however, very few takers, even for the reduced figure of 20,000, since the problems of guarding and quartering were almost insurmountable. The I. G., Himmler's most loyal customer, now turned him down. Krupp picked out 520 Jewish women to perform heavy labor in its Essen plant, although a personnel expert had voiced the opinion that the victims were "fine soft-boned creatures" who were not suitable for the work.74

The meager result of the labor allocation program (only a few thousand Hungarian Jews were recruited from Amtsgruppe D) is explained also by another factor which had nothing to do with administrative efficiency: the problem was not only to get workers while the war was on but also to get rid of them in case the war was lost. In the summer of 1944, representatives of the Württemberger Metallwaren Fabrik asked Obergruppenführer Hofmann, Higher SS and Police Leader in Army District V, to intercede with Pohl for an allocation of Jewish labor. Seven hundred Jewish women from Hungary were thereupon sent to the plant. In March, 1945, the director of the Metallwaren Fabrik phoned Hofmann with an urgent plea to take the

73. Warnecke (I. G. Farben/Leverkusen) to Guenther (Reich office for economic construction), June 2, 1944, NI-8969. Summary of I. G. Leverkusen technical conference (Haberland presiding), July 10, 1944, NI-5765.


700 women off his hands because American troops were closing in. Hofmann replied that it was none of his business and that he could do nothing.75 The utilization of Jewish labor was expensive in more ways than one, and that is one of the reasons why the great bulk of the 1944 deportees were gassed in the Auschwitz killing center upon arrival.

4 / Medical Experiments

There was another and more sinister utilization of doomed Jews—the medical experiments. Numerically, the use of inmates for experiments did not approach the dimensions of industrial exploitation, but psychologically, the experiments pose a much more significant problem.

We must establish two broad categories of experiments: the first comprised medical research which is usual and normal except for the wilful utilization of unwilling subjects—Versuchspersonen, as they were called; the second was more complex and far-reaching because it was research conducted neither with ordinary methods nor with ordinary aims. Both classes of experiments were the product of a single administrative machine, the structure of which is shown in abbreviated form in Table 86.

An experiment was initiated when someone conceived of the possibility of using inmates to try out a serum, to test a hypothesis, or to solve some other problem. For instance, the chief of the Air Force Medical Service was interested in altitude experiments and the revival of half-frozen pilots shot down over the Atlantic.1 Stabsarzt Dr. Dohmen of the Army Medical Service wanted to do research on jaundice; so far, he had injected healthy animals

75. Affidavit by Otto Hofmann, November 30, 1945, NO-2412.

1. Hippke to Wolff, March 6, 1943, NO-262.
**Table 86 / The Medical Machine of Destruction**

- **Plenipotentiary (later Reichskommissar)** for Hygiene and Health  
  Dr. Karl Brandt

- **Chief, Armed Forces Medical Service**  
  Generaloberstabsarzt  
  Dr. Siegfried Handloser

- **Reichsarzt (party sector)**  
  Dr. Leonardo Conti

- **Chief, Air Force Medical Service**  
  Medical Service  
  Generaloberstabsarzt  
  Dr. Erich Hippke

- **Reichsarzt SS und Polizei**  
  Gruppenführer  
  Dr. Grawitz

- **Deputy**  
  Dr. Kurt Blome

- **President, Robert Koch Institute for Contagious Diseases**  
  Dr. Gildemeister

- **Reich Plenipotentiary for Insane Asylums (Heil- und Pflegestätten)**  
  Ministerialdirektor  
  Dr. Linden

- **Division IV**  
  Health  
  Ministerialdirektor  
  Dr. Cropp

- **IV C**  
  Heredity and Race  
  Ministerialdirektor  
  Dr. Linden

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*Based upon: Chart, signed by Dr. Karl Brandt, undated, NO-645, and Taschenbuch für Verwaltungsbeamte, 1943, PS-3478.*
with virus from jaundiced humans, but now he wanted to reverse the process and inject humans with virus from diseased animals. The "Bayer" research laboratories of I. G. Farben wanted to test a preparation against typhus. The product existed in two forms, tablet and granulated, and it seemed that some patients were throwing up the tablets. The I. G. researchers approached a "friendly insane asylum" to make experiments, then found themselves in an embarrassing position because the insane inmates were unable to tell whether the preparation was less obnoxious in granulated than in tablet form. The I. G. thereupon remembered that one of its researchers was now an Obersturmführer in Auschwitz and asked him to help out. However, most interested parties did not adopt the informal route which I. G. Farben had chosen in this case; they submitted their requests to Reichssürz SS and Polizei Gravitz or to Himmler directly.

From the beginning Himmler personally took a great interest in these matters. Experiments fascinated him, and if he became convinced that the research was of "tremendous importance," he would go out of his way to facilitate the administrative arrangements. This patronizing interest prompted Himmler to order, in 1943, that no experiments were to be started without his express approval. In 1944 the procedure became a bit more elaborate; henceforth, proposals were to be submitted to Gravitz, who was to transmit them to Himmler with attached advisory opinions by Gebhardt, Glücks, and Nebe. Gebhardt's opinion was medical, while

Glücks and Nebe advised on the important question of choosing the victims.

As a rule, doctors asked for permission to use "habitual criminals" or inmates who had been "condemned to death." This formulation was the result of the doctor's attempt to make a compromise with his conscience. A criminal, a man condemned to death—it was reasoned—was certainly not entitled to more favorable treatment than German soldiers risking their lives and dying of wounds, etc. However, in the consideration of the request the SS often added its own notion of criminality, with the consequence that the final choice fell upon "race-defiling Jewish habitual criminals" (rassenschändende Berufsverbrecher-Juden) or perhaps "Jewish criminals of the Polish resistance movement who have been condemned to death."

On one occasion the selection of victims became a subject of discussion from a "racial viewpoint." The experiment under consideration was the conversion of sea water to make it potable. Glücks proposed the utilization of Jews, Nebe countered with "asocial Gypsy Mischlinge" (Gypsy affairs were under Nebe's jurisdiction), while Gravitz for racial reasons suggested that Gypsies were not suitable for sea water experiments.

Himmler was interested not only in the initiation of the experiments. He followed their progress, studied the findings, and occasionally suggested some improvements. Above all, he was

2. Gravitz to Himmler, June 1, 1943, NO-10.
3. "Bayer" Research Division II (signed König) to Dr. Mertens in the division, January 19, 1943, NI-12242. Dr. Weber and Dr. König to Ostub, Dr. Vetter in Auschwitz, January 27, 1943, NI-11417.
4. Pohl to Ostubaf. Brandt, August 10, 1943, NO-1010.
5. Order by Himmler, May 15, 1944, NO-919.
7. For instance, Dohmen. See Gravitz to Himmler, June 1, 1943, NO-10.
8. Himmler's authorization for the Dohmen experiments in his letter to Gravitz, with copy to Pohl, June 16, 1943, NO-11.
9. Gravitz to Himmler, June 28, 1944, NO-179.
the guardian angel of the doctors; he stood ready to assume “full responsibility” for their doings and to deal severely with their critics.

The SS and the participating doctors were ever watchful for undercurrents of disapproval in the medical profession. In May, 1943, Professor Handloser, chief medical officer of the Wehrmacht, called the fourth conference of consulting physicians to the armed forces. During the conference Gebhardt rose to introduce the featured speaker. The lecture was to deal with the transplantation of human bones, and the findings were based on actual experimentation (removal of bones from Polish women in Ravensbrück). “I carry,” said Gebhardt, “the full human, surgical, and political responsibility for these experiments.” The introduction finished, Dr. Fritz Ernst Fischer mounted the rostrum and with the help of charts explained the operations he had performed. His lecture was followed by a discussion. No criticism was raised.10

Once, during the Rascher experiments for the air force, an eruption did take place. Rascher, an air force Stabsarzt (captain), was a man who enjoyed Himmler’s friendship and patronage. (Thus, on being informed that Rascher’s mistress was pregnant for the second time, Himmler sent her fresh fruit to make sure that mother and child would be well.) Rascher’s involvement began one day when he was attending an air force course which dealt with altitude problems and pilots’ stamina. Upon the instructor’s chance remark that no experiments had ever been carried out with human beings, Rascher conceived of the idea of using some “habitual criminals” for this purpose. He communicated his proposal to Himmler11 and received the permission of Generaloberstabsarzt Hippke to perform the experiments.

After a while insinuations and criticisms by other air force doctors began to make the rounds. One man, Professor Holzlöhner, even made remarks about Himmler’s person while visiting the experimental site at Dachau. Rascher made a strong complaint to Himmler, and the Reichsführer-SS replied that he, too, would classify people who rejected the use of human beings for experiments at a time when German soldiers were dying as traitors of the second and first degree (Hoch- und Landesverräter).12 To Generalfeldmarschall Milch, Himmler wrote in the same vein, omitting references to treason but emphasizing that he would not be deterred by these “Christian” circles. Rascher, said Himmler, could be transferred to the SS, and the conscience problem would be solved. The air force would still have the benefit of all findings by Dr. Rascher.13

A few months later, Hippke wrote a letter to Wolff accepting the arrangement but taking the opportunity of correcting a few false impressions. First of all, nobody had objected to these experiments. Hippke had “immediately agreed” to them. The difficulty lay in another sphere: it was all a question of vanity. Everyone wanted to be the one to come out with new research discoveries. But if Rascher wished to create his own research institute in the Waffen-SS, Hippke would have no objection and would bid him good riddance.14

These were all doctors who made use of human guinea pigs. But some went

10. Affidavit by Fischer, November 21, 1945, Conspiracy and Aggression, VIII, 635-42.


14. Hippke to Wolff, March 6, 1943, NO-262.
one step further, carrying out experiments which were no longer characterized by any desire to help patients. These experiments had an altogether different direction—they were identified with Nazi aims. In these activities, one may glimpse an attempt to widen the destruction process. The medical technicians who became involved in this research were not merely engaged in tinkering with inmates; they were trying to discover a means by which Germany could rule Europe forever.

One day in October, 1941, a retired Army doctor, Adolf Pokorny, sat down to write a letter to Himmler. To avoid the possibility that a subordinate might open the letter and read its contents, it was sent to Himmler by a messenger, Professor Höhn. In his letter Pokorny pointed out that he had read an article in a medical journal by a certain Dr. Madaus of the biological institute at Radebeul-Dresden. The article dealt with the effect of injecting the extract of a South American plant—Caladium seguinum—into mice and rats; the animals were sterilized. While reading this article, Pokorny had thought of the "tremendous importance" of this drug "in the present struggle of our people." It should be possible, continued Pokorny, to produce in short order a preparation which would lead to the sterilization of people without their knowledge. In this connection he dropped a hint that Germany had three million Soviet prisoners of war, and in conclusion he made a few urgent suggestions: Madaus to publish no more articles, the plant to be produced in hothouses, chemical analysis to determine whether an extract could be synthesized, and "immediate experiments on human beings."  

A few months later Himmler ordered Pohl to offer Dr. Madaus possibilities of doing research. Himmler was actually quite impatient, and in September, 1942, Pohl, Lolling (medical chief, WVHA D-III), and Madaus agreed to transfer the work to the concentration camps.  

While these preparations were being made, someone else took note of the Madaus article: On August 24, 1942, the deputy Gauleiter of Lower Austria, SS-Oberführer Gerland, also addressed a letter to Himmler. Impressing upon Himmler the "tremendous importance" of the Madaus discovery, he requested that the Gauleiter expert on racial questions, Dr. Fehringer, be permitted to conduct experiments—in collaboration with the Pharmacological Institute of the Medical Faculty of Vienna University—in a Gypsy camp at Lackenbach. Himmelf's reply (through Obersturmbannführer Brandt) was friendly. The matter was already under investigation, but there were difficulties because the plant was not available in sufficient quantity; if Dr. Fehringer had a supply at hand, the Reichsführer-SS would be very glad to hear about it.

The obstacles proved insurmountable, and scientific reinforcements were called up. In November, 1942, Dr. Müller-Cunradi, director of the I. G. Farben laboratory at Ludwigshafen, sent one of his biochemists, Dr. Tauboeck, to the Madaus Institute. Tauboeck and Madaus had a discussion about the matter. The whole investigation had started when Madaus had read in the literature that a Brazilian tribe was using Caladium seguinum to sterilize its enemies. The natives accom-


17. Pohl to Rudl Brandt, September 7, 1946, NO-41. Affidavit by Rudolf Brandt, October 19, 1946, NO-440.

18. Gerland to Himmler, August 24, 1942, NO-39.


15. Pokorny to Himmler, October, 1941, NO-35.
plished the sterilization by shooting arrows at the enemy (that is, by intramuscular injection), and the victim was usually unaware of his fate. But Germany did not have the climate for growing this plant, and the feat could not be repeated.\textsuperscript{20}

The Madaus method was not the only attempt to reconcile the short-range needs of the war with the long-range policy of destruction. The idea that after intensive labor utilization during the emergency subject peoples would be allowed to die a natural death, without a chance to replenish themselves, was a recurring thought in Nazi medical circles. Thus in May, 1941, Himmler became interested in “nonsurgical sterilization of inferior women.” The author of this idea was Professor Carl Clauberg, chief physician of the woman’s clinic in Knappschaft Hospital and St. Hedwig Hospital at Königshütte, Upper Silesia. Clauberg proposed that an irritant be introduced into the uterus by means of a syringe. This procedure became known as the “Clauberg method.”

Three doctors were lined up to assist Clauberg in making experiments (Standartenführer Prof. von Wolff, Berlin; Sturmbannführer Prof. Erhardt, Graz, University Women’s Clinic; and Hauptsturmführer Dr. Günther F. K. Schultz, Grieswald, University Women’s Clinic).\textsuperscript{21} But there was one administrative obstacle. Himmler wanted Clauberg to work in the large women’s concentration camp at Ravensbrück; Clauberg did not wish to move there with his cumbersome apparatus. And in spite of Grawitz’ urgings that because of the “tremendous significance” of these experiments inmates should be made available at Königshütte,\textsuperscript{22} all plans collapsed at this point.

One year later Clauberg had a “scientific discussion” with a Himmler man, Obersturmbannführer Arlt. In the course of the conversation Clauberg brought up his now vastly expanded plans for experiments. Arlt pointed out that in such matters Himmler was the right man. Clauberg thereupon wrote to Himmler requesting permission to set up his apparatus in Auschwitz and to perform experiments there with a view to perfecting mass sterilization methods for “unworthy women” (fortipflanzungsunwürdige Frauen) as well as producing fertility in “worthy women.”\textsuperscript{23} His letter produced results.

On July 7, 1942, Himmler, Gebhardt, Glucks, and Clauberg met in conference and decided to start experiments in Auschwitz. The aim of the experiments was, first of all, the discovery of means by which a victim could be sterilized without becoming aware of what was being done to her. The experiments were to be performed in “major dimensions” upon Jewish women in the camp. Secondly, it was agreed to call upon a foremost X-ray specialist, Professor Hohlfelder, to find out whether X-ray castration of men was feasible. In conclusion, Himmler warned all those present that these were most secret matters and that anyone drawn into the work had to be pledged to secrecy.\textsuperscript{24}

Three days later Himmler’s Secretary Brandt sent a letter to Clauberg.

\textsuperscript{20} Affidavit by Dr. Karl Tausbeek, June 18, 1947, NO-3993. Apart from this difficulty, there were others. The effect of \textit{Caladium segetum} upon reproduction is the same as overdoses of nicotene, morphine, or just plain hunger. Apparently no one had informed Himmler that many of Madaus’ rats had died from poisoning. Affidavit by Dr. Friedrich Jung, undated, Pockorny-30.

\textsuperscript{21} Grawitz to Himmler, May 30, 1941, NO-214.

\textsuperscript{22} Grawitz to Himmler, May 29, 1941, NO-1639.

\textsuperscript{23} Clauberg to Himmler, May 30, 1942, NO-211.

\textsuperscript{24} Memorandum by Brandt, July, 1942, NO-216. See also his memorandum dated July 11, 1942, NO-215.
with a few additional requirements and suggestions. Himmler wanted to know how fast 1000 Jewish women could be sterilized. "The Jewesses themselves should know nothing." The results of the experiments were to be checked by taking X-ray pictures and studying them for any changes. In one or the other case, Clauberg could also make a "practical test" such as locking a "Jewess and a Jew" into a room for a certain period of time and waiting for the effects.20

One more year passed while Clauberg worked busily in Block 10 of Auschwitz I, the experimental block. To "fool" the victims, he told the women before injecting the irritating fluid that they were undergoing artificial insemination.21 Clauberg liked his work and wanted to show off. When Pohl visited Auschwitz one day, Clauberg approached the Obergruppenführer at dinner and invited him to witness a few experiments. Pohl declined.22

In June, 1943, Clauberg sent his first report to Himmler. The method was "almost perfected" (so gut wie fertig ausgearbeitet), although he still had to devise a few "improvements" (Verfeinerungen). At the moment it was effective in "usual" cases; furthermore, he could assure the Reichsführer-SS that the sterilization could be performed imperceptibly in the course of a normal gynecological examination. With ten assistants a doctor could sterilize 1000 women in one day.23 (Clauberg did not specify how secrecy could be maintained in the mass sterilization procedure.)

While Clauberg went on to "perfect" his method, there was still a third attempt to work out a mass sterilization program: the X-ray experiments. As early as March, 1941, Himmler and the Führer Chancellery (Bouhler and Brack) had discussed sterilization problems, and in the course of these discussions Brack wrote a letter to Himmler in which he gave his expert opinion on the subject. This letter was quite amazing. It started as a sober account of the possibilities of X-rays in the field of sterilization and castration. Preliminary investigations by medical experts of the chancellery, wrote Brack, had indicated that small doses of X-rays achieved only temporary sterilization; large doses caused burns. Having come to this conclusion, Brack ignored it completely and continued with the following fantastic scheme: The persons to be "processed" (die abzufertigen Personen) would step up to a counter to be asked some questions or to fill out forms. Thus occupied, the unsuspecting candidate for sterilization would face the window for two or three minutes while the official sitting behind the counter would throw a switch which would release X-rays through two tubes pointing at the victim. With twenty such counters (cost: 20,000–30,000 marks apiece) 3000–4000 persons could be sterilized daily.24

The proposal was not immediately followed up, but Brack brought it up again, in June, 1942, in connection with the installation of the gassing apparatus in the Generalgouvernement camps. It seemed to Brack that among the 10 million Jews who were doomed to die, there were at least 2 or 3 million who

25. Brandt to Clauberg, copies to Pohl, OSübaaf, Kögel (Ravensbrück), and Stubaf. Günther (RSHA IV-B-4), July 10, 1942, NO-213. Kögel and Günther received copies because Himmler was still attempting to persuade Clauberg to sterilize the "Jewesses" in Ravensbrück.

26. Affidavit by Jeannie Ingred Salomon, October 9, 1946, NO-810. Affiant, a survivor, was a victim of experimentation.

27. Affidavit by Pohl, July 14, 1946, NO-65.

28. Clauberg to Himmler, June 7, 1943, NO-212.

29. Brack to Himmler, March 28, 1941, NO-203. Brack testified after the war that this letter was deliberate nonsense. See his testimony in Case No. 1, tr. pp. 7484–93.
were needed desperately in the war effort. Of course they could be utilized only if they were sterilized. Since the usual surgical sterilization was too slow and expensive, he wished to remind Himmler that already a year before he had pointed out the advantages of X-rays. The fact that the victims would become aware of their sterilization after a few months was a trifling consideration at this stage of the game. In conclusion, Brack stated that his chief, Reichsleiter Bouhler, was ready to furnish all the necessary doctors and other personnel to carry out the program. This time Himmler replied that he should like to have the X-ray method tried out in at least one camp in an experimental series.

The experiments were carried out in Auschwitz by Dr. Horst Schumann, on women and men. As Schumann moved into Auschwitz, competition in the experimental blocks was shifted into high gear. Schumann and Clauberg were joined by the chief camp doctor, Wirtz, who started his own experimental series, performing operations on girls aged seventeen and eighteen and on mothers in their thirties. A Jewish inmate doctor from Germany, Dr. Samuel, was also impressed into the experiments. Another camp doctor, Mengele, confined his studies to twins.

30. Brack to Himmler, June 23, 1942, NO-205.
31. Himmler to Brack, copies to Pohl and Grawitz, August 11, 1942, NO-204. Also, acceptance of Himmler's offer by Brack's deputy Blankenburg, August 14, 1942, NO-207.
32. See Clauberg letter to Ostubaf. Brandt, August 8, 1943, NO-210, in which Clauberg complained that in his absence one of his X-ray machines had been used by other gentlemen. Though he did not mind this procedure, he did need the second machine to perform his "positive" experiments (increase of fertility), etc.
33. Affidavit by Jeanne Salomon, October 9, 1946, NO-510.
34. Testimony by Adelaide de Jong, Laws Reports of Trials of War Criminals (London, for it was his ambition to multiply the German nation. All these experiments, which consumed many hundreds of victims, led to nothing. Not one of the rivals succeeded. One day Brack's deputy, Blankenburg, admitted failure of the experiments conducted on men: the X-rays were less reliable and less speedy than operative castration. In other words, it had taken three years to find out what was known in the beginning.

Although the sterilization experiments were infused with dilettantism and plain deception, they were a significant episode in European history. In the very concepcion of these explorations, the destruction process threatened to escape from its narrowly defined channel and to engulf everyone within reach who might be branded as "inferior." Already, the fate of Mischlinge of the first degree hung in the balance while the Interior Ministry waited for the perfection of mass sterilization techniques. In consequence of the failure of these experiments a development was arrested which had spelled in its dim outlines the doom of large sections of the population of Europe.

This, then, marks the difference between the ordinary experiments and the mass sterilization attempts. If in the course of an ordinary experiment a victim died, the doctor performing the experiment had transformed himself from a healer into a killer. The doctor who tampered with sterilization, however, rendered himself into an architect of mass destruction. And that was not yet the end. The Nazi hierarchy also promoted a few researchers who

1947), VII, 25. Witness, a Jewish survivor, was sterilized by Dr. Samuel.
35. Perl, I Was a Doctor in Auschwitz, PP. 125-27.
wanted to fortify the mass destructive aim with an unassailable scientific reason; in their search for such a reason these doctors regressed from medical discovery and, redirecting their steps into a dead end, destroyed their science.

How did this research emerge? We have pointed out from time to time how the extreme Nazis viewed the destruction process as a race struggle. To these Nazis the anti-Jewish measures were a defensive battle of the "Nordic racial substance" against the creeping onslaught of an "inferior racial mixture." This rationalization had its difficulties. Many officials failed to see any intrinsic connection between physical characteristics and Weltanschauung; ideologists in the party and the SS were therefore hard put to prove their theory. It is not surprising that in their quest for substantiation they resorted to experiments. Let us look at two of them.

In the spring of 1942 an attempt was made to show that Gypsies had different blood than Germans had. Two doctors, Professor Werner Fischer and Stabsarzt (Captain) Dr. Hornbeck — both of whom had acquired experience while working on Negro prisoners of war — received permission to perform experiments on Gypsies in Sachsenhausen. Hornbeck dropped out because he was sent to the eastern front, and Fischer started out on forty Gypsies. At Himmler's request he promised to widen his research by exploring Jewish blood also.37

Another approach was tried by "Ahnenernbe," an organization formed by the SS in 1938 to investigate "the sphere, spirit, deed, and heritage of the Nordic Indo-Germanic race."38 The president of the organization was

Himmler; its business manager was Standartenführer Sievers; and one of its researchers was Hauptsturmführer Prof. Hirt, director of anatomy in the Reich University at Strasbourg.

At the beginning of 1942 Hirt lay in the clinic, his lungs bleeding and his blood circulation gravely impaired. From his sickbed he sent the following report to Himmler: All nations and races had been studied by examination of skull collections; only in the case of the Jews were there too few skulls to permit scientific conclusions. The war in the East offered an opportunity to correct this situation. "In the Jewish-Bolshevist commissars, who embody a repulsive but characteristic subhumanity, we have the possibility of obtaining a plastic source for study [ein greifbar wissenschaftliches Dokument] if we secure their skulls." The commissars, proposed Hirt, had best be handed over to the Field Police alive. A doctor would then take down vital statistics, kill the Jews, carefully remove the head, etc.39 Brandt replied that Himmler was very interested in this project but that, first of all, Hirt's health had to be restored. Perhaps a little fresh fruit would help.40

After a few months Hirt recovered sufficiently to do his work. In view of the scarcity of "Jewish-Bolshevist commissars," Ahnenernbe declared itself ready to accept 150 Jews from Auschwitz.41 An Ahnenernbe official, Hauptsturmführer Dr. Bruno Beger, was sent to the camp; 115 persons — including 79 Jewish men, 30 Jewish women, 4 central Asians, and 2 Poles — were quarantined, and arrangements were made with Eichmann to have them transferred to Natzweiler, where they

38. See charter of the institute, signed by Himmler, January 1, 1939, NO-659.
39. Sievers to Stubaf. Dr. Brandt, February 9, 1942, enclosing report by Hirt, NO-85.
40. Brandt to Sievers, February 27, 1942, NO-90.
41. Sievers to Brandt, November 2, 1942, NO-86.
were gassed.\(^4\) The bodies were brought to Strasbourg and preserved for race studies.\(^5\) There, in the anatomical laboratory of the university, the utmost that German doctors were capable of ran its course.

Administratively, then, the medical experiments were only peripheral to the destruction process. Taking advantage of a huge supply of doomed human beings, the doctors appropriated a few thousand victims. Psychologically, the experiments pose a wider problem, bringing into focus the enormous extent of latent destructiveness in German society. In order to deal with these psychological implications, we have paid much attention to this subject, but now we must come back to the killing center operations in the midst of which the experiments went on.

5 / Confiscations

We come now to the remaining two killing center operations: the confiscation of property and the killings themselves. The utilization of inmates for labor and experiments was an interruption of the process, an introduction of intermediary procedures for economic and other extrinsic purposes. Only the expropriations and killings were organic in an administrative sense. They were the only two operations which were implemented in all six death camps and which embraced all but a few Jewish deportees.

The confiscation of personal belongings was a catchall affair. Everything the Jews had managed to keep, every-


43. Staf. Sievers to Staf. Brandt, September 5, 1944, NO-98.

thing they had succeeded in hiding, was collected in the killing centers. Property which the satellite states had been forced to relinquish in order that the deportees could start life anew in the "East" now also fell into the bag. Everything was collected and turned into profit. But the salvage of that property was a precise, well-planned operation.

A preliminary step toward systematic salvage was taken in the spring of 1941. In April of that year the RSHA informed the inspectorate that returning to relatives and dependants the personal belongings taken from Jews in concentration camps was "out of the question." The property was subject to confiscation through the normal channels (that is, the Regierungspräsidenten).\(^1\) This procedure, it must be remembered, applied to all camps before the start of mass deportations. After the establishment of the killing centers the collection, sorting, and distribution of the vast number of personal belongings became a major problem which could no longer be handled on an ad hoc basis; accordingly, special administrative machinery was set up for the purpose of carrying out these expropriations. Under the new arrangements collection was handled by the individual camps, but the inventory and disposal of the items became much more complicated.

Jurisdiction over sorting and distribution of the Kulmhof loot was centralized under an organization which was outside SS and Police control: the Ghetto Administration of Lodz. Kulmhof was strictly a local enterprise, set up by Gauleiter Greiser for the Jews in his Gau. As previously pointed out, Greiser conferred on the Ghettoverwaltung of Litzmannstadt (Lodz) the

1. Liebehenschel to camp commanders, May 5, 1941, enclosing letter by RSHA II-A-8 (signed Dr. Neckmann) to inspectorate, dated April 3, 1941, NO-1235.
The DESTRUCTION of the EUROPEAN JEWS

by RAUL HILBERG

QUADRANGLE BOOKS / CHICAGO