through its territory of Panama, Washington's officials were livid. Roosevelt scarcely cared what route the waterway took, but once the United States had decided upon Panama, no "contemptible little creatures" in Bogotá could be allowed to thwart it. Impatiently following the progress of Panama's revolution of 1903, the Administration lent the presence of a warship to ensure its success, hastily recognized the new state, and dictated terms for an American zone across the isthmus. Construction commenced almost immediately, and by 1914 the United States had its canal, a trophy to the nation's new hemispheric authority.

If Roosevelt's canal diplomacy constituted a declaration of intent, its corollary to the Monroe Doctrine outlined the means of accomplishing it. A year after taking office, he faced another version of the question which the Cleveland Administration had broached in 1895 and which had again arisen in the negotiations over the Cuban rebellion. What supervisory rights did the United States hold over the relations between European and Latin American countries? Cleveland had insisted that Britain settle a boundary dispute between its colony of Guiana and Venezuela; McKinley had demanded independence for a European possession; yet neither had set his action into a framework for continuing diplomacy. Soon after Roosevelt had discouraged England and Germany from employing military force to collect debts from Venezuela, he told the world what it might expect in the future from the United States.

If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing and impotence, to exercise an international police power.

In effect, the President had announced a new doctrine rather than a corollary to the old. The original pronouncement, by prohibiting certain types of action, had tried to fix outer limits around Europe's involvement in Latin America. While shrinking these limits so that they essentially excluded the use of European arms, Roosevelt concentrated upon the core the Monroe Doctrine had avoided. Fundamentally the United States would now sit in judgment on Latin America, not Europe, and with military power as its most obvious weapon, determine unilaterally the proper state of internal affairs for the nations of that region. Weakly disguised as the unhappy policeman tending other people's nasty business, the United States had declared Latin America its sphere of influence.

It required three administrations to develop the implications of the Roosevelt Corollary, and year by year the process interlaced the government's work more tightly with that of the expanding financial elite. American investments spread rapidly throughout Latin America in the first decade of the century, doubling the
total in Mexico, for example, and trebling it in the balance of the Caribbean area. Even more important, the quality of investment was changing. Instead of many additional little enterprises, the new ventures usually concerned major, long-term commitments and emanated from the same great banking houses. Agents for these institutions, like their concession-hunting predecessors, cultivated close alliances with America's resident officials abroad, supplementing an independent influence within these countries and an impressive power at home. Consequently, as leaders in Washington moved out to regulate their new domain, they encountered an extensive network of American involvements, often well matured, which defined a boundary about the government's operations. Although the financiers could not dictate the government's policy, no policy could ignore their interests. The bankers, furthermore, had the great advantage of specificity. Protection of those definite interests provided a very convenient, an almost unavoidable, point of focus for officials who had only thought in the general terms of asserting United States power.

The string of protectorates that the United States acquired early in the twentieth century illustrated one phase of that interaction. Following the conflict with Spain, the War Department had administered Cuba in preparation for its independence, for independent it would have to be after the highly publicized altruism of America's war. Under the government's aegis, the Cuban economy revived quickly, in part because American funds poured into the sugar-rich island. Here of all places the United States would have to exercise regular surveillance, and bankers anticipated this in calculating their investments. Predictably, the government left Cuba only after the new republic had accepted America's right to intervene in cases of serious civil disturbance. In 1905 a more carefully planned concert of interests emerged in the Dominican Republic, the first country to qualify under Roosevelt's new formula. After a period of devastating internal strife had bankrupted its government, Roosevelt decided to settle its affairs by removing the prize of battle—the customs house.

This time New York bankers and Washington officials entered hand in hand, the one contracting to give the customs house an honest, impartial administration and the other guaranteeing to protect the bankers.

As Taft succeeded Roosevelt, the maneuvering of American banana companies in the bloody politics of Nicaragua was rendering that nation equally helpless. Unable to install a friendly faction from a distance, Secretary Knox resorted to arms in 1910. This did not stabilize matters, and in 1913 Wilson gladly ended the affair. By 1915, however, the Democratic President had witnessed all the turmoil in Haiti he could tolerate, and he in turn tried to enforce calm by troops and a treaty. In the context of Latin American barbarism, the populistic Bryan found the agent of the National City Bank, whose interests the intervention preserved, a most congenial colleague in the crusade for civilization. A year later renewed troubles in the Dominican Republic led to a second, more forceful intervention there, and to an even more elaborate system of financial controls underwritten by the United States. To Wilson's dismay, no native politicians would supply the facade, so the Navy Department conducted the government while the bankers supervised the economy. Thus while the initiative had shifted from time to time, the pattern of mutual interest remained approximately the same.

These eye-catching events tended to obscure a stream of far subtler relationships which did not always demonstrate such harmony. A caution against overcommitment and a concern for broader strategy diluted Washington's zeal for defending each major enterprise. High officials concluded that intervention in Honduras, Guatemala, and Venezuela would not serve their conception of the national interest, despite the importunities of embroiled American businessmen. Moreover, each administration channelled some energy into economically irrelevant forms of uplift. Wilson in particular never quite lost faith in the efficacy of a compulsory education. "I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men!" he had remarked in 1913, and whenever he was free to do so, he instructed. (Roosevelt's
analogous comment in 1905—"Some time soon I shall have to
spank some little brigand of a South American republic"—sug-
gested how Wilson had both elevated and extended the earlier
meaning of a barbarian's education.) Twice during the pro-
tracted Mexican revolution which had begun in 1911, Wilson
skirted the edge of a full-scale war with armed interventions
that had practically no bearing upon the needs of American investors.
Wilson wanted to secure what he called honor and decency, and
he employed the nation's resources as much to impose these as to
prepare Mexico for American enterprise.

Nevertheless, the main thrust of America's policy remained
clear enough. Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and their primary advisers
all acknowledged a close interconnection between imperial pol-
itics and imperial financing, and each administration provided
whatever diplomatic support it felt it could for the bankers' ambi-
ations, not merely because they were United States citizens
but because they were citizens who trafficked in a power indis-
penensible to United States policy. When Wilson successfully
applied pressure on several Latin American countries to exclude
an important British investing firm in favor of its American
competitors, Walter Hines Page, the ambassador at London,
commented with unintentional irony on "the application of the
Monroe Doctrine to concessions that might imperil a country's
autonomy." It represented an impeccably logical extension of the
Roosevelt Corollary. All nations in the American sphere must
depend upon Americans. As capital flowed southward, officials
could talk more and more honestly about the fundamentals of
control. In 1917 Secretary Lansing wrote that each Latin Ameri-
can country seeking aid abroad should as a matter of course offer
any important opportunities first to Americans. To the degree the
government could enforce that rule and the financiers could
fulfill it, the United States would close the door in Latin
America.

In East Asia, on the other hand, the challenge was to open the
door and keep it open. Here American policy showed neither the
clarity nor the consistency that it did in Latin America, largely
because East Asia remained an optional area in the minds of too
many important men. Unlike Latin America, where those re-
ponsible for American policy made commitments that varied
only in intensity, in East Asia they attempted periodically to alter
the nature of their involvement. The financial elite, after organiz-
ing as the American China Development Company and acquir-
ing a choice railroad concession in 1898, sufficiently lost interest in
their venture during the next few years to let control over the
enterprise fall into Belgian hands. Their enthusiasm revived
somewhat around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, only to
drop abruptly with the panic of 1907. Again it rose early in Taft's
Administration, held tentatively for a few years, then declined
precipitously at the onset of the Chinese revolution in 1912. It did
not really recover until the end of the First World War. Each of
these fluctuations took its toll upon the continuity of the nation's
policy.

The government's leaders on their part could not hold firmly to
one conception of what the United States should accomplish in
East Asia and how they might best achieve it. The lure of the
China trade was forever intruding into their schemes. Commer-
cial hopes, in fact, lay immediately behind John Hay's famous
"open door" notes in 1899 and 1900. Riding the winds of oratory
about a limitless Asian market, the Secretary made two clever but
ineffectual efforts to shame the China powers into granting easy
entry for American goods and foregoing its final dissection into
colonies. Thoughts of 400 million customers also distracted Taft,
leading him to work at odds with his investment-minded subor-
динates. When Wilson took office, the new President willingly
chose commerce over investment as the economic rationale for
American policy. Since China never absorbed as much as 2
percent of the nation's foreign trade, that enduring dream testi-
fied to the remarkable strength of a bonanza psychology among
otherwise shrewd Americans. Yet its appeal also demonstrated
the marginal position of East Asia in American calculations.
Whatever his personal inclinations, Wilson as President would
never have dispensed with the support of the financiers in the
Caribbean. In distant China, however, where the influence of the United States relied even more heavily upon investments, he could temporarily turn his back upon them because national power as such did not seem at stake. The loose requirements of a commercially-oriented policy would scarcely have distinguished China from the rest of the globe. Although Wilson later changed his mind, the very fact he thought in terms of options illustrated the sharp difference in prevailing attitudes toward East Asia and toward Latin America.

An East Asian policy originated in Theodore Roosevelt's unquenchable ambition to force the United States into the league of powers which determined its affairs. He knew as well as John Hay that however striking the Secretary's craftsmanship the open-door notes alone were immaterial in world politics. The United States had done nothing since to implement them, or in fact to demonstrate any type of continuing interest in the area, in part because of America's fundamental weakness there and in part because of the Administration's indifference to the principles it had just enunciated. It was left to Roosevelt, therefore, to find an avenue for steady, effective involvement and an occasion to announce the nation's arrival as a major East Asian power. With his unerring eye for dramatization, he managed the latter flawlessly. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 attracted an extraordinary amount of international attention in an era of general peace. A skillful use of his highly placed European friendships combined with the desire of the combatants for a settlement enabled Roosevelt to bring representatives of the two countries to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and while the world looked on, he acted as mediator. The United States could not make war in East Asia, so Roosevelt made peace. It was, under the circumstances, a brilliant maneuver, as perfectly suited to America's situation across the Pacific as an announcement by way of the Panama Canal was to its position in Latin America.

The far more important part, a route to continuing influence, posed very different and difficult problems, ones neither Roosevelt nor his successors fully resolved. Military means offered scant hope. Although the Navy grew in strength and Roosevelt sent a portion of it around the world to display the nation's power, every official agreed that Americans would not sustain a major war in East Asia. Finance proved almost as undependable. Despite Wall Street's renewed interest in the area around 1904, the bankers did not care enough to fight past the ring of entrenched Europeans and claim a secure position of their own. In a classic example of the conflict between power and profits, Roosevelt pleaded in vain with J. P. Morgan to hold his ground in China just when the ledger and the market counselled retreat. At a critical moment the President lost that precious resource because the man who controlled it was following the dictates of another god.

Roosevelt's only recourse, therefore, lay in borrowing from the nation's general fund of prestige. The path of entry he chose was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The most logical avenue in light of America's increasing ability to cooperate with Britain, it still contained innumerable hazards. Britain, which had arrived first and taken the most in China, looked to rising powers like Japan and the United States as shields against its European opponents, who in combination could strip the leader of its bounty. That cautious, defensive posture meant that it would take no risks assisting the United States, a nation on the make.

Japan on its part was as much America's competitor as its ally. Roosevelt hoped that by keeping relations as smooth as possible with this expansive nation, Japan in its turn would not oppose the assertions of the United States in the Far Pacific. The President, however, miscalculated the strength of Japan's drive, particularly in Manchuria. Moreover, this man of faint sensitivity to the subtler emotions never did comprehend the implications of race prejudice in his foreign policy. The violent antipathy to yellow skins along the West Coast only caricatured a prevailing American assumption of Oriental inferiority. Neither nation could surmount the obstacle of white chauvinism. Although Roosevelt managed one bitter incident in 1907 when he simultaneously convinced California to moderate its discrimination
against Americans of Japanese descent and Japan to limit its immigration to the United States, he approached the matter as if he were settling a claim for property damages. A state’s interference with the nation’s foreign policy infuriated him, but the prejudices behind it did not.

Of course troubles would have beset any route the latecomer had chosen. At least as detrimental to American policy in East Asia was Roosevelt’s imprecision in objectives. He talked a good deal about a balance of power there, the kind that would enhance American opportunities. In practice, however, that meant little more than checking Russia, which he both distrusted and despised. British influence and Japanese expansion on the continent never seriously disturbed him. (There were good and bad powers just as there were good and bad trusts.) Although he cared about the Philippines only as a repository of American prestige, the rigamarole of his imaginary war games caused him to worry inordinately about an attack upon the islands, and that too modified his approach. Prestige, again, impelled him to oppose a Chinese boycott of American goods during 1905 and 1906. Yet if Roosevelt could never allow such an affront to pass, he was equally incapable of tying his general policy to the petty interests of commerce. Nor did he share the belief of Brooks Adams and Franklin Giddings, among several others, that in some geopolitical sense the key to the world’s future lay in the Far Pacific. East Asia concerned Roosevelt very much, but no more than Europe or Latin America. In the end, the ground never quite settled beneath his efforts. While he established a pattern of involvement, he could not grasp a goal greater than his initial purpose, a mere assertion of the nation’s power.

Taft compounded the confusion. As he entered office, the railroad king Edward H. Harriman was mapping the most ambitious Asian scheme of the early twentieth century—domination of the Manchurian railways—as one link in his grand design for a global transportation system. At the same time, subordinates in the State Department transposed this venture into an ideal means by which the United States might gain a preponderant influence throughout all China. Manchuria would serve as the lever, opening Peking to America’s full power. The slender chances of such an enterprise depended upon the most careful attention to changing circumstances and upon the most delicate diplomacy. Instead, the complexities of the situation eluded the President, who was thinking of Manchurian trade rather than Chinese investments, and he threw the nation’s prestige in the breach just when America’s financial elite, in another example of political-economic divergence, was retiring before too much uncertainty and too much foreign opposition. There he stood, overextended and alone, as the revolution commenced and Wilson succeeded him.

To the relief of the bankers, who desired only to escape the chaos, Wilson withdrew government support for all such elaborate proposals. As if reverting to the simple, trade-oriented philosophy of the open-door notes, he asked merely for decent treatment in China and a pause until the turmoil ceased. It did not, nor did Japan wish to wait. When the First World War drew the European powers back home, Japan issued an ultimatum to the government then installed in Peking that would have fixed China as its neighbor’s vassal. Once the United States might have shrugged and accepted fate. But now Roosevelt’s involvements, which Taft however ineptly had kept alive, automatically transformed that incident into a challenge to American prestige. Wilfully, the United States as a power in East Asia was trapped in the requirements of a foreign policy. Although Japan did relent ever so slightly, the United States deserved little credit for that. In time Wilson’s frustration led him back to the fundamentals Roosevelt had examined earlier. By the end of his Administration, he also was encouraging the financiers to enter China and even calculating the value of a token military force as means for a sharper and more systematic influence in East Asia.

Two decades of erratic behavior in a marginal area gave American policy a very mottled appearance indeed. Yet somewhere close to the center of these happenings ran a continuity of purpose that the policymakers themselves only half-recognized.
Viewing China as a resource for the use of Western powers, the United States had participated in multinational efforts to hold its government at that critical level between competence and impotence. Its rulers should have the ability to ensure a minimum domestic stability without the capacity to resist imperial penetrations. Viewing Japan as an inferior nation—precocious but in the long run no match for Western power—the United States had hoped to use its ambitions as a counterpressure to Europe and thereby maintain an environment in East Asia favorable to American expansion. The belief that ultimately any Oriental nation would have to bend before a determined Occidental one would die hard. The total effect was less a balance of power than a point of tension. All factors, internal and external, would so interact that they created a stasis allowing Americans to move in and out at their discretion.

Set against comparable domestic developments, America’s first ventures into foreign policy showed an unmistakable immaturity. Unlike the best of the new administrative arrangements at home, the system for gathering and assessing information from abroad never approached the nation’s requirements. Nothing better illustrated that failing than the almost panicky demands in Washington for basic data once the First World War had begun. Despite a series of measures designed to increase the professional and organizational strength of the State Department, the American network of international communications had not acquired fiber or depth even in areas of special concentration. Both Roosevelt and Wilson relied heavily upon unofficial sources—either a random scattering of friends or an ill-equipped set of private emissaries—in deciding important matters of policy. That amateurish approach not only accentuated the elements of chance where consistency was essential, but it also inclined leaders toward explosive action where careful steps would have served far better. A number of the armed interventions in Latin America, while appropriate to the spirit of American policy, actually represented one form of bankruptcy, a crude replacement for the kind of indirect influence officials had sought but could not achieve. Taft’s bullish behavior in China reflected much the same weakness.

The apparatus remained that faulty in part because the politicians in command did not feel the need for something superior. As long as Americans constructed a world view so thoroughly out of the materials immediately about them, and did so without sensing any disadvantage, they would continue indulging their imaginations almost at will. Roosevelt and Wilson both retained a powerful faith in the intuitive management of world affairs, contrasting markedly with their discipline in the conduct of domestic matters. Consequently, Roosevelt’s wide-ranging correspondence simply suited him better than the more mundane collations of a bureaucratic staff, and Wilson’s willingness to let Bryan turn portions of the foreign service into a junk heap of party patronage was actually not so very strange. In fact, the choice of Bryan, whom his chief once said had “no mental rudder,” was itself suggestive. Tradition had not forced Wilson’s hand. No President since 1897 had used the Secretary of State’s office as an honorary reward for the dean of the party. In an era of such speculative freedom in foreign affairs, Wilson believed he could afford a useless first lieutenant. Roosevelt had indicated that if he won in 1912 he would select Gifford Pinchot, a man utterly devoid of experience in the field. The two of them looked at America’s domestic problems in just about the same light, and in foreign policy it was the starting point that really mattered.