THE
VIET-CONG
STRATEGY
OF
TERROR

DOUGLAS PIKE
The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror

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Saigon, Viet-Nam

February 1970
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This monograph was written privately as a contribution to understanding the present-day situation in Viet-Nam. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government.
Chapter I: Overview
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As this is being written, early in 1970, the so-called Vietnamization process is well under way in South Viet-Nam. What is going on is the assumption of responsibility by the South Vietnamese for all aspects of the war, accompanied by the orderly -- but not precipitous -- disengagement of U.S. military forces. Only as this process reaches its conclusion (and no man now knows, exactly, when that will be) will one be able to assess the degree to which the coherence of the social structure in South Viet-Nam, including both civil and military elements, has been retained and strengthened in the face of the communists' persistent efforts to reduce it to chaos.

The communists have indicated\(^1\) that they are picking up the "Vietnamization" gauntlet thrown down by the governments of Viet-Nam and the United States. They appear, at least in terms of public pronouncements, to be confident they can spoil this effort to transfer the burden and frustrate the endeavors of the South Vietnamese to establish, after the Americans have departed, a system that can stand alone. From the documents and pronouncements noted above\(^2\), it is apparent that the communist leadership has mapped out for its forces four tasks which, if successful, will yield communist victory. In order of priority they are:

1. To prove by demonstration (possibly with division-sized operations) that the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) cannot successfully fight alone.

2. To prove that the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) in Saigon is a mere facade propped up by the Americans and will collapse when American disengagement reaches a certain point.

3. To destroy the various political, social, economic and militia-type programs the GVN has under way in the country's 2,500 villages -- collectively known as the Pacification Program -- thus destroying or minimizing any faith and trust villagers might have in the Saigon government.

4. To increase American casualties so as to turn the disengagement into a rout.
In pursuing these four objectives, particularly objectives two and three (one and four being essentially military activity), it is quite probable that the communists will make increased and intensified use of what they variously call armed struggle, armed reconnaissance or sapper work, or what the other side calls terror.

It is more difficult than might first appear to distinguish between terror and violence or between terror and war. Terror, of course, is a pejorative word, one which each side uses to deprecate the activities of the other. Without being drawn too far afield, it would seem fair, for purposes of this monograph, to define terror as illegal violence, assuming that warfare, although immoral in ethical terms, is legal in the context of international law, but that even in warfare certain acts are illegal and may properly be termed terror. This latter point rests on the belief that in all things there are limits, and a limit in warfare is reached at the point of systematic use of death, pain, fear and anxiety among the population (either civilian and military) for the deliberate purpose of coercing, manipulating, intimidating, punishing or simply frightening into helpless submission. Certain acts even in war are beyond the pale and can only be labeled terror.

Probably the men of Hanoi would subscribe to this. They use the word terror frequently in describing their enemy's actions in the South, usually drawing a legal distinction: terror is a criminal act of violence, although other acts of violence are not criminal. It should be made clear that Hanoi theorists do not endorse any form of pacifism, which would equate war with terror. In fact, they reject flatly and vehemently the Gandhian type of passive non-violence in favor of what they term the armed struggle movement. To get a communist in Viet-Nam to admit to a terror act (by your definition) is not necessarily to show him guilty of anything in his own mind.

In part, of course, this is a semantic question -- that is, the difference between terror and force. What seems more to the point is not language but thought pattern, world view, philosophy of politics or however you want to characterize the question which divides us most sharply in the 20th Century: what are the limits to force, irrational violence, terror, in
that ascending order, in bringing about social change? All of us fall somewhere along this force-violence-terror continuum. Toward one end are those who believe that less rather than more is justified; toward the other are those who advocate more on grounds of imperative need or as principle. As one looks about at various world societies in various conditions of social pathology, one cannot help but conclude sadly that the drift toward the extreme end, terror, is anything but a diminishing phenomenon. Thus the question of force/terror is not one of concern only to the Vietnamese, but one that concerns us all.

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The communists in Viet-Nam, as we shall see, are far down the continuum. Terror is an essential ingredient of nearly all their programs. Current intelligence in Viet-Nam points to a continuation of this. Indicators, such as information on communist training programs, weaponry shipments, personnel assignment, public statements on doctrine and strategy, all suggest that the communists are in the process of reverting to the so-called protracted conflict thesis, perhaps in some new form. Much of the intelligence indicates that this new form will involve what in part might be termed a strategy of terror. An example is the conversion of communist military and paramilitary elements into wide-ranging, well-trained sappers or city commandoes assigned to full-time terrorism. This does not necessarily mean a substantial increase in terror incidents -- already the incident rate is at a high level -- but that terror will become even more central to communist strategy than in the recent past.

Therefore, it seems worthwhile that a monograph on this new strategy, and especially the aspects dealing with terror, be written at this time. It would not be worthwhile nor is it the purpose of this monograph, to produce a word picture of Vietnamese communist as fiendish fanatics with blood dripping from their hands. Most of the world that pays any attention to the war in Viet-Nam learned years ago the communists engage systematically in what we here define as terror (indeed, as we shall see, the communists assert they have a right to do so). If there still be at this late date any who regard
them as friendly agrarian reformers, nothing here could possibly change that view. Hopefully this monograph will be of some aid in understanding communist doctrine and strategy as they unfold during the crucial next year or two. If it also is an indictment of communist behavior, it is because the behavior is indictable.

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Saigon, Viet-Nam
February 1, 1970
Chapter I - Footnotes
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1 - See especially Resolution Nine, which contains a detailed communist assessment of the current military situation and represents an accurate portrayal of the collective judgment of the men of the DRV politburo; The Party's Military Line, by General Vo Nguyen Giap; and Under the Party Banner by Colonel General Van Tien Dung. All three have been published recently in the Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes series by the U.S. Mission, Viet-Nam. Earlier indications of changed communist strategy are found in the author's War, Peace and the Viet Cong (MIT Press 1969).

2 - Ibid.
Chapter II: Doctrine and Programs
Chapter II: Doctrine and Programs

The goal of the communists in Viet-Nam is unification of North and South Viet-Nam under the communist banner. Their leaders have reiterated this goal in virtually every speech since 1954. It is implicit in their every act, in Viet-Nam or in Paris. To most South Vietnamese, this is what the war in Viet-Nam is all about. The issue is not peace, the issue is forced unification.

In seeking their objective over the years the communists have employed various grand strategies:

* Unification by relying on French diplomacy (1954-58).

* Unification by fostering anarchy, chaos and social pathology in South Viet-Nam (1959-64).

* Unification by big-unit war, i.e., 130 battalions of North Vietnamese soldiers in South Viet-Nam, doing 80 percent of the day-to-day combat (1965-present).

Through the years the struggle in Viet-Nam has had a dual character, in effect it has been two wars. One war, in communist terminology the armed struggle, pitted the Liberation Army and later the North Vietnamese Army against the South Vietnamese Army and later the Allied armies. This kind of combat is as old as war itself -- contending armies each trying to destroy the other. It is an adjunct to the more central war, the political struggle waged on the communist side by various specially-created organizations collectively (and inaccurately) termed by the world the Viet-Cong. The individual fighting this other war is the man in the black pajama of the Vietnamese peasant. His mission is to steal people away from the government. His concern is almost exclusively control of the people, as distinguished from the big-unit war, where the concern is "control" of the enemy's army. He seeks to achieve this through programs designed to control the people, programs augmented
and made possible by as much (and as little) military effort as is required.

Population Control

Control of the people, and here we are chiefly concerned with the two-thirds or so of the population living in the nation's villages, is sought through a number of specific methods. One means is enmeshing the villager in a network of social movements and organizations which develop social pressures to keep the dissenter in line, probably the most powerful force in any society. Another is through intensive communication efforts: education, "thought reform", agitation, propaganda. A third means is coercion, force and terror. All, and others besides, are essential to the system.

To understand fully their use by communists, one must understand the political and social instruments through which the communists work. This apparatus includes the Party, the various military elements, the popular front organization and mutual interest groups2. All are engaged in various types of programs. All of these programs contain elements of terror, not as a capricious addition, but as an integral part. In short, the communists operate a population control system resting in part on terror.

This does not mean a system in which terror is dominant, all pervasive and always at the forefront. Quite the contrary. What is vital to the system is not terror which has been employed. Terror employed, at that point and in that particular case, must be put down as a program failure. What is vital is the underpinning of terror, the ominous spectre always hovering in the background; ideally, threatening but never emerging. Of course credibility demands periodic demonstrations that one still is able and willing to use terror.

Too often communist terror is portrayed in simplistic terms: viciousness for its own sake, terror simply to terrorize, the communists presented as sub-human sadists
indifferent to the blood on their hands. Those who paint it thus do a disservice to truth and a greater one to understanding. The average communist in Viet-Nam thinks of his system not in moral but in utilitarian terms. He finds terror to be the single greatest advantage he has over the government, one which he credits for making possible most of his successes. This being the case, he can intellectualize and semantically its use and easily come to regard himself as a finer person than those whom he terrorizes.

It has become an axiom for the communists that their successes are a direct function of the degree of people's sense of insecurity: the greater the insecurity, the better their prospects. This is well known and fully understood at all communist levels. Insecurity is not exactly the same as terror, but is closely allied to it. Conversely, for the government, the more security the brighter its prospects. To the government, security is not exactly the same as organization, but it is its heart.

Thus, in effect, the tool of the communists in establishing control consists of those programs which terrorize, just as the indispensable device of the government, also seeking to establish control, is organization. This is not to suggest that terror is the only concern of the communists any more than that the only concern of the government is organization. In each case it is the respective essence. All communist programs therefore have development of insecurity/terror as their center.

A frank word is required here about "terror" on the other side, by the government and the Allied forces fighting in Viet-Nam. No one with any experience in Viet-Nam denies that troops, police and others commanding physical power, have committed excesses that are, by our working definition, acts of terror. No one can justify these, no one can condone them. They are wrong and beyond atonement. The heat of battle is no excuse. Neither is the argument that every army, now or in history, has been similarly guilty.
But there is an essential difference in such acts between the two sides, one of outcome or result. To the communist, terror has utility and is beneficial to his cause, while to the other side the identical act is self-defeating. This is not because one side is made up of heroes and the other of villains. It is because, as noted above, terror is integral in all the communist tactics and programs and the communists could not rid themselves of it if they wanted to. Meanwhile, the other side firmly believes, even though its members do not always behave accordingly, that there is a vested interest in abstaining from such acts.

One might remark that terror from passion is the same as terror from policy, but in fact there is a world of difference: the difference of one side seeking to maximize its use and the other seeking to eliminate it from its ranks.

Rationale

Two devices are employed constantly and intensively by the communists in verbalizing their use of terror: semantics and legalisms.

The communists choose their words most carefully when writing or talking about what we here define as terror, and it is virtually impossible to condemn them out of their own mouths by quoting them. A whole range of terms and words are studiously avoided. In print especially the subject of communist violence is treated delicately, alluded to, or circumnavigated. Communist writers are masters of the technique of writing around a subject, leaving the desired impression without ever dealing directly with it. Something of the nature and flavor of this exercise in semantics is contained in the following examples taken from communist announcements and reports.

* Blowing Up Saigon Police Headquarters. "At 0830 hours on August 16 a commando unit of the Liberation Army, Saigon-Gia Dinh area, attacked valiantly the Saigon puppet administration's Directorate General of National Police at
the intersection of Vo Tanh street and Cong Hoa Boulevard... The hooligan police faced with the violent attack dared not resist and their losses were very heavy... This was an appropriate blow directed at these lackeys of the Americans, notorious for their dishonesty, wickedness and cruelty. "³

* Execution of Two American Prisoners of War. The punishment of September 26 of U.S. Captain Humbert R. Versace and Sgt. Kenneth M. Roarback is a fully justified act, severe and well deserved... a proper protest against the fascist sentence and execution by the lackey government of three patriots (convicted by the GVN of terror acts - Ed.). To prevent further such crimes on the part of the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen the NLF has carried out its severe verdict against the aggressors. "⁴

* Killing of Civilians. "⁵We never did it without reason. We advised people who worked with the government to stop. Some of them were very stubborn. We would warn them three times, but still some refused to leave the government side. Since they stayed with the government, it meant they supported the government's fascist suppression efforts. So they deserved to be punished. "⁶

* Killing Government Social Welfare Workers. "The (enemy) is concentrating its greatest efforts against the countryside. It is trumpeting about the vanguard role of the so-called Revolutionary Development groups. These are people who are given a quick training course to turn them into hunting dogs to operate under the cover of cultural, educational and social welfare work, using intimidation and demagogy... We are attacking and punishing these cadres right in their dens or when they crawl out to spray their poison...."⁷

* Killing Government Civil Servants. Smash the enemy pacification scheme... The U.S.-puppet vile terrorist methods have given (our) self-defense armed combatants new urgent tasks, which are to heighten vigilance..., wipe out enemy spy organizations, maintain security for compa-
triot... (Our people) have relentlessly demonstrated their gallantry, steadfastness, resourcefulness, determination and boldness. 7

Note the absence of any words that imply terror. In communist output (and this is generally true of internal documents circulated only among Party members as well as published statements) one is seldom shot or decapitated; he is punished or the Front has exercised its power. The victim is never a civil servant but a puppet repressor, or a cruel element; never a policeman but a secret agent or a lackey henchman. One is not an American, Korean or Thai, but an imperialist aggressor or imperialist aggressor lackey. One is not a member of a political or religious group opposing the communists but a key reactionary or recalcitrant elements (when more than one) in an oppressive organization. Always cruel fascists are brought to justice or criminal acts against patriots avenged or the Front has carried out its severe verdict against the aggressors, not that non-combatants have been slaughtered. Such is the language that can rationalize use of terror.

The second device employed is the facade of legalism. It is no accident that the head of the NLF is a lawyer. Or that the NLF has carried on extensive public communication over the years with the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a communist-front group, including sending representatives to each of its meetings, even those in Central Africa. All communist efforts in the South are cast in terms of having a judicial base. A codified system always is intimated, even though none exists. Assassinations are carried out after a "trial" in a "people's court". The "verdict" is handed down and then "implemented". For an example of this effort to create an image of code-based law, consider the tone and language of two public pronouncements, the first dealing with the execution of the two American prisoners cited earlier:

"Faced with this situation (GVN execution of communist terrorists), the NLF could not let the U.S. aggressors
and their lackeys go unpunished. Logically, the U.S. aggressors captured by us should have been brought before people's courts for trial long before, because they illegally invaded our country and committed many crimes against our people... To punish the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys for having massacred our compatriots indiscriminately, the Liberation Armed Forces command ordered the punishment of the two aforementioned U.S. aggressors. 8

The second:

"In order to severely punish the reactionary agents and spies, defend the revolutionary power and safeguard the people's lives and property, the people's courts of Ca Mau and Can Tho provinces recently held public trials of the reactionary agents and spies who had created disturbances and undermined public safety in the liberated areas." 9

This is the language of law, seeking to convey the aura of the courtroom, the judicial process at work. It is a constantly-employed screen with which the communists hope to avoid the stigma of illegality for their terror-based programs.

In the Communist-Controlled Villages

Some 400 villages of the 2500 total in the country, chiefly in the more remote parts of the country (and incorporating about 10 percent of the population) are under communist control and it is the programs in these villages that we seek to examine briefly here.

Some of these villages have been under more or less continual communist control for a generation and have come to be something of an enclave communist society. Not a great deal is known about life in these villages but it is known that certain social institutions have changed considerably -- production and marketing of rice, the parent-child relationship, the nature of social organization, for example.

In this sub-society the aims are: internal order,
external security, expansion of geographic size, revolutionary justice and mutual welfare, in that order. Its economics are semi-collectivist with considerable socialist competition. Its political tools are custom and terror. Its cloak of authority, Party ceremony and symbolism. Political obedience exists in these villages because of villager self-interest and habit resting on fear and force with outward manifestation of inertia, deference, sympathy or numbed resignation.

A host of social organizations at the village level enmesh the villager in a web of social control. Strong social sanctions -- physical, psychological and economic -- are used to force conformity. There is no escape except to flee the village for the government area. This villagers have done by the tens of thousands. Most of the so-called refugees in Viet-Nam are not refugees from battle but are self-displaced war victims, having as much attempted to escape the repressive hand of the communists in their villages as to escape dangers of war. "Refugees" do not come from secure government-controlled areas.

The communists portray the "liberated village" as a sort of peaceful, tranquil Shangri La where not only hostility but even animosity has vanished and the only worry is the intrusion of the government. Those who come from such villages, however, depict them as places of never-ending "urgent tasks of revolution." Cadres constantly harangue villagers to raise more food for PAVN troops in the vicinity; to engage in corvée labor such as transporting supplies for the military; to join local "self-defense" units; to buy more "war bonds" or pay more "national defense taxes"; to root out spies. These are merely some of the tasks in a never-ending list.

Authority in the village is essentially negative, denying the government access to the villagers. Adjudication of non-political internal disputes is handled casually by local committees. All else, especially anything involving security, is handled by district level cadres virtually as they please. Such a cadre is judge, jury and executioner rolled into one.
Freed prisoners from communist "jails" have told bone-chilling stories of communist justice in action. The most grievous crime is "spying" which can be any act the communists decide is hostile. Cadres, as well as the apparat as a whole, have developed a paranoic preoccupation with spies in recent years.

Any suspect may be arrested by any cadre. He is then handed over to the district level political officer along with his dossier and a bill of indictment. He goes before a "People's Court" which tries and sentences him -- to death or imprisonment. Usually the death penalty must be approved by provincial officials. District cadres may sentence persons to prison or detention up to one month. Longer sentences must be approved by provincial officials. An exception is "anyone who uses force to prevent the people's will... he may be executed on the spot by the district cadre."10

To handle a rather large volume of villagers who are suspected of harboring anti-communist thoughts and are therefore not to be trusted, but who have committed no known act of "spying," a "sentence of surveillance," which is in effect house arrest, has been devised. A captured directive described its operation:

"The following persons should immediately be put under the sentence of surveillance: Those enemies of society whose arrest and execution or imprisonment would not be beneficial to the Revolution; those guilty of being enemies of society who have not repented but whose cases are not so serious as to warrant imprisonment; former inmates of (communist) prisons who have not repented. Names of all persons under surveillance sentence must be sent immediately to district cadres. Persons in this category must make a public confession and denounce their accomplices. They must present themselves every 15 days to the village security cadre and make a public report on their re-education progress. They must perform forced labor to redeem themselves. The surveillance sentence can last up to two years at the end of which time the person, if still unredeemed, will be tried by a People's Court."
Thought reform sessions were introduced by Northern cadres in 1966 and since have become a standard institution in the areas tightly controlled by the communists. The magnitude of the effort is indicated by one captured document from the zonal level (roughly 10 provinces) in the Mekong Delta in which it was reported that 2,700 people in a three-month period had taken the district-level "thought reform course". The system employed with such people is as follows: He (or she) is persuaded to go voluntarily to a district level camp established for the specific purpose of thought reform. If he refuses he is taken under guard. The "classes" in the camp run from two weeks to a month, after which the individual, if reformed, is allowed to return home. If he indicates he is not "reformed" he is run through the course again. If he still remains recalcitrant (and one wonders why he would not overtly go along with his captors) he is sentenced to jail at the provincial level. A person who is allowed to return home finds that his relatives have been notified ahead of his arrival that they will be held accountable for his behavior. This is the so-called double-hostage system, also employed in the military ranks (if a son serving the communist forces deserts, his parents will be punished; if they do not support the cause, the son will suffer).

Captured records describe individual villagers who have been sent through the thought reform course several times. One report described a villager in these words: "He remained totally unrepentant, continued to work for the enemy by creating confusion in the village and doubt (about communists)."

One cannot help but wonder about such a person, his motivation, his source of courage, his stubborn refusal even to pretend to bow before those who have a life-death hold on him. How many of these have gone defiantly to the firing squad we do not know. How many remain to fight we do not know. But in such is the great untold story of this Viet-Nam war. Such a person is by any standard an authentic hero of that war. Alone, in silence, facing incredible odds, with no
very great hope of accomplishing much, he fights on against the deadly communist apparatus in the most dangerous arena of all, the communist-controlled village.

In the Contested Village

The true battleground in the "other war" is the so-called contested village, with its struggle for power between the communists and the government, between the two contending programs resting on two separate bases.

— The communist programs now are chiefly defensive. They seek to blunt and nullify the government efforts known as Revolutionary Development or as the pacification program. Revolutionary development or pacification is not so much a program as a concept, alternative generic terms covering a whole host of specific programs, which range over the entire social, political and economic spectrum in Viet-Nam. Included are the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) or amnesty program; specific offers of doan ket or national reconciliation to higher ranking cadres who quit the communist side (offers including everything from money to specific political posts, but made to cadres as individuals, not as members of the NLF); organization of the People's Self-Defense Force, II which is a new village defense group, static in concept, composed chiefly of youth under draft age and of old men—an armed homeguard; the local election program under which the villagers choose the people who run affairs in their villages through a council; economic development in the rural areas, chiefly through improved methods of rural credit and marketing as well as introduction of innovations in agricultural technology; and finally, increased communication efforts with focus on better two-way communication between leaders and led, between the village and Saigon. This is what is meant by Revolutionary Development or pacification. This is the gauntlet thrown down by the government, an organizational offensive which the communists seek to destroy.

The attention paid by the communists to this challenge is relatively new. In the years after the big-unit war began,
in 1965, the communists allocated few resources to disrupt the various government programs in the countryside. Their focus was military. Part of the trauma of the Tet offensive in February 1968 was the high communist casualty total, which caused the leadership to reassess its doctrine of victory through big-unit war. And part of the trauma, a reflection of those personnel losses, was a resounding improvement (from the government view) in the security condition of the countryside, especially in late 1968 and early 1969. The Pacification Program, which previously had not been taken seriously, gradually assumed major significance for the communists. A full scale attack on it is now under way, and in fact, one could approach all present communist programs in the contested villages in these terms. For example, hoi chanh\textsuperscript{12} (especially officers) are sought by large numbers of "defector-hunting teams" who would otherwise be engaged in combat.

Whereas the communists previously made little effort to prevent villagers from becoming "refugees" (and may in some instances have encouraged it, to add a further burden on the government), now considerable effort is made to prevent them from leaving their home area; in fact this is the primary duty of many main force companies in the Mekong Delta. Resettlement camps are harassed, or worse (see examples in Appendix).

The People's Self-Defense Force is a primary target, as might be expected. It is an impediment to communist tax collectors and recruiters, but equally important, since it is from and of the village it defends, it serves there as a stabilizing and unifying force.\textsuperscript{13}

Village elections, also ignored at first by the communists, now are physically disrupted, as indicated by several examples contained in the Appendix. The government's social welfare projects occupy the attention of several thousand communist cadres whose only duty is to disrupt them, sometimes employing terror that is beyond explanation; consider, for example, what could have been the policy decision behind an act such as this:
"They (the communists) are particularly interested in closing schools (in this area). For example, last month an armed propaganda team stopped a local school bus on a side road one morning and told the driver the children were not to attend school any more. The driver conveyed this message to the parents who could not believe the communists were serious. The bussing continued until a few days later when the same team stopped the same bus, took off a little girl and cut off her fingers. The school has been closed since." 14

Revolutionary Development is attacked chiefly through its personnel -- the cadres specially trained at a school at Vung Tau or the individuals who are part of the various programs at the village level. Revolutionary Development cadres and other governmental officials working in the countryside are first targets for assassination, either directly or following kidnapping.

The second most important target -- and certainly not a new one -- is key individuals in the villages -- not just officials, but the natural village leaders, those individuals who hold no office but who, because of age, sagacity or strength of character, are the ones to whom people turn for advice and look to for leadership. They may be religious figures, school teachers or simply people of integrity and honor. Because they are superior individuals they are the communists' most deadly enemy. Steadily, quietly and with a systematic ruthlessness, the communists in 10 years have wiped out virtually a whole class of Vietnamese villagers, and many villages today are devoid of natural leaders. Natural leaders are perhaps the single most important element in any society, representing a human resource of incalculable value. This loss to Viet-Nam is inestimable; its replacement will take a generation or more.

Specifically there are fifteen types of South Vietnamese who come within the scope of the assassination program. This "Fifteen Categories" list has been frequently found among captured documents; the language varies slightly,
but this is typical:

1. Enemy personnel in fields of espionage, police, public security, special forces psywar, including covert organizations.

2. Members of reactionary political parties and organizations, and parties working behind a religious front (i.e., Dai Viets, VNQDD, Cao Dai, Hòa Hao).

3. Members of enemy military and para-military organizations.

4. Puppet government officials, from inter-family level upwards.

5. Leading and key popular organization leaders (i.e., village organizations such as farm cooperatives, women's and youth organizations; trade unions).

6. Members of the enemy's cultural, art, propaganda and press establishment.

7. Leading and key members of religious organizations still deeply superstitious (i.e., Catholics).

8. Thieves, assassins, gangsters, prostitutes, speculators and fortune tellers.

9. Defectors who have given information to the enemy, who have taken with them automatic weapons or important documents, or who are suspected of having done same; or who were cadres or officers.

10. Members of the exploiter class and their spouses who have not specifically sided with the workers. (The communists in Viet-Nam as elsewhere divide society into exploiter and exploited.)

11. Individuals with backward political tendencies
including those who do dishonest and corrupt deeds, yet try to justify them.

- "12. Relatives of persons engaged in enemy espionage, security, special forces or psywar organizations; relatives of important members or leaders of reactionary political parties or religious groups still deeply superstitious; families of military above the rank of private; members of families of government officials from village level upwards.

- "13. Relatives of persons who have been punished by the Revolution (i.e., in earlier years) and who subsequently have grumbled about the Revolution; relatives of those jailed by the Revolution for spying.

- "14. Deserters or AWOL's who have returned to the Revolution but without clear explanation (i.e., who may be government penetration agents.)

- "15. Individuals with suspicious background or record of past activity."

It has been estimated that this list, if strictly applied to all of South Viet-Nam, would total at least three million. This probably is what Col. Tran Van Dac, the highest ranking hoi chanh, meant when he said, "There are three million South Vietnamese on the (communist) blood debt list."

In the Urban Areas

The communist calculation (basic Maoism) has always been that assault on individuals, as individuals and as key members of organizations, should begin in the villages and work its way up through district and provincial levels until finally a direct attack is made on the establishment in Saigon. For this reason there never has been as concerted an assassination effort as might be expected in the more secure areas, which include most cities. As far as can be determined only recently did the communists begin a concerted effort to assassinate cabinet-level government officials. Prior to
this such attempts were regarded as "adventurism", wasteful of resources even if successful. Now there are indications this is changing. Attempts in 1969 were made on the lives of two cabinet-level officials, one of them successful. From reports of communist training camp activities currently under way, we can expect a step-up in urban terror, especially kidnapping and assassinations. There is further discussion of urban area terror in Chapter IV.

Doctrine

The public rationale for use of terror employed by the communists is that the enemy has permitted no alternative. Such justification, or any other for that matter, never has been an easy matter among the rank and file. The natural abhorrence of Vietnamese for systematic assassination was and is a major and continuous doctrinal problem to the cadres. To the locally recruited especially, even the use of force seems both repugnant and unnecessary. Among the more sophisticated cadres, especially those from the South, there was widespread belief that victory could be obtained by political struggle alone and would not require terror. The response by the leadership to this view was to mix thoroughly the violence program and the political struggle and to call the result political. It also involved administering massive doses of indoctrination to cadres to convince them that victory could be achieved only through force and violence.

The doctrinal underpinnings for use of terror have tended to shift over the years. The present doctrine seems to be that terror is required to achieve three major proximate objectives:

1. **Terror to diminish the opposing force**, both in the sense of eliminating key individuals and in reducing the totality of power which the other side has accumulated. Terror weakens greatly and that is the single most important gain the communists achieve in its use. This is a hard objective with little of the fuzzy psychological considerations of other objectives. A person is kidnapped and killed or is
assassinated: gone not only is an individual, but a service, a resource, an asset which the enemy had and now is without. From a doctrinal standpoint any one in any of the fifteen categories is someone that the country would be well rid of and that is excuse enough for his removal. But there are limiting factors. One is expediency: one does not kill a prominent "neutralist" because the Party currently is wooing neutralists. Nor is it as easy to kidnap, say, a province chief, as an outsider might assume, and the mortality rate on would-be assassins (as well as the failure rate on assassinations) has been exceedingly high this year. Therefore cost is a factor; the price must be worth it. A kind of priority exists. The criterion followed is: How much power is subtracted from the other side. From this, for example, follows the policy that it is better to kill a Vietnamese official than his American advisor since: "If we destroy the Americans, they are capable of bringing in replacements. But (it is) difficult to find replacements for the experienced old foxes (i.e., GVN officials) who are familiar with the local situation."16 The measure of this objective: it contributes to the cause to the degree that it diminishes the force opposite.

2. Terror to sustain communist morale. This may not be considered by outsiders as a serious objective. But a guerrilla leader knows that the morale of his followers is far more ephemeral and subject to greater swings from euphoria to dysphoria than is the morale of regular soldiers. And he knows that a sense of impotency is the most debilitating thought that can infect his men and drive morale down to the point where he dare not commit them to action. Always the guerrilla sees himself alone, beleaguered, surrounded, outnumbered. Initially terror builds confidence; later it sustains morale. Nothing so sends guerrilla morale soaring, and wipes out past feelings of despondency and doubt, as a shattering blow delivered the enemy in his lair, one expertly planned, faultlessly executed and culminating in unscathed escape. In a moment the enemy's great fire power, his overwhelming numbers, his huge logistic base, shrink into unimportance. Whether the blow the terrorist struck was little more than inconvenience to the enemy does not matter. Prowess is demonstrated;
invulnerability again proven. The caution, of course, and the worry to the leader in serving this objective, is that the act must be perfect. If it is botched, he is far worse off than if he had never attempted it.

3. **Terror to disorient and psychologically isolate the individual.** Terror is a rot in the social fabric. Hue was a classic example. Terror to disorient and isolate relates directly to our earlier discussion of the communist subliminal goal: raising the level of the people's sense of insecurity. The communists need only a single index to measure their progress (assuming it can be measured objectively) -- a people's anxiety-level graph. If it goes up and stays high long enough, the communists will have won; if it goes down and stays there, they will have lost. Obviously, and even by definition, nothing serves to increase a sense of individual insecurity as does terror.

But here we are also concerned with the social context, what terror does to the relationship of the individual to his society. An assassination in a village not only frightens a villager but it destroys part of the structure which previously was a source of security. Terror of any sort shifts the ground strangely, as an earthquake. It removes the underpinnings of the elderly system leaving confusion as much as fear. A civilian expects safety and order in his society and when it vanishes he becomes disoriented. Terror isolates. An individual can no longer draw strength from customary social support. He can rely only on himself. Physically he may be untouched by a terror act, but because of it he is suddenly terribly alone and in anguish. A terrorized village, said an American psychiatrist in Viet-Nam, is a case of collective anxiety neurosis, the victim seeking only relief. The victim, in this case the village, stops behaving as a normal social unit; each individual is fragmented within, searching desperately to fix his own personal security. When this happens, the third communist proximate objective has been served.

These programs and doctrine are the face of communism which the Vietnamese people in the past decade have
come to know well. Much water and blood have flowed beneath
the bridge. The Vietnamese people are wiser, and sadder,
even if the world is not. How outsiders can assume they
would prefer communism to an extension of the security being
brought them by the government is a universal and never-
ending puzzlement to all in Viet-Nam, Vietnamese and
foreigners alike.

The impression with which one is left, following a survey
of communist terror uses, is that its effectiveness as a poli-
tical and psychological weapon has been overrated by the com-
munist leadership. Despite intensive efforts, the villagers' sense of insecurity is not driven upwards or, if it is, refuses
to stay there. The villagers' anxiety is converted into hatred
and increasingly they have taken calculated risks to strike
back; the nominally indifferent Buddhist leader is incensed
and angered by communist rockets dropping into a school
yard; the average man's reaction is no longer fear, but anger.

Yet the communist leaders are prisoners of their own
policy. If they were to eliminate terror as a base they might
win worldwide commendation but would commit suicide; and
theirs is a power struggle, not a popularity contest. We can
expect them to continue increased efforts to terrorize but
with diminished effect.

One also concludes that to end the military defense in
Viet-Nam, to halt opposition to these communist programs,
would not, as has often been suggested, bring an end to the
long suffering that has been the plight of the Vietnamese
people. Considering the integral part terror plays in commu-
nist social change, it does not follow that the quick and sure
route to peace, to a moratorium on death, is to permit the
communists to assume power.
Chapter II - Footnotes
Chapter II: Footnotes

1. Political struggle as defined by the communists does not preclude the shedding of blood; it would be more accurate to use, in English, the term non-military violence program.

2. See listing of forces on the communist side, in glossary.


5. Remarks to the author by hoi chanh, chief of assassination unit, My Tho province, November 1969.


10. Numerous descriptions exist in captured documents; this one came from the Mekong Delta, circa 1965.

11. The military and para-military forces of the GVN are organized to correspond to the enemy structure, i.e., the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) or regular military, made up of Army of Viet-Nam (ARVN), the Air Force, the Navy, the Marines and several elite units of paratroopers, Special Forces, etc., is matched against the PAVN and the Main Force elements of the PLAF; the GVN's Regional Force, operating chiefly at the provincial level, is matched against the communist para-military Regional or Territorial guerrilla force; the GVN's Popular Force, operating chiefly at the district level, is matched against the communist para-military Local Force; the GVN's Self-Defense Force as noted above is a static village guard. In addition there is operating in the country-
side the GVN's National Police Field Force, a lightly-
armed para-military force with police duties.

12. See glossary.

13. The terror incident level involving People's Self-Defense
Force members was about 200 cases per month in mid-
1969 (the assassination rate being 65 per month; the kid-
napping rate, 140 per month). The Revolutionary Develop-
ment cadres, numerically far fewer, were being killed
at the rate of about 20 per month and the village official
assassination rate at about 33 per month.


15. Col. Tran Van Dac, press conference in Saigon, February
6, 1969.

Chapter III: Hue
Chapter III: Hue

The city of Hue is one of the saddest cities of our earth, not simply because of what happened there in February, 1968, unthinkable as that was. It is a silent rebuke to all of us, inheritors of 40 centuries of civilization, who in our century have allowed collectivist politics—abstractions all—to corrupt us into the worst of the modern sins, indifference to inhumanity. What happened in Hue should give pause to every remaining civilized person on this planet. It should be inscribed, so as not to be forgotten, along with the record of other terrible visitations of man's inhumanity to man which stud the history of the human race. Hue is another demonstration of what man can bring himself to do when he fixes no limits on political action and pursues uncautiously the dream of social perfectibility.

What happened in Hue, physically, can be described with a few quick statistics. A communist force which eventually reached 12,000 invaded the city the night of the new moon marking the new lunar year, January 30, 1968. It stayed for 26 days and then was driven out by military action. In the wake of this Tet offensive, 5,800 Hue civilians were dead or missing. It is now known that most of them are dead. The bodies of most have been found in the past 20 months, in single and mass graves throughout Thua Thien province which surrounds this cultural capital of Viet-Nam.

Such are the skeletal facts, the important statistics. Such is what the incurious world knows, if it knows anything at all about Hue, for this is what was written, modestly, by the world's press. Apparently it made no impact on the world's mind or conscience. For there was no agonized outcry. No demonstrations at North Vietnamese embassies around the world. Lord Russell did not send his "war crimes tribunal" to Hue to take evidence and indict. In a tone beyond bitterness, the people there will tell you that the world does not know what happened in Hue or, if it does, does not care.

The City

Considered by Asian standards, Hue is not old, less than two centuries. The ancient imperial capital was Hanoi. A dynas-
tic breakup in the early 1800's afforded a powerful court noble the chance to seize the mantle of power, which he did. He proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long and went on to become one of Viet-Nam's most famous rulers. One of Gia Long's first acts was to move the capital far to the south, to the banks of the meandering Perfume River half way between Hanoi and Saigon. There he settled his court behind the newly-built walled fortification now called the Citadel. Inside his artisans erected buildings, working with sketches of the palaces of Peking. The city of Hue grew up around the Citadel.

As the years passed Hue became the center of religious and intellectual leadership, while Hanoi assumed the political and Saigon the commercial leadership. Throughout the days of French rule, Hue maintained what neither Viet-Nam's two other major cities could manage, and that was dignity. In Hue the French hand was behind a facade, the Court. But a facade is better than nothing and in Hue pride could grow. Confucianism and Buddhism mingled harmoniously, first in the temples and later in the university, each reinforced steadily by the growing power of nationalism. Traditionalism became a means of affronting the French, and Hue specialized in tradition. So the old classics were read and revered, the ancient musical instruments taught and played and each new building went up according to time-honored architectural precepts. Hue came to regard itself as the repository of a great esthetic and cultural inheritance with the special task of defending and transmitting this to the future. Hue as guarantor of culture was a concept held even by the illiterate cyclo driver in the street. Gradually Hue assumed a personality, then character, then ambiance.

Each emperor before joining his ancestors carefully constructed his own tomb, fine gardened areas which now grace the river valley behind the city. The tombs of Tu Duc, Minh Mang, Khai Dinh and Dong Khanh are treasured national landmarks known to every Vietnamese school child.

Now Hue has a new tomb, Nui Ba Vanh (Three Hills Ringed). It is destined to become a hallowed national shrine, for here are buried the unidentified victims of the Hue Massacre (others having been reinterred in their own ancestral plots), all civilians. It is appropriate somehow that in this kind of war the tomb of the unknown should contain a civilian.
The Battle

The Battle of Hue was part of the communist Winter-Spring campaign of 1967-68. The entire campaign was divided into three phases:

Phase I came in October, November, and December of 1967 and entailed "coordinated fighting methods," that is, fairly large, set-piece battles against important fixed installations or allied concentrations. The battles of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, Dak To in Kontum Province, and Con Tien in Quang Tri Province, all three in the mountainous interior of South Vietnam near the Cambodian and Lao borders, were typical and, in fact, major elements in Phase I. Phase II came in January, February, and March of 1968 and involved great use of "independent fighting methods," that is, large numbers of attacks by fairly small units, simultaneously, over a vast geographic area and using the most refined and advanced techniques of guerrilla war. Whereas Phase I was fought chiefly with North Vietnamese Regular (PAVN) troops (at that time some 55,000 were in the South), Phase II was fought mainly with Southern Communist (PLAF) troops. The crescendo of Phase II was the Tet offensive in which 70,000 troops attacked 32 of South Vietnam's largest population centers, including the city of Hue.

Phase III, in April, May, and June of 1968, originally was to have combined the independent and coordinated fighting methods, culminating in a great fixed battle somewhere. This was what captured documents guardedly referred to as the "second wave". Possibly it was to have been Khe Sanh, the U.S. Marine base in the far northern corner of South Vietnam. Or perhaps it was to have been Hue. There was no second wave chiefly because events in Phases I and II did not develop as expected. Still, the war reached its bloodiest tempo in eight years then, during the period from the Battle of Hue in February until the lifting of the siege of Khe Sanh in late summer.

American losses during those three months averaged nearly 500 killed per week; the GVN losses were double that rate; and the PAVN-PLAF losses were nearly eight times the American loss rate.

In the Winter-Spring Campaign, the communists began with
about 195,000 PLAF main force and PAVN troops. During the nine months they lost (killed or permanently disabled) about 85,000 men.

The Winter-Spring Campaign was an all-out communist bid to break the back of the South Vietnamese armed forces and drive the government, along with the Allied forces, into defensive city enclaves. Strictly speaking, the Battle of Hue was part of Phase I rather than Phase II since it employed "coordinated fighting methods" and involved North Vietnamese troops rather than southern guerrillas. It was fought, on the communist side, largely by two veteran North Vietnamese army divisions: The Fifth and 324-B, augmented by main forces battalions and some guerrilla units along with some 150 local civilian commissars and cadres.

Briefly the Battle of Hue consisted of these major developments: The initial communist assault, chiefly by the 800th and 802nd battalions, had the force and momentum to carry it across Hue. By dawn of the first day the communists controlled all the city except the headquarters of the First ARVN Division and the compound housing American military advisors. The Vietnamese and Americans moved up reinforcements with orders to reach the two holdouts and strengthen them. The communists moved up another battalion, the 804th, with orders to intercept the reinforcement forces. This failed, the two points were reinforced and never again seriously threatened.

The battle then took on the aspects of a siege. The communists were in the Citadel and on the western edge of the city. The Vietnamese and Americans on the other three sides, including that portion of Hue south of the river, determined to drive them out, hoping initially to do so with artillery fire and air strikes. But the Citadel was well built and soon it became apparent that if the communists' orders were to hold, they could be expelled only by city warfare, fighting house by house and block by block, a slow and costly form of combat. The order was given. By the third week of February the encirclement of the Citadel was well under way and Vietnamese troops and American Marines were advancing yard by yard through the Citadel. On the morning of February 24th, Vietnamese First Division soldiers tore down the communist flag that had flown for 24 days over the outer wall and hoisted their own. The
battle was won, although sporadic fighting would continue outside the city. Some 2,500 communists died during the battle and another 2,500 would die as communists elements were pursued beyond Hue. Allied dead were set at 357.

The Finds

In the chaos that existed following the battle, the first order of civilian business was emergency relief, in the form of food shipments, prevention of epidemics, emergency medical care, etc. Then came the home rebuilding effort. Only later did Hue begin to tabulate its casualties. No true post-attack census has yet been taken. In March local officials reported that 1,900 civilians were hospitalized with war wounds and they estimated that some 5,800 persons were unaccounted for.

The first discovery of communist victims came in the Gia Hoi High School yard, on February 26; eventually 170 bodies were recovered. In the next few months 18 additional grave sites were found, the largest of which were Tang Quang Tu Pagoda (67 victims), Bai Dau (77), Cho Thong area (an estimated 100), the imperial tombs area (201), Thien Ham (approximately 200), and Dong Gi (approximately 100). In all almost 1,200 bodies were found in hastily dug, poorly concealed graves. At least half of these showed clear evidence of atrocity killings: hands wired behind backs, rags stuffed in mouths, bodies contorted but without wounds (indicating burial alive). The other nearly 600 bore wound marks but there was no way of determining whether they died by firing squad or incidental to the battle. Among these victims were three West German doctors, a medical technician who was the wife of one of the doctors, and two French Catholic priests, one of whom was buried alive.

The second major group of finds was discovered in the first seven months of 1969 in Phu Thu district -- the Sand Dune Finds and Le Xa Tay -- and Huong Thuy district -- Xuan Hoa-Van Duong -- in late March and April. Additional grave sites were found in Vinh Loc district in May and in Nam Hoa district in July.

The largest of this group were the Sand Dune Finds in the three sites of Vinh Luu, Le Xa Dong and Xuan O located in rolling, grass-tufted sand dune country near the South China Sea. Separated by salt-marsh valleys, these dunes were ideal for graves.

On the discovery of the Sand Dune Finds a story is told that a local farmer, walking over the dunes one morning, tripped over a piece of wire sticking out of the sand. Inire he jerked at the wire and out of the sand, at the other end of his wire, came a bony hand and arm.
The find was made. Excavation work was ordered, and 809 bodies began to be uncovered.

A fixed procedure then developed, now used in all the excavations. Four-person teams, usually young people, operate as a unit. They wear surgical gloves well-doused in alcohol, their faces masked to avoid odor. They dig systematically, using sound archeological principles. The area is marked off into a grid. Digging is done with flat shovels used in a peculiar sideward motion that slices away layer after layer of sand until a strike is made. Then, with the aid of a small garden trowel, the body is uncovered. It is removed and placed on a sheet of plastic. Then comes registration: a number painted on the skull and a description (dental impression, color of hair, identifying papers, clothing, jewelry, religious artifacts, etc.) listed in a record book. The body is then carted away to a central clearing station where the information gathered is posted before waiting relatives. It is slow work, averaging six man-hours per body.

The teams are now experienced and even specialized. Some are assigned the task of probing the sand with long iron rods and have developed an almost sixth sense as to where the bodies are. Others specialize in removing bodies intact, important in terms of later identification. One old man has gained fame for his ability to identify persons he has known by the shape and feel of skulls.

Vegetation is one indicator, the presence of bright green grass is an almost certain sign that a body is beneath. Young children are another source of information. A fourteen-year-old buffalo boy with a sharp eye and a good memory pinpointed the location of more than a dozen bodies, which he had watched the communists bury a year and a half ago.

In the Sand Dune Find, the pattern had been to tie victims together in groups of 10 or 20, line them up in front of a trench dug by local corvee labor and cut them down with submachine gun (a favorite local souvenir is a spent
Russian machine gun shell taken from a grave). Frequently the dead were buried in layers of three and four, which makes identification particularly difficult.

In Nam Hoa district came the third, or Da Mai Creek Find, which also has been called the Phu Cam death march, made on September 19, 1969. Three communist defectors told intelligence officers of the 101st Airborne Brigade that they had witnessed the killing of several hundred people at Da Mai Creek, about 10 miles south of Hue, in February of 1968. The area is wild, unpopulated, virtually inaccessible. The Brigade sent in a search party, which reported that the stream contained a large number of human bones.

By piecing together bits of information, it was determined that this is what happened at Da Mai Creek: On the fifth day of Tet in the Phu Cam section of Hue, where some three-fourths of the City's 40,000 Roman Catholics lived, a large number of people had taken sanctuary from the battle in a local church, a common method in Viet-Nam of escaping war. Many in the building were not in fact Catholic. A communist political commissar arrived at the church and ordered out about 400 people, some by name and some apparently because of their appearance (prosperous looking and middle-aged businessmen, for example). He said they were going to the "liberated area" for three days of indoctrination, after which each could return home. They were marched nine kilometers south to a pagoda where the communists had established a headquarters. There 20 were called out from the group, assembled before a drumhead court, tried, found guilty, executed and buried in the pagoda yard. The remainder were taken across the river and turned over to a local communist unit in an exchange that even involved handing the political commissar a receipt. It is probable that the commissar intended that their prisoners should be re-educated and returned, but with the turnover, matters passed from his control. During the next several days, exactly how many is not known, both captive and captor wandered the countryside. At some point in Phase III (see below) the local communists decided to eliminate witnesses. Their captives were led
through six kilometers of some of the most rugged terrain in Central Viet-Nam, to Da Mai Creek. There they were shot or brained and their bodies left to wash in the running stream.

The 101st Airborne Brigade burial detail found it impossible to reach the creek overland, roads being non-existent or impassable. The creek's foliage is what in Viet-Nam is called double-canopy, that is, two layers, one consisting of brush and trees close to the ground, and the second of tall trees whose branches spread out high above. Beneath is permanent twilight. Brigade engineers spent two days blasting a hole through the double-canopy by exploding dynamite dangled on long wires beneath their hovering helicopters. This cleared a landing pad for helicopter hearses. Quite clearly this was a spot where death could be easily hidden even without burial.

The Da Mai Creek bed, for nearly a hundred yards up the ravine, yielded skulls, skeletons and pieces of human bones. The dead had been left above ground (for the animists among them, this meant their souls would wander the lonely earth forever, since such is the fate of the unburied dead), and 20 months in the running stream had left bones clean and white.

Local authorities later released a list of 428 names of persons whom they said had been postively identified from the creek bed remains. The communists' rationale for their excesses was elimination of "traitors to the revolution." The list of 428 victims breaks down as follows: 25 percent military; two officers, the rest NCO's and enlisted men; 25 percent students; 50 percent civil servants, village and hamlet officials, service personnel of various categories, and ordinary workers.

The fourth or Phu Thu Salt Flat Finds came in November 1969, near the fishing village of Luong Vien some ten miles east of Hue, another desolate region. Government troops early in the month began an intensive effort to clear the area of remnants of the local communist organization. People of Luong Vien, population 700, who had remained silent in the presence of
troops for 20 months apparently felt secure enough from communist revenge to break silence and lead officials to the find. At this writing, excavation work is under way. Based on descriptions from villagers whose memories are not always clear, local officials estimate the number of bodies at Phu Thu to be at least 300 and possibly 1,000.

The story remains uncompleted. If the estimates by Hue officials are even approximately correct, nearly 2,000 people are still missing. Recapitulation of the dead and missing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After the battle, the GVN's total estimated civilian casualties resulting from Battle of Hue</td>
<td>7600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded (hospitalized or outpatients) with injuries attributable to warfare</td>
<td>-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>subtotal</strong></td>
<td>5700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated civilian deaths due to accident of battle</td>
<td>-944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Finds-Bodies discovered immediately post-battle, 1968</strong></td>
<td>4756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>subtotal</strong></td>
<td>3583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Finds, including Sand Dune Finds, March - July, 1969 (est.)</td>
<td>-809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>subtotal</strong></td>
<td>2774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Find, Da Mai Creek Find (Nam Hoa district) September, 1969</td>
<td>-428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>subtotal</strong></td>
<td>2346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Finds-Phu Thu Salt Flat Find, November, 1969, (est.)</td>
<td>-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>subtotal</strong></td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous finds during 1969 (approximate)</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL YET UNACCOUNTED FOR.</strong></td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A map of the Hue area showing locations of major body finds is inside the back cover of this monograph.)
Communist Rationale

The killing in Hue that added up to the Hue Massacre far exceeded in numbers any atrocity by the communists previously in South Viet-Nam. The difference was not only one in degree but one in kind. The character of the terror that emerges from an examination of Hue is quite distinct from communist terror acts elsewhere, frequent or brutal as they may have been. The previously noted objectives for communist terror (see page 21) scarcely fit for Hue. The terror in Hue was not a morale building act—the quick blow deep into the enemy's lair which proves enemy vulnerability and the guerrilla's omnipotence and which is quite different from gunning down civilians in areas under guerrilla control. Nor was it terror to advertise the cause. Nor to disorient and psychologically isolate the individual, since the vast majority of the killings were done secretly. Nor, beyond the blacklist killings, was it terror to eliminate opposing forces. Hue did not follow the pattern of terror to provoke governmental over-response since it resulted in only what might have been anticipated—government assistance. There were elements of each objective, true, but none serves to explain the widespread and diverse pattern of death meted out by the communists.

What is offered here is a hypothesis which will suggest logic and system behind what appears to be simple, random slaughter. Before dealing with it, let us consider three facts which constantly reassert themselves to a Hue visitor seeking to discover what exactly happened there and, more importantly, exactly why it happened. All three fly in the face of common sense and contradict to a degree what has been written. Yet, in talking to all sources—province chief, police chief, American advisor, eye witness, captured prisoner, hoi chanh (defector) or those few who miraculously escaped a death scene—the three facts emerge again and again.

The first fact, and perhaps the most important, is that despite contrary appearances virtually no communist killing was due to rage, frustration, or panic during the communist withdrawal at the end. Such explanations are frequently heard, but they fail to hold up under scrutiny. Quite the contrary, to trace back any single killing is to discover that almost without exception it was the result of a decision rational and justifiable
in the communist mind. In fact, most killings were, from the communist calculation, imperative.

The second fact is that, as far as can be determined, virtually all killings were done by local communist cadres and not by the PAVN troops or Northerners or other outside communists. Some 12,000 PAVN troops fought the battle of Hue and killed civilians in the process but this was incidental to their military effort. Most of the 150 communist civilian cadres operating within the city were local, that is from the Thua Thien province area. They were the ones who issued the death orders. Whether they acted on instructions from higher headquarters (and the communist organizational system is such that one must assume they did), and, if so, what exactly those orders were, no one yet knows for sure.

The third fact is that beyond "example" executions of prominent "tyrants", most of the killings were done secretly with extraordinary effort made to hide the bodies. Most outsiders have a mental picture of Hue as a place of public executions and prominent mass burial mounds of fresh-turned earth. Only in the early days were there well-publicized executions and these were relatively few. The burial sites in the city were easily discovered because it is difficult to create a graveyard in a densely populated area without someone noticing it. All the other finds were well hidden, all in terrain lending itself to concealment, probably the reason the sites were chosen in the first place. A body in the sand dunes is as difficult to find as a sea shell pushed deep into a sandy beach over which a wave has washed. Da Mai Creek is in the remotest part of the province and must have required great exertion by the communists to lead their victims there. Had not the three hoi chánh led searchers to the wild uninhabited spot the bodies might well remain undiscovered to this day. A visit to all sites leaves one with the impression that the communists made a major effort to hide their deeds.

The hypothesis offered here connects and fixes in time the communist assessment of their prospects for staying in Hue with the kind of death order issued. It seems clear from sifting evidence that they had no single unchanging assessment with regard to themselves and their future in Hue, but rather that changing situations during the course of the battle altered their
prospects and their intentions. It also seems equally clear from the evidence that there was no single communist policy on death orders; instead the kind of death order issued changed during the course of the battle. The correlation between these two is high and divides into three phases. The hypothesis therefore is that as communist plans during the Battle of Hue changed so did the nature of the death orders issued. This conclusion is based on overt communist statements, testimony by prisoners¹ and hoi chanh, accounts of eye witnesses, captured documents and the internal logic of the communist situation.

Hue: Phase I

When the communists were preparing their attack on Hue, their cadres at the sand table exercises deep in the jungle told officers they would be in the city seven days and no more. A message was passed on to most of the attackers on the eve of the battle. It was stated more or less openly in public pronouncements. Radio Hanoi, on February 1 for example, described the attack as an effort "to remove Saigon power at certain levels, accelerating the process of decomposition of the Saigon administration."

Thinking in Phase I was well expressed in a PRP resolution issued to cadres on the eve of the offensive:

"Be sure that the liberated ... cities are successfully consolidated. Quickly activate armed and political units, establish administrative organs at all echelons, promote (civilian) defense and combat support activities, get the people to establish an air defense system and generally motivate them to be ready to act against the enemy when he counterattacks..."

This was the limited view at the start—held momentarily. Subsequent developments in Hue were reported in different terms. Radio Hanoi on February 4 said:

"After one hour's fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces occupied the residence of the puppet provincial governor (in Hue), the prison and the offices of the puppet administration... The Revolutionary Armed Forces punished most cruel agents of the enemy and seized control of the streets... rounded up and punished dozen of cruel agents and caused the enemy organs
of control and oppression to crumble..."

During the brief stay in Hue, the civilian cadres, accompanied by execution squads, were to round up and execute key individuals whose elimination would greatly weaken the government's administrative apparatus following communist withdrawal. This was the blacklist period, the time of the drumhead court. Cadres with lists of names and addresses on clipboards appeared and called into kangaroo court various "enemies of the Revolution." Their trials were public, usually in the courtyard of a temporary communist headquarters. The trials lasted about ten minutes each and there are no known not-guilty verdicts. Punishment, invariably execution, was meted out immediately. Bodies were either hastily buried or turned over to relatives. Singled out for this treatment were civil servants, especially those involved in security or police affairs, military officers and some non-commissioned officers, plus selected non-official but natural leaders of the community, chiefly educators and religionists.

With the exception of a particularly venomous attack on Hue intellectuals, the Phase I pattern was standard operating procedure for communists in Viet-Nam. It was the sort of thing that had been going on systematically in the villages for ten years. Permanent blacklists, prepared by zonal or inter-zone Party headquarters have long existed for use throughout the country, whenever an opportunity presents itself. Quite obviously not all the people named in the lists used in Hue were liquidated. One meets today a surprisingly large number of people who obviously were listed, who stayed in the city throughout the battle, but escaped. Throughout the 24-day period the communist cadres were busy hunting down persons on their blacklists, but after a few days their major efforts were turned into a new channel.

**Hue: Phase II**

In the first few days, the Tet offensive affairs progressed so well for the communists in Hue (although not to the south, where Party chiefs received some rather grim evaluations from cadres in the midst of the offensive in the Mekong Delta) that for a brief euphoric moment they believed they could hold the city. Probably the assessment that the communist were in
Hue to stay was not shared at the higher echelons, but it was widespread in Hue and at the Thua Thien provincial level. One intercepted communist message, apparently written February 2, exhorted cadres in Hue to hold fast, declaring: "A new era, a real revolutionary period has begun (because of our Hue victories) and we need only to make swift assault (in Hue) to secure our target and gain total victory."

The Hanoi official Party paper Nhan Dan echoed the theme: "Like a thunderbolt, a general offensive has been hurled against the U.S. and the puppets... The U.S.-puppet machine has been duly punished... The puppet administrative organs... have suddenly collapsed. The Thieu-Ky administration cannot escape from complete collapse. The puppet troops have become extremely weak and cannot avoid being completely exterminated." 2

Of course, some of this verbiage is simply exhortation to the faithful, and, as is always the case in reading communist output, it is most difficult to distinguish between belief and wish. But testimony from prisoners and hoi chanh, as well as intercepted battle messages, indicate that both rank and file and cadres believed for a few days they were permanently in Hue, and they acted accordingly.

Among their acts was to extend the death order and launch what in effect was a period of social reconstruction, communist style. Orders went out, apparently from the provincial level of the Party, to round up what one prisoner termed "social negatives," that is, those individuals or members of groups who represented potential danger or liability in the new social order. This was quite impersonal, not a blacklist of names but a blacklist of titles and positions held in the old society, directed not against people as such but against "social units."

As seen earlier in North Viet-Nam and in Communist China, the communists were seeking to break up the local social order by eliminating leaders and key figures in religious organizations (Buddhist bonzes, Catholic priests), political parties (four members of the Central Committee of Viet-Nam), social movements such as women's organizations and youth groups, including, what otherwise would be totally inexplicable, the execution of pro-communist student leaders from middle and upper class families.
In consonance with this, killing in some instances was
done by family unit. In one well-documented case during this
period a squad with a death order entered the home of a prom-
inent community leader and shot him, his wife, his married
son and daughter-in-law, his young unmarried daughter, a
male and female servant and their baby. The family cat was
strangled; the family dog was clubbed to death; the goldfish
scooped out of the fishbowl and tossed on the floor. When the
communists left, no life remained in the house. A "social
unit" had been eliminated. (Appalling though it was, one
stands in that family's living room and, as a parent, thinks
perhaps this was the kindest way, for in Hue one is haunted
by the feeling that bereavement is worse than death).

Phase II also saw an intensive effort to eliminate
intellectuals, who are perhaps more numerous in Hue than
elsewhere in Viet-Nam. Surviving Hue intellectuals explain
this in terms of a long-standing communist hatred of Hue
intellectuals, who were anti-communist in the worst or most
insulting manner: they refused to take communism seriously.
Hue intellectuals have always been contemptuous of communist
ideology, brushing it aside as a latecomer to the history of
ideas and not a very significant one at that. Hue, being a
bastion of traditionalism, with its intellectuals steeped in
Confucian learning intertwined with Buddhism, did not, even
in the fermenting years of the 1920's and 1930's, debate the
merits of communism. Hue ignored it. The intellectuals in
the university, for example, in a year's course in political
thought dispense with Marxism-Leninism in a half hour
lecture, painting it as a set of shallow barbarian political
slogans with none of the depth and time-tested reality of
Confucian learning, nor any of the splendor and soaring
humanism of Buddhist thought. Since the communist, espe-
cially the communist from Hue, takes his dogma seriously, he
can become demoniac when dismissed by a Confucian as a
philosophic ignoramus, or by a Buddhist as a trivial material-
ist. Or, worse than being dismissed, ignored through the
years. So with the righteousness of a true believer, he sought
to strike back and eliminate this challenge of indifference.
Hue intellectuals now say the hunt-down in their ranks has
taught them a hard lesson, to take communism seriously,
if not as an idea, at least as a force loose in their world,
The killings in Phase II perhaps accounted for 2,000 of the missing. But the worst was not yet over.

Hue: Phase III

Inevitably, and as the leadership in Hanoi must have assumed all along, considering the forces ranged against it, the battle in Hue turned against the communists. An intercepted PAVN radio message from the Citadel, February 22, asked for permission to withdraw. Back came the reply: permission refused, attack on the 23rd. That attack was made, a last, futile one. On the 24th the Citadel was taken.

That expulsion was inevitable was apparent to the communists for at least the preceding week. It was then that began Phase III, the cover-the-traces period. Probably the entire civilian underground apparat in Hue had exposed itself during Phase II. Those without suspicion rose to proclaim their identity. Typical is the case of one Hue resident who described his surprise on learning that his next door neighbor was the leader of a phuong (which made him 10th to 15th ranking communist civilian in the city), saying in wonder, "I'd known him for 18 years and never thought he was the least interested in politics." Such a cadre could not go underground again unless there was no one around who remembered him.

Hence Phase III, elimination of witnesses.

Probably the largest number of killings came during this period and for this reason. Those taken for political indoctrination probably were slated to be returned. But they were local people as were their captors; names and faces were familiar. So, as the end approached they became not just a burden but a positive danger. Such undoubtedly was the case with the group taken from the church at Phu Cam. Or of the 15 high school students whose bodies were found as part of the Phu Thu Salt Flat find.

Categorization in a hypothesis such as this is, of course, gross and at best only illustrative. Things are not that neat in real life. For example, throughout the entire time the blacklist hunt went on. Also, there was revenge killing by the communists in the name of the Party, the so-called "revolutionary
justice." And undoubtedly there were personal vendettas, old scores settled by individual Party members. (How else can one explain one body found at Phu Thu in which every principal bone had been broken?)

The official communist view of the killing in Hue was contained in a book written and published in Hanoi:

"Actively combining their efforts with those of the PLAF and population, other self-defense and armed units of the city (of Hue) arrested and called to surrender the surviving functionaries of the puppet administration and officers and men of the puppet army who were skulking. Die-hard cruel agents were punished."\(^4\)

The communist line on the Hue killings later at the Paris talks was that it was not the work of communists but of "dissident local political parties". However, it should be noted that Radio Liberation April 26, 1968, criticized the effort in Hue to recover bodies, saying the victims were only "hooligan lackeys who had incurred blood debts of the Hue compatriots and who were annihilated by the Southern armed forces and people in early Spring." This propaganda line however was soon dropped in favor of the line that it really was local political groups fighting each other. The line on Hue much later is exemplified by this Radio Hanoi broadcast of April 27, 1969:

"According to LPA, in order to cover up their cruel acts, the puppet administration in Hue recently played the farce of setting up a so-called committee for the search for burial sites of the hooligan lackeys who had owed blood debts to the Tri-Thien-Hue compatriots and who were annihilated by the Southern armed forces and people in early Mau Than spring.

"The local puppet administration sent its lackeys to carry out searching activities in city wards and to force compatriots to pay for ritual presents. The compatriots in the Dong Ba city ward, especially the small merchants, were forced to collect the greatest sum of money. Profoundly indignant, the Hue compatriots cursed and violently opposed
the puppet administration agents. Faced with this, on 19, 20 and 21 April, the Hue puppet administration was forced to broadcast a communiqué denying this act by its lackeys and cast the blame on others for pocketing money in the name of the above-mentioned committee. Well aware of the Thieu-Ky-Huong clique's cheating and crafty tricks, the Hue compatriots told one another to resolutely boycott its searching and memorial service force."
## HYPOTHESIS IN SUMMARY FORM:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>COMMUNIST ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>PATTERN OF LIQUIDATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First few days of Tet.</td>
<td>We have our orders to stay in the city for seven days, no more.</td>
<td>Drumhead Court Phase. Blacklists, advertised trials, public executions, bodies not hidden. &quot;Tyrants, enemies of the revolution&quot; liquidated, especially those whose deaths weaken the structure of the Hue establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle period</td>
<td>We can hold the city. We are in Hue to stay.</td>
<td>Social Reconstruction Phase. Purge the old social order and begin to build a new one. Liquidate the &quot;social negatives, all imperialist lackeys.&quot; Killing done quietly and bodies usually hidden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final period</td>
<td>We cannot hold; we are going to be driven out.</td>
<td>Leave No Witnesses Phase. Liquidate anyone in communist hands who could identify individual Party members. Kill secretly and hide bodies carefully.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout: Liquidation on grounds of Party retribution or in vendettas by individual Party members; also, of course civilian casualties incidental to Battle of Hue.
The number of deaths probably would have been higher but for limitations of time and circumstance. Consider the milieu in which the communists were operating: The population of the city at the time of the attack was about 180,000; the surrounding districts, where many victims were found, contained another 326,000. Some 16 communist battalions in and out of the city battled 14 allied battalions. People were fleeing, chaos and confusion were on all sides. The communist civilian cadres numbered about 150, aided by several hundred local communists who had surfaced. The communist population control and organization plan was to divide the city into phuongs or precincts, a geographic unit containing up to 8,000 persons each. A ten-man cadre team was to run each phuong, charged with the task of locating, organizing, identifying and sorting out people in its area. After the first few days, allied military action divided the communist forces and denied them roughly half the population. They maintained this control for about three weeks. One cannot but conclude that the number of civilian victims would have been much larger than the 5700 currently estimated had the communist grip been tighter and longer.

The only statistics available yet, and they are lamentable, suggest this rough breakdown of the 5,700:

Military or para-military men or officers...... 30%  
Government officials or civil servants........... 10%  
Women........................................... 5%  
Children under age 16 .......................... 5%  
Unknown or unidentified ......................... 50%  

Beyond these crude figures, and they are based on study of about 800 bodies, lies a vast ignorance. We do not know who the dead are, nor even how many.
Answers to these, and other questions await the coming to Hue of a good historian who will piece together the mosaic of information into a coherent picture.

Aftermath

In the days after, when awareness gradually spread, the attitude of the people of the city moved from surprise to shock to horror to a kind of numbness. The effect on the men and officers of the First Division was perhaps most striking.

It is a generally accepted fact in military circles in Viet-Nam that the ARVN First Division in terms of spirit and fighting élan has changed from one of the worst divisions in the Vietnamese Army to perhaps the best.

The civilians of the city will tell you that in the months after communist departure they were gripped by a social malaise, strange but understandable. The huge wound inflicted on them healed only slowly. An all-pervasive mood settled over the city. Fear lingered in every quarter. Activity in the streets was subdued and even the children played quietly. It was an atmosphere compounded of sadness, remorse, bitterness, perhaps a little guilt mixed in, but most of all it was a pathetic desire of each to rid his mind of memories too dreadful to hold. Blot out the past, each seemed to say, for this is the way back to light. "Don't look for the graves," was the unspoken rule. Only the families of the missing were determined to face reality. They were the ones who persisted in the search and in most cases their children were the ones who did the actual digging.

Parenthetically it might be noted that, outwardly, this mood in Hue largely has evaporated. The city once again is alive, a beehive of construction work with business flourishing and people filled with ongoing projects and future plans. Physically Hue has almost completely recovered. Materially all economic indices are up. But one senses deep recesses in the mind of Hue that will never again know the sun.
As might be expected an undercurrent of irrational bitterness developed among people of Hue against the outside--the Americans because they did not somehow prevent the massacre, the Vietnamese government for what is viewed as insufficient subsequent assistance. Both are unreasonable, of course. Had it not been for the Americans the slaughter in Hue would have been infinitely worse. The government has poured many recovery resources into the area in the past 20 months and its efforts to rebuild are wholly commendable. Such bitterness slowly will dissipate. This attitude, of course, in no way even touches the measures of hatred for the communists and all they stand for. In listening in the evening to a flood of words from survivors about what happened at Hue, one is submerged in a hate that is almost a fog. Gone from Hue are the attentistes, the fence sitters, the advocates of non-involvement. Hardly a person exists in the city who did not find a blood relation or intimate friend in a communist grave: the implacable hatred for communism by the people of Hue has become a function of mathematics.

The meaning of the Hue Massacre seems clear. If the communists win decisively in South Viet-Nam (and the key word is decisively), what is the prospect? First, all foreigners would be cleared out of the South, especially the hundreds of foreign newsmen who are in and out of Saigon. A curtain of ignorance would descend. Then would begin a night of long knives. There would be a new order to build. The war was long and so are memories of old scores to be settled. All political opposition, actual or potential, would be systematically eliminated. Stalin versus kulak, Mao versus landlord, Hanoi communist versus Southern Catholic, the pattern would be the same: eliminate not the individual, for who cares about the individual, but the latent danger to the dream, the representative of the blocs, the symbol of the force, that might someday, even inside the regime, dilute the system. Beyond this would come communist justice meted out to the "tyrants and lackeys." Personal revenge would be a small wheel turning within the larger wheel of Party retribution.

But little of this would be known abroad. The communists in Viet-Nam would create a silence.

The world would call it peace.
Chapter III - Footnotes
Chapter III - Footnotes

1. Including one Son Lam (Party name), the highest ranking civilian prisoner taken who was part of the Hue offensive; he was a combination political commissar, district chief and local guerrilla unit leader in Hue at the start of the battle as well as during most of the subsequent period. He was not captured until much later.


3. A theory widely circulated in Hue but without foundation is that Ho Chi Minh, having been socially rebuffed when teaching high school in Hue years ago, hated the place much as Hitler hated Stalingrad and personally ordered mass slaughter in Hue.


5. That is, the military who lived in Hue, were in the city on leave, etc., but not in the units which took back the city.
Chapter IV: The Technology of Terror

The basic unit in any communist organization, in Viet-Nam or elsewhere, is the three-man cell. But while the three-man cell may be a firm entity, the larger groups of cells are not. Vietnamese communists are casual and often inconsistent in structuring organizations or assigning missions to organizations. Line of responsibility, chain of command, the organizational chart itself, tend to be far vaguer than, say, in the U.S. Army.

Decentralization easily becomes compartmentalization. One can ask a political commissar hoi chanh to draw an organizational chart of his province and the resulting jumble of lines and boxes soon obviously confuses even him. Particularly in the case of terror units the communists employ an almost endless variety of unit names, special designations, and code listings (which are changed frequently as a security measure)—some highly descriptive if not informative (The Red Arrow Into The Enemy Heart Squad); some so vague as to be meaningless (Cluster Two). Further, organizational structure varies throughout the country and what is a common pattern in the Mekong Delta may be unknown in the Hue area.

Sorting out and keeping straight this welter of overlapping terror designations is hardly worth the effort unless one is a specialist. Therefore, in approaching the organization of terror units, it seems best for our purposes to do so in terms of function and confine ourselves chiefly to the basic unit, the cell, rather than the larger units.

Most of the non-military violence and terror programs by the communists in Viet-Nam are the work of three types of functional units.

The Para-Military Cell

This is a special unit within the para-military or guerrilla structure which engages in sabotage, small strike operations and "punishment" missions in the cell's familiar home territory, the villages of the rural area. It is the least professional of the three types and differs from an ordinary para-military or guerrilla unit cell in that it receives special training. Its members
also tend to be younger and more dedicated.

Functionally these may operate in units up to as many as nine cells, (i.e., 27 persons). They may work as an Armed Propaganda Team, the most ancient of the para-military units in Viet-Nam (references in documents go back as far as 1958), or as Special Action Units (Biet Dong Doi), or as part of Armed Reconnaissance Teams. They are civilians and their orders come from the Party Central Committee at the provincial level. The determining factor in their terror is almost always political rather than military. Much of the assassination work in the less-defended hamlets, or along the minor highways and canals, is the work of the people in the para-military cell.

Special Activities Cell³

These are the most efficient of the terrorists, operating both in rural and urban areas. Into their hands go most of the kidnapping, assassination, extortion and intimidation assignments. Normally they do not handle explosives, at least nothing more complex than a hand grenade. Their basic weapon is the AK-47 submachine gun with the folding stock. This cell, in the main, is a fixed, in-place unit operating within a single designated area, either doing the work itself or running amateur volunteers or hired terrorists. Members are highly motivated and many have long experience. In the past they were often remarkably clever and skillful but in recent years their proficiency has dropped markedly because of attrition. In urban areas they may stay deeply covert and non-operational until the moment when their services are needed, at which time they emerge to perform their assignment. There is unquestionably a large number of such Special Activities Cells in the Saigon area, for example; but since they do nothing to expose themselves, they are virtually impossible to uncover.

The Sapper Cell⁴

"Sapper" is a military term for a military engineer who is trained in demolition work and who is found in every army in the world with the same assignment: to destroy during combat those enemy fortifications, road blocks, etc., which impede his army's advance. The term as applied to communist activities in South Viet-Nam is both confusing and inaccurate, but, like the term
Viet-Cong, it is now so widespread that we all are obliged to use it. As employed here, the term "sapper cell" has no military implication; rather it means a cell whose members use explosives in attacks on non-military targets.

PAVN has two types of sappers, infantry sapper and "commando" sapper. The first is the usual military engineer; the second is more of a special saboteur who engages in what, in other wars, would be behind-the-lines activities, often on one-man missions. Both types of PAVN sappers now operate in the south and engage in what we here call terror. The PLAF division of sappers is more functional: those used in rural areas (field sappers); those used in urban areas (city sappers) and those used to attack targets in the rivers and canals (water sappers).

What we are concerned with here is the sapper, be he military or "non-military", who is engaged in what clearly are non-military activities: attacks on Revolutionary Development teams, "pacified" villages, refugee centers, People's Self-Defense Force units, etc. In truth this "non-military" sapper from the ranks of the military is a sui generis, a true cross between soldier and terrorist. Again the line between what is military and what is terror becomes a thin one. It would seem that our definition, terror is illegal violence, should be amended or interpreted here in context of intent or motive. For instance blowing up a line of helicopters at an airfield would not be an act of terror while blowing up a Saigon electrical power plant would be. The difference is not so much one of function of the target as motive of the sapper, the criterion being whether his objective was military. In any event our interest here is not with the military sapper assaulting an airfield full of helicopters but with a cell engaged in destruction which under our definition is terror.

Sapper cells operate chiefly in the urban areas. Some members belong to PAVN or PLAF; others are part of the Party structure, reporting to the provincial level Central Committee (although the organization within Saigon is a special command structure both in the case of the military and the Party). The majority are Northerners. Most are Party members (the requirements for urban sappers are quite strict; one must be a Party member, must be nominated and seconded by Party members, must pass certain "ideological" examinations, etc.).
Military sappers are formed operationally into four-man teams (see description of training, below) which combine into detachments of from four to seven teams. Five detachments make a battalion; five battalions make a regiment. Those from the military side think of "my unit" as the battalion. Indeed the sapper battalion does not have identity, for it is made up of mutually-supporting organic elements and is not simply a group of independent detachments or teams. For example, one team (or even one detachment) may be assigned exclusively to reconnaissance work, another to transporting explosives, another to manufacturing charges to order, etc. Most operations are the work of a few persons, say eight or twelve members, but there have been cases, such as the Cam Ranh Bay hospital attack, of full sapper battalions in action.

This organization into battalions probably was not necessary for operational reasons but was done to develop greater esprit de corps, to reduce morale problems afflicting members who cannot operate in isolation or without psychic support; and to facilitate matters for the Northerners in the unit who have a particularly difficult time operating clandestinely in the district towns and provincial capitals.

Functionally, what distinguishes the sapper cell from the other two is not organization but the fact that it works with explosives and its members are expected to be able to handle TNT, dynamite, C-4 or plastique, the primary explosives used in Viet-Nam. Some cells or individuals are highly specialized, for example, in setting series-charges timed to explode one after the other.

The chief targets of the sapper cell are government buildings, communication and transportation centers, port and storage facilities, as well as a range of individually smaller targets, such as people, vehicles in the streets, key enemy personnel in public concentrations, etc.

Sapper cell members, of necessity, are bolder and more willing to take risks. And it is policy for them to do so (unlike PAVN and Main Force units, which generally are conservative in terms of risk-taking). They are for the most part strongly dedicated and highly militant. Recruiters seek chiefly the young, because they are more easily influenced in their thinking, are
more willing to run risks, physically are better able to carry out their assignments, are less likely to question the arrangements for an operation, and are less apt to be or become double agents. Optimum age seems to be around 18; seldom is a sapper older than the late 20's (an exception being the specialist), and it is not uncommon to find 14-year-olds playing a key role in an operation.

Since many of these now come from the North Vietnamese military, there is a penchant for the military approach. For example, in assassinations grenades or satchel charges are preferred to a pistol; a mortar at a distance is preferred to a satchel charge up close. The approach in effect is to think as a soldier, not as a saboteur, to fight a personal or small-unit war rather than a "clandestine" one, to substitute surprise for covertness, shock of impact for scalpel precision, escape from an operation under cover of a barrage of fire rather than by stealth. The result of the terror act may be the same, but the character often is quite different.

Bold they often are, but seldom foolhardy. Public reports over the years of "death squads" and "suicide missions" probably are exaggerated. The number of fanatical true believers indifferent to pain or death is as small in the communist ranks as anywhere else. What often appears to be a suicide mission actually is an act of credulity. For example, a 14-year old boy is persuaded that he can hop off a motorcycle, carry a satchel charge through a gate of a police headquarters, hurl his charge and be out and away before the enemy is alerted. He may know (or he may not be told) that on the roof of that headquarters is a 50 caliber machine gun, manned day and night, and aimed directly at the gate. If he does know it, he believes, or has been convinced, that surprise and speed will still permit his successful departure. When he is shot at the gate his act is put down as another fanatic communist freely sacrificing himself for the cause. The communists later, of course, have no interest in correcting such a mistaken view.

Training Terrorists

One of the clearest picture of the purpose and direction of communist terror programs comes from an inspection of training efforts.
Camp Ba Thu in the "parrot's beak" of Cambodia, due west of Saigon, is the chief training area for communists slated to engage in terror work. About one hundred students are in this area at any one time taking the basic two-month elementary course called "Armed Security Training." Others in smaller numbers receive more advanced or specialized training. Students, either are Northerners who have had previous training at Camp Xuan Mai in North Viet-Nam, or local communists who have come in for the training.

About 40 percent of the coursework at Ba Thu is political indoctrination, all incorporated into one lecture session titled, "Role of the Revolution During the General Uprising Period." (In the communist view, Viet-Nam is now in the stage of Tong khoi nghia or general uprising, the final stage before victory.) Specific topics include: "Situation in the South," "Historical Analysis," "Meaning of the General Uprising and the General Offensive," "Role and Responsibility of Armed Security." The mission of the individual, he is told, is:

"To eliminate tyrants, local administrative personnel, betrayers, those who undermine our movement and those who terrorize the people; to protect the revolutionary organs; to heighten the prestige of the Revolution and lower the prestige of the enemy; to create conditions favorable to binh van (troop proselytizing) or capturing enemy personnel, especially those who can supply us with information, especially if they steal enemy documents which help us understand enemy plans and estimates. The main objective of the Revolution is the government. In order to oust the puppet government and seize power for ourselves, we must resort to revolutionary violence, both military and political, also to oppose the enemy's anti-revolutionary violence. The Armed Security Force in particular and the People's Security Agency in general should be the main tools of the Party and the Revolution in this effort."5

The rest of the coursework consists of classes in: "Techniques of Security" (protection of fixed installations or simple guard duty); "How to Set Ambushes" (which means how to kidnap and how to assassinate as well as how to set ambushes for the same purposes); "Reconnaissance" (casing the target and route planning); "Methods of Camouflage and Disguise"; "Tactics of Urban Warfare"; and something called "Personnel" which appar-
ently deals with handling amateur collaborators and, an increasingly common phenomenon, the hired terrorist whose services are engaged for a single operation for which he receives a considerable sum of money. Students also receive training in weapons handling, if they have not already acquired it elsewhere; the basic weapon is the AK-47. There also is training in the use of pressure- and electrically-detoned mines, and use of B-40 and B-41 rockets. In the physical education classes, emphasis is on silent swimming.

Toward the end of the training period those students who are part of the communist military structure (as opposed to those who operate under the control of the Party) are formed into four-man teams: a chief, who does the actual detonating of the charge and thus has the most dangerous assignment; a logistics man responsible for assembling the explosives and detonators; a reconnaissance man who maps the target as well as the routes to be followed before and after the operation; and an outside man, who is responsible for transportation and who acts as the "cover" man during the getaway, that is, as a counter-pursuit force. These teams, singly or in clusters, then receive team training both at the sand table and in mock operations.

Operations

Communist terror activity seldom is conducted in isolation. Almost every act is part of a program and every program an integral part of some project which the leaders feel is required at the moment: the refugees must be forced back to their home villages, American casualties must be increased, villagers must be discouraged from voting in village council elections, etc. Normally the activities of the various cells are integrated into the perennial "offensives" which communist planners love to divide into three phases and mount as "Autumn-Winter" and "Spring-Summer" offensives of "Dry Season" and "Wet Season" campaigns. Between "offensives" the cells are available for other assignments, but also during these periods they do a good deal of training.

The specific acts of terror as well as the intent and purpose behind them can be quickly understood by skimming the Appendix, "Terror: The Record", and, in fact, that is the reason it was included in this monograph.
Especially in Central Viet-Nam, the terror units operate under a kind of Stakhanovite quota system. The six-month quota imposed on six units (probably district special activities squads) in southern Phu Yen and northern Khanh Hoa Provinces for the last half of 1969 is reproduced below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation</th>
<th>To Be Annihilated</th>
<th>To Be Captured &amp; Re-educated (At District Centers)</th>
<th>To Be Re-Educated At Village Level</th>
<th>Warning Letters To Be Sent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>26</td>
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The quota takes note of four of the five major activities of various terror units: assassination; kidnaping (with indoctrination and later release, or with subsequent assassination); "re-education" in the village (a whole range of indoctrinal, agitational and propaganda efforts by special action teams, armed propaganda teams and agit-prop teams); and psychological intimidation (those on the warning letter list may later be moved to the assassination list; in any event the warning letter is cheap and can be highly effective in individual cases). The fifth activity, beyond the capability of the units for which this quota was designed, is the use of explosives for terror purposes.

The tricks of the terror trade are endless:

*Poisoned cigarettes given eleven police officers in Kien Hoa province; one died, the others were hospitalized.

*Two 12-year old boys in Binh Dinh Province were kid-
naped by a Special Activities Squad. The chief held their heads under water until they promised to throw two grenades in their village, which they did, killing 27 persons.

*Poison injected into bottles of wine with hypodermic needles. Or wine bottles used as grenade carriers: the bottom is cut off the bottle, a hand grenade fitted snugly into the bottle with the pin removed and the bottom cemented back on. When the bottle is hurled it breaks, releasing the firing arm (an excellent way to conceal a grenade when traveling in the city).

*Doors, drawers or automobile engines booby trapped; booby traps of explosives, but also of poisoned darts.

*Assassinations directed against the very best and the very worst enemy officials, against the highly popular and effective civil servant and against the most corrupt and oppressive local official, stimulating a policy of mediocrity.

*The bicycle or motorcycle can be a death instrument, with its hollow tubular frame packed with plastique and the timing device fixed under the saddle. The terrorist rides into the area, leans his machine against the building to be destroyed, sets the fuse and walks off.

*The use of a B-40 rocket for purposes of extortion. For example, a Chinese transportation company owner is delinquent in his payments to the communists. One of his trucks, traveling over government-controlled roads (meaning that a communist unit would not dare openly stop the truck) is blown up from a distance, with a rocket; there is virtually no risk to the communists and the pay-off is high, as the owner doesn't want to lose another truck.

Increasingly we have seen develop in Viet-Nam the large scale terror attack, a commando-type raid by sappers but with the purpose of terrorizing rather than accomplishing some military objective. The raid on the U.S. Sixth Convalescent Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay, August 7, 1969, may be an ominous fore-shadowing of this new face of communist terror: a 100-man sapper force infiltrated the hospital compound, detonated several dozen charges, shot some American patients and then vanished without a casualty to themselves. The capability, scope and
importance of this sort of mass terror operation has broadened steadily in the past 18 months. We can expect it to continue to grow in importance. More communist resources will be allocated to it, more emphasis will be placed on it doctrinally. This is a reflection of the steadily changing nature of the war since mid-1968. For the communists it is a trend toward less costly warfare, especially less lavish expenditure of men and materials. A sapper battalion attack is more economical than an assault by far larger numbers of PAVN. Not only does it allow the better husbanding of resources, it also provides greater precision in strikes at those enemy targets which represent maximum threat at the moment—for example, the Revolutionary Development cadres, or the People's Self-Defense Force. Therefore it is quite possible that the communist leaders may during 1970 restructure the war and put the chief burden of the struggle on the shoulders of the terrorist. Indeed, an increasingly impressive body of evidence from captured documents points clearly toward this eventuality.

Limitations

We would be remiss if we did not consider the limits which exist in communist use of terror, for they are many and significant. The chief limit, of course, is that imposed by the other side, the so-called counter-terror measures which for the most part are nothing more than patient detective and police work; these have always been important but in recent months have at times become impressive. Poor quality of personnel is probably the second greatest limitation. Closely allied to this is the matter of individual morale. Doctrine also can be a limitation. Some examples:

*The Saigon police intercept a shipment of explosive materials and detonating devices en route to Saigon but without communist knowledge. Experts then sabotage them. For example a fuse is removed from a hand grenade. Or the fuse is changed from a five-second to a half-second one. Or the explosive is replaced with material that looks identical but is harmless. The word which eventually gets back to the terror teams is that their equipment is faulty.

*GNV penetration agents in a sapper squad are under order: to watch for signs of faint-heartedness or loss of zeal among
members. If an agent detects this in a member, he carefully reveals himself and offers to arrange the next assignment as a staged affair, appearing to be genuine but run with the cooperation of the police and thus involving no danger to the faint-hearted member.

*On several occasions naval patrol boats have seen underwater explosions from a distance and upon investigation have found the remains of what undoubtedly were water sappers who had blown themselves up. Allied forces have captured several stockpiles of water sapper explosive devices and equipment: magnetic-acoustic mines, pressure-influence detonators, torpedoes and scuba-diving equipment, all of it communist-bloc manufactured and of first-rate quality. Yet there has been surprisingly little water sapper activity. Probably this is a limitation imposed by lack of trained and experienced water sappers, who are much harder to come by than is good water-sapper equipment.

*Getting and keeping safe houses, especially in Saigon, is a steadily more difficult task. Captured documents indicate that the leadership does not expect any safe house to remain secure more than six months.

*Lack of skill means more accidents. On May 15, 1969, for example, there was a large explosion in Saigon's Fifth District. Later, it was determined that a team had been transporting three rockets and 88 pounds of plastique and because of carelessness or ignorance, or sabotage, had accidentally set them off. Sappers carrying concealed charges in Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive failed to carry out their assignment because they got lost (and aroused suspicions with inquiries as to location of target; one passer-by notified police who arrested them).

*Morale is a major limitation. Terrorists must be zealously energetic or they are nothing. Losses in their ranks have a cumulative effect, tending to cause survivors anxiety about living on borrowed time because of the discouraging prospect of the arrival of new and usually green recruits with all the consequent hazards. The knowledge that GVN penetration agents are everywhere, reporting and internally sabotaging the effort, must have a particularly corrosive effect.
*Limits are recognized frankly by communist theoreticians, writing in cadre handbooks and even publicly. In earlier years especially, cadres were advised to use terror judiciously, selectively and only sparingly. Terror, they were told, was largely useless against a dedicated opponent, such as the South Vietnamese Catholics. In general the theoreticians seemed to regard terror as a technique which provides quick but rapidly diminishing returns, a weapon of the weak that would fall into disuse as power grew. Writings also repeatedly make the point that terror methods can succeed only when the objectives of the terrorist are widely and fully supported by the general population (the example always given is the Viet Minh war against the French). One concludes that had these theoreticians had their way, terror would never have grown to the proportion that it did, nor would it have become integral in virtually all communist programs, as is the case now.
Chapter IV - Footnotes
Chapter IV: Footnotes

1. Three-member cell in Vietnamese is to ba nguoi. Also employed are to keo son (glue-welded cell) and to tam gia (three-participant cell).

2. In Vietnamese, to thanh phan ban quan su.

3. In Vietnamese, to tieu dac cong.

4. The standard Vietnamese word for sapper is cong binh. However, it now is common to encounter sapper as the translation for dac cong, the same term employed in our second type of terror cell and translated as special activities. In communist usage dac cong means literally special operation, as for example doi dac cong cam tu or special operations "suicide" unit. However, as noted dac cong now is being translated by GVN translators as sapper.

5. From the captured notebook of a cadre who had attended the course at Ba Thu. Circa early 1969.
Appendix: Terror -- The Record
Appendix: Terror -- The Record

To provide the reader with a sense of the all-encompassing nature of communist terror in Viet-Nam, representative, but by no means comprehensive, examples have been selected from books, government files, newspaper morgues and International Control Commission reports.

Viet Minh Terror

The Viet Minh war against the French was marked by considerable use of terror, not only against the French but against Vietnamese who did not support the Viet Minh.

Beginning in the final days of World War II, the communists, under Vo Nguyen Giap, destroyed all non-communist nationalist leaders they could run to earth.

In the Viet Minh controlled areas during the war, "enemies of the Resistance" were systematically eliminated.

Something of a blood bath took place following victory in 1954, one which would have been greater had not some 900,000 North Vietnamese escaped to the South in Operation Exodus.

Terror again surged upwards in 1956 with the so-called land reform program, which actually was destruction of the natural leader class in the North Vietnamese villages. A conservative figure of the number who died at this period is 50,000; some estimates run as high as a half-million (population of North Viet-Nam at the time was about 14 million).

Accounts of various communist terror activity is found in the standard works on the Viet Minh war, including: Bernard Fall, Le Viet Minh; Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled; Lucien Bodard, The Quicksand War; George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina. The later terror, during the so-called land reform period, is detailed in Harvey Smith et al, Area Handbook for North Viet-Nam; Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism; Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indo-China; and Dennis Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Viet-Nam.
Some typical quotations follow:

"That city (Saigon) was in the hands of the Viet Minh. For a month on end life there was a nightmare. During the day everything seemed quiet... Fear came back with the twilight. The darkness outside was full of prowling Viet Minh... It was an endless vigil. In every house the waiting had the same aspect. The rooms were lit for sake of face. The men played cards with their only weapons, the kitchen knives, within hand's reach. From time to time they broke off to calm their wives overtaken by hysteria. The children, all put into the same bed in a next-door room, trembled with fear and were sick on the mosquito netting. The terror mounted. From mouth to mouth ran the names of men who had been hacked to pieces, of women who had been raped and cut open, of children who had been maimed. The shrieks of those who were being tortured to death could be heard. The Viet Minh had set up Resistance camps in the suburbs and there they took their hostages, burying them alive, with only their heads showing above the ground. The horror reached its culminating point... when some one hundred men were dismembered, slashed to pieces in unimaginably horrible circumstances."


"To make force a Viet Minh monopoly required a great deal of preventive violence... Like all fanatics whether political or religious who believe that they are called upon to save souls or to realize great worldly projects, the communists had no qualms when it came to advancing their cause by assassination... It was not difficult for people convinced of the virtue of their cause to kill others and feel they had performed a good deed.... Success was achieved through a political strategy in which terror, always subordinate to tactical considerations, played a secondary though at times a rather important role...."

"The Communist policy of killing all true nationalist opponents of the Viet Minh also had deep and lasting political consequences for the future of Viet-Nam. It is one of the reasons for the weakness of the non-Communist national movement which, its best and most promising young candidates murdered, was deprived of scores of qualified leaders, enough to guide it for many years to come."

**North Viet-Nam**

"In 1955 North Viet-Nam launched a three-year program of economic rehabilitation and land distribution... motivated in part by the regime's attempt to strengthen its control over the population by purging the landlords whom they regarded as reactionary. In implementing the redistribution measures the Communist regimes used terror and other coercive means resulting in the death of more than 50,000 persons between 1954 and 1956."


"The Land Reform was carried out in two successive campaigns (1953-1956).... The second campaign was interrupted in 1955 owing to the mass exodus of nearly a million people from North to South Viet-Nam,... The communists temporarily halted the terror in order to avoid an even larger exodus.... But after the closing of Hai Phong, the last seaport through which people could escape, they at once resumed their campaign.... The number of victims in this campaign has never been made public, but if we are to believe M. Gerard Tongas, a French professor who remained in Hanoi up to 1959 and who claims to have accurate information: 'This indescribable butchery resulted in one hundred thousand deaths.'"


"These 'mistakes'(in the DRV Land Reform program) had been committed by the Communist cadres in charge of this operation who, when they were faced with disconcerting discovery that no landlords existed in many of the (Red River) delta villages, had proceeded to create such a class by resorting to murder and torture in order to wring the statutory confessions of past ill-treatment of tenant farmers from villagers who either
cultivated their own meagre holdings or in some cases possessed no land at all. The cost in lives and suffering of this somber farce was revealed in December 1956 when 12,000 victims of the operation were released from the forced labor camps to which they had been unjustly condemned; the number of those who had been murdered was unofficially estimated at between ten and fifteen thousand."


"The periodical campaigns of systematic terror, to ensure obedience and loyalty, followed the succession of ideas put into practice in China (on land tenure problems).... In 1954 village murders of alleged traitors had been perpetrated out of hand as acts of vengeance; from 1951 onward the purpose of terror became indoctrination in this sense and victims were picked out by denunciation, more or less at random, according to their social standing, to be made examples of at people's trials. But the greatest of the terror campaigns in the DRV did not begin until 1953... The intention seems to have been less the elimination of any particular class of people than eradication from everybody's mind, without distinction of class, of any desire to own private property or to pursue any private purposes.... People's courts, set up by the visiting teams of cadres and conducted with similar cowardly hysteria to those of China, demanded quotas of denunciations by the villagers and ordered on-the-spot destruction of property and execution of the owners by various unjusticial barbarities; besides tens of thousands who lost their lives many more were made outcasts from their village communities..."


"Hard times lay ahead for the people of North Viet-Nam (late 1954).... Colonialism was dead but misery and unfreedom continued to be the people's lot.... And in the political conflicts that these conditions were bound to
produce, terror would still remain the government's chief weapon against popular discontent."


_South Viet-Nam--A Partial Chronology_

February 2, 1960 - Terrorists sack and burn the Buddhist temple at Phuoc Thanh, Tay Ninh province. They stab to death 17-year old Phan Van Ngoc, who tries to stop them.

April 22, 1960 - Some 30 armed communists raid Thoi Long, An Xuyen province. They attempt to take away villager Cao Van Nanh, 45. Villagers protest en masse. Farmer Pham Van Bai, 56, is particularly argumentative. The communists, angered, seize him. This arouses the villagers who swarm toward the Viet Cong and their prisoner. The communists fire into the crowd. A 16-year old boy is shot dead.

August 23, 1960 - Two school teachers, Nguyen Khoa Ngon and Miss Nguyen Thi Thiet, are preparing lessons at home when communists arrive and force them at gun point to go to their school, Rau Ran, in Phong Dinh province. There they find two men tied to the school veranda. The communists read the death order of the two men, named Canh and Van. They are executed, presumably to intimidate the school teachers.

September 24, 1960 - An armed band sacks a school in An Lac, An Giang province. It piles seats and desks together and fires them and the school. All that remains is four bare walls.

September 28, 1960 - Father Hoang Ngoc Minh, much beloved priest of Kontum parish, is riding from Tan Canh to Kondela. A communist road block halts his car. A bullet smashes into him. The guerrillas drive bamboo spears into Father Minh's body, then one fires a submachine gun point blank, killing him. The driver Huynh Huu, his nephew, is seriously wounded.
September 30, 1960 - A band of ten armed communists kidnap farmer Truong Van Dang, 67, from Long Tri, Long An province. They take him before what they call a "people's tribunal." He is condemned to death for purchasing two hectares of rice land and ignoring communist orders to turn the land over to another farmer. After the "trial" he is shot dead in his rice field.

December 6, 1960 - Terrorists dynamite the kitchen at the Saigon Golf Club, killing a Vietnamese kitchen helper and injuring two Vietnamese cooks.

December, 1960 - The GVN reports to the ICC that during the year the communists destroyed or damaged 284 bridges, burned 60 medical aid stations and, through destruction of schools, deprived some 25,000 children of schooling.

March 22, 1961 - A truck carrying 20 girls is dynamited on the Saigon-Vung Tau road. The girls are returning from Saigon where they have taken part in a Trung Sisters Day celebration. After the explosion terrorists open fire on survivors. Two of the girls are killed and ten wounded. The girls are unarmed and traveling without escort.

May 15, 1961 - Twelve Catholic nuns from La Providence order are traveling on Highway One toward Saigon. Their bus is stopped by communists who ransack their luggage. Sister Theophile protests and is shot dead on the spot. The vehicle is sprayed with bullets seriously wounding Sister Phan Thi No. The ambush takes place near Tram Van, Tay Ninh Province.

July 26, 1961 - Two Vietnamese National Assemblymen Rmah Pok and Yet Nic Bounrit, both Montagnards, are shot and killed by terrorists near Dalat. A schoolteacher, traveling with them on their visit to a Montagnard resettlement village, is also killed.

September 20, 1961 - One thousand main force communist soldiers storm Phuoc Vinh, capital of (then) Phuoc Thanh
province, sack and burn government buildings, behead virtually the entire administrative staff. They hold the capital for 24 hours before withdrawing.

October, 1961 - A U.S. State Department study estimates that the communists are killing Vietnamese at rate of 1,500 per month.

December 13, 1961 - Father Bonnet, a French parish priest from Konkala, Kontum is killed by a terrorist while visiting parishioners at Ngok Rongei.

December 20, 1961 - S. Fukai, a Japanese engineer at the Da Nhim dam, a Japanese government war reparations project to supply electric power to Viet-Nam, is kidnapped after being stopped at a road block. His fate is never learned.

January 1, 1962 - A Vietnamese labor leader, Le Van Thieu, 63, is hacked to death by terrorists wielding machetes near Bien Hoa, in the rubber plantation on which he works.

January 2, 1962 - Two Vietnamese technicians working in the government's anti-malaria program, Pham Van Hai and Nguyen Van Thach, are killed by communists with machetes, 12 miles south of Saigon.

February 20, 1962 - Terrorists throw four hand grenades into a crowded village theater near Can Tho, killing 24 women and children. In all, 108 persons are killed or injured.

April 8, 1962 - Communists execute two wounded American prisoners of war near the village of An Chau in Central Viet-Nam. Each, hands tied, is shot in the face because he cannot keep up with the retreating captors.

May 19, 1962 - A terrorist grenade is hurled into the Aterbea restaurant in Saigon, wounding a Berlin circus manager and the cultural attache from the German Embassy.
May 20, 1962 - A bomb explodes in front of the Hung Dao Hotel, Saigon, a billet for American servicemen, injuring eight Vietnamese and three Americans who are in the street at the time.

June 12, 1962 - Communists ambush a civilian passenger bus near Le Tri, An Giang province, killing the passengers, the driver and the driver's helper, a total of five men and women.

October 20, 1962 - A teen-age communist hurls a grenade into a holiday crowd in downtown Saigon, killing six persons, including two children, and injuring 38 persons.

November 4, 1962 - A terrorist hurls a grenade into an alley in Can Tho, killing one American serviceman and two Vietnamese children. A third Vietnamese child is seriously injured.

January 25, 1963 - Communists dynamite a passenger-freight train near Qui Nhon, killing eight passengers and injuring 15 others. The train is carrying only rice as freight.

March 4, 1963 - Two Protestant missionaries -- Elwood Forreston, an American, and Gaspart Makil, a Filipino -- are shot dead at a road block between Saigon and Dalat. The Makil twin babies are shot and wounded.

March 16, 1963 - Terrorists hurl a grenade into a Saigon home where an American family is having dinner, killing a French businessman and wounding four other persons, one of them a woman.

April 3, 1963 - Terrorists throw two grenades into a private school near Long Xuyen, An Giang province, killing a teacher and two other adults. Students are performing their annual variety show at the time.

April 4, 1963 - Terrorists throw grenades into an audience attending an outdoor motion picture showing in
Cao Lanh village in the Mekong Delta, killing four persons and wounding 11.

**May 23, 1963** - Communists mine the main northern rail line, killing five civilian passengers. Twelve other passengers and crew are injured.

**May 31, 1963** - Two powerful explosions set off by terrorists on bicycles kill two Vietnamese and wound ten others in Saigon. Police believe the explosion was accidentally premature.

**September 12, 1963** - Miss Vo Thi Lo, 26, a schoolteacher in An Phuoc, Kien Hoa province, is found near the village with her throat cut. She had been kidnapped three days earlier.

**October 16, 1963** - Terrorists explode mines under two civilian buses in Kien Hoa and Quang Tin provinces, killing 18 Vietnamese and wounding 23.

**November 9, 1963** - Three grenades are thrown in Saigon, injuring a total of 16 persons, including four children; the first is thrown in a main street, the second along the waterfront, and the third in the Chinese residential area.

**February 9, 1964** - Two Americans are killed and 41 wounded, including four women and five children, when a communist bomb is set off in a sports stadium during a softball game. A second portion of the bomb fails to explode. Officials estimate that if it had, fifty persons would have died.

**February 16, 1964** - Three Americans are killed and 32 injured, most of them U.S. dependents, when terrorists bomb the Kinh Do movie theater in Saigon.

**July 14, 1964** - Pham Thao, chairman of the Catholic Action Committee in Quang Ngai, is executed when he returns to his native village of Pho Loi, Quang Ngai province.
October, 1964 - U.S. officials in Saigon report that from January to October of 1964 the communists killed 429 Vietnamese local officials and kidnaped 482 others.

December 24, 1964 - A Christmas eve bomb explosion at the Brink officers' billet kills two Americans and injures 50 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

February 6, 1965 - Radio Liberation announces that the communists have shot two American prisoners of war as reprisals against the Vietnamese government, which had sentenced two terrorists to death.

February 10, 1965 - Terrorists blow up an enlisted men's barracks in Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans.

March 30, 1965 - A bomb explodes outside the American Embassy in Saigon, killing 2 Americans, 18 Vietnamese and injuring 100 Vietnamese and 45 Americans.

June 24, 1965 - Radio Liberation announces the execution of an American prisoner.

June 25, 1965 - Terrorists dynamite the My Canh restaurant in Saigon, killing 27 Vietnamese, 12 Americans, two Filipinos, one Frenchman, one German; more than 80 persons are injured.

June, 1965 - Vietnamese officials report the rate of assassinations and kidnapings of rural officials has doubled in June over May and April; 224 officials were either killed or kidnapped.

August 18, 1965 - A bomb at the Police Directorate office in Saigon kills six and wounds 15.

October 4, 1965 - One of two planted bombs explodes at the Cong Hoa National Sports Stadium, killing eleven Vietnamese, including four children, and wounding 42 persons.

October 5, 1965 - A bomb goes off, apparently prematurely, in a taxi on a main street in downtown Saigon, killing two Vietnamese and wounding ten others.
December 4, 1965 - In Saigon a terrorist bomb kills eight persons when it explodes in front of a billet for U.S. enlisted men; 137 are injured, including 72 Americans, three New Zealanders and 62 Vietnamese.

December 12, 1965 - Two terrorist platoons kill 23 Vietnamese canal construction workers asleep in a Buddhist Pagoda in Tan Huong, Dinh Tuong province; wound seven others.

December 30, 1965 - Saigon editor Tu Chung of the newspaper Chinh Luan is gunned down in point blank fire as he arrives home at noon for lunch. Earlier he had published the texts of threatening notes he had received from the communists.

January 7, 1966 - A Claymore mine explodes at Tan Son Nhut gate (entrance to Saigon airport), killing two persons and injuring 12.

January 17, 1966 - Communists in Kien Tuong detonate a mine under a highway bus, killing 26 civilians, seven of them children. Eight persons are injured and three are listed as missing.

January 18, 1966 - Communists mine a bus in Kien Tuong province, killing 26 civilians.

January 29, 1966 - Terrorists kill a Catholic priest, Father Phan Khac Dau, 74, at Thanh Tri, Kien Tuong province. Five other civilians, including a church officer, are also killed. The marauders desecrate the church, destroying its statuary and religious artifacts.

February 2, 1966 - A communist squad ambushes a jeep load of Vietnamese information workers, killing six and wounding one; in Hau Nghia province.
February 14, 1966 - Two mines explode beneath a bus and a three-wheeled taxi on a road near Tuy Hoa, killing 48 farm laborers and injuring seven others.

March 18, 1966 - Fifteen Vietnamese civilians are killed and four injured by the explosion of a homemade mine on a country road eight kilometers west of Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen province.

May 22, 1966 - Terrorists kill 18 sleeping men, a woman and four children during an attack on a housing center for canal workers in the Mekong Delta province of An Giang. "We are doing this to teach you a lesson," a communist cadre is reported to have said just before he pulled the trigger.

September 10, 1966 - On the eve of South Viet-Nam's Constituent Assembly elections, communists stage 166 separate incidents of intimidation, abduction and assassination. Polling places also are destroyed.

September 11, 1966 - On election day, communists kill 19 voters, wound 120, in fire on polling places, mining of roads, and in individual assassinations.

September 24, 1966 - American troops free eleven persons from a communist "jail" in Phu Yen province who report that 70 fellow prisoners were deliberately starved to death and 20 others tortured until they died.

October 11, 1966 - Acting on information from a 14-year old boy, allied forces discover a prison complex in Binh Dinh province containing the bodies of 12 Vietnamese who had been machine gunned and grenaded by fleeing guards.

October 22, 1966 - A youth worker in Binh Chanh, Gia Dinh province, is shot and killed by raiders while asleep in his home.
October 24, 1966 - The Hue-Quang Tri bus runs over a mine in Phong Dien district, Thua Thien province; 15 passengers are injured.

October 27, 1966 - A grenade is thrown into a home in Ban Me Thuot, Darlac province, killing a 63-year old man and a nine-month old child; seven other persons, six of them women, are wounded.

October 28, 1966 - An alert policeman arrests a female communist agent who is about to place a time-bomb under the reviewing stand at a festival in Khanh Hung (Soc Trang), Ba Xuyen province.

November 1, 1966 - Communists direct long-range recoilless rifle fire into downtown Saigon during National Day celebration killing or wounding 51 persons.

November 2, 1966 - A grenade is thrown by a terrorist at Phu Tho racetrack, Saigon, killing two persons and wounding eight others, including two children.

November 2, 1966 - A squad of armed guerrillas attacks a hamlet in Chau Thanh district, Phong Dinh province, then withdraws after detonating a 10-kilogram charge which wrecks a steel bridge across the Dau Sau canal. An aged woman and two children are wounded.

November 3, 1966 - Communist squads infiltrate the outskirts of Saigon, fire 24 recoilless rifle shells on the city. Among the buildings hit are Saigon Central Market, Grall Hospital, Saigon Cathedral, a seminary chapel and several private homes. Eight persons are killed and 37 seriously wounded.

November 4, 1966 - Communists lob mortar shells into a village in Hau Nghia province, killing one civilian and wounding eight.
November 4, 1966 - Communist attack an outpost in Tay Ninh province, killing six civilians and wounding two Revolutionary Development team members.

November 7, 1966 - A communist squad on Provincial Road 8, Quang Duc province, abducts a hamlet chief and deputy chief.

November 8, 1966 - In Chau Doc province, a 53-year-old woman is tortured and shot to death; a note pinned to her body accuses her of supporting the South Vietnamese government.

November 16, 1966 - A terrorist bomb-laden bicycle on Nguyen Van Thoai Street, Saigon, explodes; two South Vietnamese soldiers and a civilian are wounded.

November 19, 1966 - Eight mortar rounds on Can Giuoc, Long An province, kill two children; 12 civilians are wounded. Some 20 mortar rounds drop on Can Duoc, wounding five civilians.

November 20, 1966 - Two policemen are wounded when they attempt to remove several communist banners equipped with explosive devices.

November 23, 1966 - Three terrorists dressed in South Vietnamese army uniforms kill a policeman guarding a bridge at Khanh Hung (Soc Trang), Ba Xuyen province. While escaping, they throw two grenades, wounding seven civilians and two soldiers.

November 26, 1966 - A Claymore-type mine is set off in the playground of the Trinh Hoai Duc boys' school, An Thanh, Binh Duong province. Korean troops are using adjacent area as a training site. Three Koreans are killed and a Vietnamese student is wounded.

November 30, 1966 - Communist shell Tan Uyen market, Bien Hoa province, killing three civilians and wounding seven.
December 4, 1966 - A village chief in Gia Dinh province is abducted from his home in Phu Lam by four men and assassinated by rifle fire.

December 7, 1966 - Tran Van Van, Constituent Assemblyman, is assassinated while en route to the National Assembly building; death weapon is a .32 caliber East German pistol; his killers are captured.

December 10, 1966 - A terrorist throws a grenade into the Chieu Hoi district playground, Binh Duong City, severely injuring three children.

December 10, 1966 - A taxi on Highway 29, Phong Dinh province runs over a mine. Five passengers, all women, are killed and the driver badly wounded.

December 13, 1966 - Revolutionary Development personnel attend a course at the Ca Mau school, An Xuyen province; a charge explodes in the classroom, killing three and wounding nine.

December 20, 1966 - A squad infiltrates a hamlet in Quang Tin province, kidnap a former Viet Cong member who recently defected, carries him to another location and shoots him.

December 27, 1966 - National Constituent Assemblyman, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, narrowly escapes death when his car explodes in Gia Dinh province. A charge is concealed beneath the vehicle and detonates as Dr. Dan opens the door. Dan escapes with minor wounds but a woman passerby is killed and five civilians wounded.

January 6, 1967 - A South Vietnamese policeman in Tan Chu, Kien Phong province, is shot and killed while members of his family look on.

January 7, 1967 - An explosion destroys a school and health station in Hong Ngu district, Kien Phong province.
January 8, 1967 - In An Xuyen province, terrorists throw a grenade into the house of a hamlet chief. One of the children is killed and three other civilians are wounded.

January 12, 1967 - Three civilians are killed and three South Vietnamese soldiers are wounded in an ambush of a truck on National Highway 14, two kilometers south of Tan Canh village.

January 15, 1967 - At Thanh Tho, Quang Tin province, communists shoot a merchant when he refuses to give them two oxen.

January 21, 1967 - Several communists force their way into Buon Ho, Darlac province, gather the people for a propaganda lecture; kidnap six young men.

February 6, 1967 - Communists raid Lieu Tri, Quang Tin province, and abduct a teacher and a local official. The teacher is killed.

February 6, 1967 - A grenade is thrown onto the porch where Kontum deputy province chief is entertaining a group of South Vietnamese officials. The provincial Chief of Education is killed instantly; the Chief of Montagnard Affairs and another official die of wounds the next day. Eight others are seriously wounded.

March 4, 1967 - Only two badly wounded prisoners survive as communist prison guards near Can Tho tie 12 South Vietnamese captives together, shoot and stab them before fleeing from advancing South Vietnamese troops; both survivors live despite having their throats cut.

March 5, 1967 - In a nocturnal raid, terrorists murder two young Revolutionary Development workers in Vinh Phu, Phu Yen province. Seven additional Revolutionary Development team members are killed in the ensuing gunfight and four are wounded. The raid is the 113th attack on Revolutionary Development workers since the first of the year.
March 30, 1967 - Recoilless rifle fire directed at homes of families of South Vietnamese troops demolishes 200 houses and kills 32 men, women and children in the capital city of Bac Lieu province.

April 13, 1967 - A South Vietnamese entertainment troupe is the target of nocturnal raid in Lu Song hamlet, near Da Nang. The team chief and his deputy are killed; two team members are wounded.

April 14, 1967 - Terrorists kidnap Nguyen Van Son in Binh Chanh district, Gia Dinh province; he is a candidate in the elections for village council.

April 16, 1967 - A squad enters Cam Ha, Quang Nam province and murders an election candidate. One child is killed and three civilians are wounded.

April 18, 1967 - Sui Chon hamlet northeast of Saigon is attacked by assassins and arsonists who slay five Revolutionary Development team members, wound three, abduct seven; three of those slain are young girls, whose hands are tied behind their backs before they are shot in the head. One-third of the hamlet's dwelling is destroyed by fire.

April 26, 1967 - Nguyen Cam, chief of Ba Dan hamlet, Quang Nam province, is shot and killed by a terrorist. Cam had been a candidate in recent elections.

May 10, 1967 - A bus loaded with South Vietnamese civilians runs over a land mine near Than Bach Thach, Phu Bon province. One passenger is killed; the driver and five passengers are wounded.

May 11, 1967 - More than 200 doctors and medical workers of the Republic of South Viet-Nam have been victims of the communists in the past 10 years, State Health Secretary Dr. Tran Van Lu-Y tells the World Health Organization in Geneva. He says 211 members of his staff have been killed or kidnapped; 174 dispensaries, maternity homes and hospitals destroyed; 40 ambulances mined or machine-gunned.
May 16, 1967 - In two separate attacks in Quang Tin and Quang Tri provinces, communists kill eight Revolutionary Development team members and injure five.

May 24, 1967 - The information officer of Phu Thanh, Bien Hoa province, and his two children are killed by grenades thrown into their home at 3 a.m.

May 29, 1967 - Frogmen emerge from the Perfume River in Hue to blow up a hotel housing members of the International Control Commission. No member of the Indian-Canadian-Polish team is hurt, but five South Vietnamese civilians are killed and 15 wounded. The hotel is 80 percent destroyed.

June 2, 1967 - Armed with automatic weapons, two platoons make a post-midnight raid on a Chieu Hoi camp in Long An. They injure five South Vietnamese soldiers and five civilians.

June 27, 1967 - Twenty-three civilians are killed when their bus strikes a mine in Binh Duong province, southeast of Lai Khe.

July 6, 1967 - Several children walking on the road to a pagoda at Cam Pho hamlet, Quang Nam province, are wounded when a passing truck explodes a Viet Cong anti-tank mine. One child dies of wounds.

July 13, 1967 - An explosion in a Hue restaurant kills two Vietnamese. Twelve Vietnamese, seven Americans and one Filipino are injured.

July 14, 1967 - Terrorists dressed in Vietnamese Army uniforms capture a prison in Quang Nam province, releasing about 1,000 of the 1,200 inmates; they execute 30 in the prison yard. Ten civilians are killed and 29 wounded as the terrorists fight their way out of the area.

July 25, 1967 - Communists appear at homes in Binh Trieu, Long An province and kidnap four men, a woman and the woman's 16-year-old son. All six are found the following morning along Highway 13, hands tied behind their backs, a bullet in each head.

August 5, 1967 - During a special civics class in a secondary school in An Xuyen province, part of the September election
"get out the vote" campaign, a terrorist gives a small girl a hand grenade with the pin extracted and tells her to carry it carefully to her teacher. At the classroom door the child drops the grenade, killing herself and injuring nine children.

**August 24, 1967** - Terrorists kill one and wound four when they detonate a charge at the home of a Vietnamese policeman in Can Tho, Phong Dinh province.

**August 26, 1967** - Twenty-two civilians die and six are injured when their bus strikes a mine in Kien Hoa province.

**August 27, 1967** - A week before presidential and senate elections, terrorists step up their activities. A recoilless rifle and mortar attack on Can Tho kills 46 and injures 227. Ten die and ten are injured in an attack on a Revolutionary Development team in Phuoc Long province. Fourteen civilians, including five children, are wounded by mortar fire southeast of Ban Me Thuot, Darlac province. Two civilians die and one is wounded in an attack on a hamlet in Binh Long province. Six civilians are kidnapped from Phuoc Hung village in Thua Thien province.

**August 29, 1967** - Groups of communists infiltrate four hamlets in Thanh Binh district, Quang Nam province, kill two civilians and abduct six, including an inter-family chief.

**September 1, 1967** - Terrorist explosives blast six craters in National Route 4 in Dinh Tuong province, stopping all vehicular traffic except a South Vietnamese army ambulance bus which runs over a pressure mine, killing 13 passengers, injuring 23.

**September 3, 1967** - Shortly after polls open in Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen province, communists detonate a bomb hidden in a polling place. Three voters are killed and 42 are wounded. Election morning attacks, including long-range shellings, claim 48 lives.

**November 8, 1967** - The Ky Chanh refugee center in Quang Tin province is infiltrated by terrorists who kill four persons, wound nine others and kidnap nine more; they also fire the camp's school.

**December 5, 1967** - A name that should be remembered
as long as Lidice is Dak Son, a Montagnard village of some 2,000
in Phuoc Long province, the scene of what in some ways remains
the worst atrocity in the entire atrocity-ridden war. Some 300
communists stage a reprisal raid on Dak Son. The chief weapon:
the flame thrower, 60 of them. The purpose: purely to terrorize.
The result: a Carthaginian solution, all but sowing of the salt.
After breaking through the flimsy hamlet militia defense, the
communists set about systematically to destroy the village and
the people in it. Families are incinerated alive in their grass-
roofed huts or in the shelters dug beneath their beds. Everything
combustible is put to the torch: houses, recently harvested grain
on the ground, livestock, fences, trees, people. One of the first
Americans to approach the scene the following day: "As we
approached the place I thought I saw charred cordwood piled up
the way you pile up logs neatly beside the road. When we got
closer I could see it was the burned bodies of several dozen
babies. The odor of burned flesh, which really is an unforgettable
smell, reached us outside the village and of course got stronger
at the center. People were trying to breathe through cabbage
leaves...I saw a small boy and a smaller girl, probably his
sister, sort of melted together in a charred embrace. I saw a
mother burned black still hiding two children, also burned black.
Everything was burned and black. The worst was the wail of
the survivors who were picking through the smouldering ruins.
One man kept screaming and screaming at the top of his lungs.
For an hour he kept it up. He wasn't hurt that I could tell. He
just kept screaming until a doctor gave him a shot of morphine
or something...Fire boils bodies I learned, and after a few
hours the skin splits and peels and curls....The far end of the
village wasn't burned; the communists ran out of flamethrower
fuel before they got to it...." Estimated toll: 252 dead, about
two-thirds of them women and children; 200 abducted, never to
return.

December 14, 1967 - Bui Quang San, member of South
Viet-Nam's lower house, is gunned down in his home near Saigon.
Two days before his murder, San told friends of receiving a letter
from the communists threatening his life. His mother, first
wife and six children were killed in an earlier Viet Cong raid in
the city of Hoi An.

December 14, 1967 - Saigon reports a total of 232 civilians
killed by acts of terrorism in one week.
December 16, 1967 - During the intermission at a classi
cal drama at the University of Saigon, a communist appears on
stage and begins a propaganda speech about the NLF. A student
attempts to climb to the stage and is shot in the stomach. Two
other students are shot in the melee that follows.

January 20, 1968 - An armed propaganda team enters Tam
Quan, Binh Dinh province, gathers 100 people for a propaganda
session; one prominent village elder objects and is shot to death.

April 6, 1968 - A band of communists enters That Vinh
Dong, Tay Ninh province; they sell several thousand plasters
worth of "war bonds" and then depart, taking with them a school
teacher, the hamlet chief's two daughters and nephew and six
other males age 15 or 16.

May 5 - June 22, 1968 - Some 417 rockets are fired indis-
criminately into Saigon, chiefly in the densely-populated Fourth
District. The rockets are 107mm Chinese-made and 122mm

May 29, 1968 - A band of communists stops all traffic on
Route 155 in Vinh Binh province; 50 civilians are kidnapped,
including a Protestant minister; 2 buses and 28 three-wheeled
taxi's are burned.

June 28, 1968 - A major attack is made against the refugee
center and fishing village of Son Tra, south of Da Nang. In all,
88 persons are killed and 103 are wounded by mortar and machine
gun fire, grenades and explosive charges. Some 450 homes are
destroyed leaving 3,000 of the 5,000 persons there homeless.
Later, villagers gathering bamboo to rebuild the center are fired
on from ambush.

July 28, 1968 - Four gun-wielding terrorists, two of them
women, detonate a 60-pound plastique charge in city room of
Cholon Daily News, most prominent of city's seven Chinese-
language newspapers, after ordering workers out of building;
the four escape before police arrive.

September 1, 1968 - Doctors at the Americal Division's
27th Surgical Hospital report two Montagnard women have been
brought in for treatment for advanced anemia. It is determined
that the North Vietnamese had been systematically draining them of blood for treating their own wounded.

September 12, 1968 - A communist report (captured in Binh Duong province) from the Chau Thanh district Security Section to the provincial Party Central Committee says that seven prisoners in the district's custody were shot prior to an expected enemy sweep operation: "we killed them to make possible our safe escape," the report says.

September 26, 1968 - A grenade is thrown into the crowded Saigon central market, killing one person and wounding 11.

December 11, 1968 - A band of terrorists appears at the home of the provincial People's Self-Defense Force chief in Tri Ton, Chau Doc province; they bind his arms with rope and lead him 50 yards from his home where they fire a burst from a sub-machine gun into his body.

January 6, 1969 - The Vietnamese Minister of Education, Dr. Le Minh Tri, is killed when two terrorists on a motorcycle hurl a hand grenade through the window of the car in which he is riding.

February 7, 1969 - A satchel charge is exploded in the Can Tho market place, killing one and wounding three.

February 16, 1969 - Communists invade and occupy Phuoc My village, Quang Tin province, for several days. Later, survivors describe a series of brutal acts: a 78-year old villager shot for refusing to cut down a tree for a fortification; a 73-year old man killed when he could not or would not leave his home, pleading that infirmities prevented him from walking; an 11-year old boy stabbed; several families grenaded in their homes.

January 19, 1969 - A bicycle bomb explodes in a shop in Kien Hoa Province (Truc Giang), killing six civilians and wounding 16.

February 24, 1969 - Terrorists enter the Catholic Church in Quang Ngai province, assassinate the priest and an altar boy.

February 26, 1969 - A bicycle bomb explodes near a pool
hall in Kien Hoa province, killing a child and wounding three other persons.

**March 4, 1969** - Rector of Saigon University, Professor Tran Anh, is shot by motorcycle-riding terrorists; previously he had been notified that he was on the "death list" of something called the "Suicide Regiment of the Saigon Youth Guard."

**March 5, 1969** - An attempt is made to assassinate Prime Minister Tran Van Huong by hurling a satchel charge against the automobile in which he is riding. The attempt fails and most of the terrorists are captured.

**March 6, 1969** - An explosive charge explodes next to a wall at Quang Ngai city hospital, killing a maternity patient and destroying two ambulances.

**March 9, 1969** - Terrorists enter Xom Lang, Go Cong Province, take Mrs. Phan Thi Tri from her home to a nearby rice field where they behead her, explaining that her husband had defected from the communists.

**March 9, 1969** - A band of communists attack Loc An, Loc My and Loc Hung villages in Quang Nam province, killing two adults and kidnapping ten teenage boys.

**March 13, 1969** - Kon Sitiu and Kon Bobanh, two Montagnard villages in Kontum province, are raided by terrorists; 15 persons killed; 23 kidnapped, two of whom are later executed; three long-houses, a church and a school burned. A hamlet chief is beaten to death. Survivors say the communists' explanation is: "We are teaching you not to cooperate with the government."

**March 21, 1969** - A Kontum province refugee center is attacked for the second time by a PAVN battalion using mortars and B-40 rockets. Seventeen civilians are killed and 36 wounded, many of them women and children. A third of the center is destroyed.

**April 4, 1969** - A pagoda in Quang Nam province is dynamited, killing four persons, wounding 14.
April 9, 1969 - Terrorists attack the Phu Binh refugee center, Quang Ngai province and fire 70 houses, leaving 200 homeless. Four persons are kidnapped.

April 11, 1969 - A satchel charge explodes in the Dinh Thanh temple, Long Thanh village, Phong Dinh province, wounding four children.

April 15, 1969 - An armed propaganda team invades An Ky refugee center, Quang Ngai province, and attempts to force out the people living there; nine are killed and ten others wounded.

April 16, 1969 - The Hoa Dai refugee center in Binh Dinh province is invaded by an armed propaganda team. The refugees are urged to return to their former (communist dominated) village, but refuse; the communists burn 146 houses.

April 19, 1969 - Hieu Duc district refugee center, Quang Nam province, is invaded and ten persons kidnapped.

April 23, 1969 - Son Tinh district refugee center, Quang Ngai province, is invaded; two women are shot and 10 persons kidnapped.

May 6, 1969 - Le Van Gio, 37, is kidnapped and later shot for refusing to pay "taxes" to a communist agent who entered his village of Vinh Phu, An Giang province.

May 8, 1969 - Communist sappers detonate a charge outside the Postal-Telephone Building in Saigon's Kennedy Square, killing four civilians and wounding 19.

May 10, 1969 - Sappers explode a charge of plastique in Duong Hong, Quang Nam province, killing eight civilians and wounding four.

May 12, 1969 - A communist sapper squad attacks Phu My, Binh Dinh province, with satchel charges, rockets and grenades; 10 civilians are killed, 19 wounded; 87 homes are destroyed.

May 14, 1969 - Five communist 122mm rockets land in the residential area of Da Nang, killing five civilians and wounding 18.
June 18, 1969 - Three children are wounded when they step on a communist mine while playing near their home in Quan Long (Ca Mau) city, An Xuyen province.

June 19, 1969 - In Phu My, Thua Thien province, communists assassinate a 54-year old man and his 70-year old mother.

June 24, 1969 - A 122mm communists rocket strikes the Thanh Tam hospital in Ho Nai, Bien Hoa province, killing one patient.

June 30, 1969 - Communist mortar shells destroy the Phuoc Long pagoda in Chanh Hiep, Binh Duong province; one Buddhist monk is killed and ten persons wounded.

June 30, 1969 - Three members of the People's Self-Defense Force are kidnapped from Phu My, Bien Hoa province.

July 2, 1969 - Two communist assassins enter a hamlet office in Thai Phu, Tay Ninh province, shoot and wound the hamlet chief and his deputy.

July 17, 1969 - A grenade is thrown into Cho Con market, Da Nang, wounding 13 civilians, most of them women.

July 19, 1969 - A communist unit attacks the Chieu Hoi center in Vinh Binh province killing five persons, including two women and a youth, and wounding 11 civilians.

July 18, 1969 - Police report two incidents of B-40 rockets being fired into trucks on the highway, one in Quang Duc province in which three civilians were wounded and one in Darlac province which killed the driver.


July 30, 1969 - Communists rocket the refugee center of Hung My, Binh Duong, wounding 76 persons.
August 1, 1969 - A sapper team detonates a *plastique* charge at the base of an electric transformer tower in Saigon, cutting the line.

August 5, 1969 - Two grenades are thrown into the elementary school in Vinh Chau, Quang Nam province, where a school board meeting is taking place. Five persons are killed and 21 are wounded.

August 7, 1969 - Communist sappers set off some 30 separate *plastique* charges in the U.S. Sixth Evacuation Hospital compound, Cam Ranh Bay, killing two and wounding 57 patients.

August 7, 1969 - A series of explosions is detonated outside an adult education school for Vietnamese military in Cholon, killing eight and wounding 60.

August 13, 1969 - Officials in Saigon report a total of 17 communist terror attacks on refugee centers in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces, leaving 23 persons dead, 75 injured and a large number of homes destroyed or damaged.

August 21, 1969 - Communists infiltrate Ho Phong, Bac Lieu province, and kill three People's Self-Defense Force members, wound two others.

August 26, 1969 - A nine-month-old baby in his mother's arms is shot in the head by terrorists outside Hoa Phat, Quang Nam province; also found dead are three children between ages six and ten, an elderly man, a middle-aged man and a middle-aged woman, a total of seven, all shot at least once in the back of the head.

September 6, 1969 - Communists rocket and mortar the training center of the National Police Field Force in Dalat, killing five trainees and wounding 26.

September 9, 1969 - South Vietnamese officials report that nearly 5,000 South Vietnamese civilians have been killed by communist terror during 1969.

September 20, 1969 - Communists attack Tu Van refugee center in Quang Ngai province, killing 8 persons and wounding
two, all families of local People's Self-Defense Force members. In nearby Binh Son, eight members of a police official's family are killed.

**September 24, 1969** - A bus hits a mine on Highway 1, north of Duc Tho, Quang Ngai province; 12 passengers are killed.

**October 13, 1969** - A grenade is thrown in the Vi Thanh City Chieu Hoi center, killing three civilians and wounding 46; about half those wounded are dependents.

**October 13, 1969** - Communists kidnap a Catholic priest and a lay assistant from the church at Phu Hoi, Bien Hoa province.

**October 27, 1969** - Communists booby trap the body of a People's Self-Defense Force member whom they have killed. When relatives come to retrieve the body the subsequent explosion kills four of them.
Statistics (See Chart Below)

In May, 1967 the GVN-U.S. began employing new and more sophisticated systems, some using computers, for the collection and analysis of statistical data, including data on terror incidents. Under the new systems, categories were changed some what and therefore the pre-1967 figures below are not strictly comparable to those later (hence the drop in total number of terror acts for 1968 and first ten months of 1969).

With respect to the general matter of the Viet-Nam war and statistics, experienced writers in the mass media, the academic community and in government have learned, often from personal and bitter experience, not to try to quantify the Viet-Nam war. As a result they reflexively eschew statistics, not because they do not recognize them as a valuable tool, but because they know the conditions and circumstances under which they are collected make them, at best, untrustworthy, and at worst, dangerously misleading. With respect to terror acts, the data processing system is chiefly dependent on reports from the 2500-village countryside, a shaky base indeed.

Like most people in developing societies the Vietnamese are not great record keepers and particularly are not keepers of precise numbers, usually seeing no need. (Belief in the imperative need for figures, indeed simply to become statistics-conscious, seems to be a characteristic that develops as does the society.) Beyond this unperceived need to collect statistics of any sort, including those on terror, there is in Viet-Nam a fog of war which by its disruptive nature virtually prohibits systematic and patient collection of data. War is often responsible for the destruction of such data as has been assembled. This is the case, for example, of records of land surveys, title deeds and other legal documents on holdings in the Mekong Delta, a jurist's nightmare, one which the courts will be sorting out for a generation.

Thus in Viet-Nam there is the triple problem of indifference to the collection of statistics, inability because of war to collect them, and incomplete reporting even when collected. Therefore this chart is to be treated cautiously. Its benefit, if any, is simply to suggest the scope and general order of magnitude of communist terror acts over the years; the error probably is not more than plus or minus 25 percent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Terror Acts&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Assassinations&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Kidnapings&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Attacks&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957 to 1960</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,700 (est.)</td>
<td>2,000 (est.)</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,300 (est.)</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>20,000 (est.)</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>5,484</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>25,280</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>3,735</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>21,733</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>15,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>18,300 (est.)</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>15,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>15,600 (est.)</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>3,810</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>23,000 (est.)</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>5,357</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1968&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9,617</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>8,759</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969 (10 mos.)</td>
<td>9,216</td>
<td>5,340</td>
<td>5,807</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Footnotes

1. Includes sabotage, harassing fire, visits by armed propaganda teams to villages, "VC War Bond" sales, confiscation of food, but not the other acts of terror listed in subsequent columns.

2. Until May 1967 the figures are for assassinations of government officials only, and not killings of other civilians (records were kept only on officials and even these are incomplete.) Based on a 1964 study it probably is safe to conclude that for every official Vietnamese assassinated, at least four non-officials were killed.

3. As in the case of assassinations, the only records of kidnappings kept prior to May 1967 were kidnappings of government officials; in light of a 1964 study, it is safe to conclude that for every government official kidnapped, two non-government persons were seized. The GVN reported to the ICC in 1966 these kidnapping figures (government and non-government totaled): 1962, 10,000; 1963, 7,200; 1964, 10,450; 1965, 11,500.

4. Military attacks on villages, ambushes, etc., by the Liberation Army. After the beginning of the big-unit war and the arrival of large numbers of PAVN, this figure no longer made any sense.

5. The collection system broke down during the 1968 Tet offensive and no firm statistics on terror acts are available for the period Feb. 1 - March 15. The GVN reported civilian casualties at Tet as 7,424 killed and 15,434 wounded.
Glossary of Vietnamese Terms
Glossary of Vietnamese Terms

The term Viet Cong used to describe the communist forces in Viet-Nam is an imprecise one. Nevertheless it now is in almost universal use. The correct terms for the specific forces on the other side are as follow:

A. The National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam (NLFSV), generally called the National Liberation Front (NLF), sometimes NLF SVN. This is a communist front organization which is the major—in terms of numbers—enemy force. It is headed by a Central Committee and has elements running down to the villages. It is made up of some 20 ostensibly independent functional organizations, and a total membership of from 200,000 to 300,000, with perhaps 30,000 full-time cadres, about half of whom are Northerners.

B. People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF), formerly called the National Liberation Front Army or Liberation Army. It is divided into two parts:

1. The Full Military Force, usually called the Main Force or "hard hats".

2. The Para-Military Force, or the guerrilla force which in turn is of two types:

   a. Regional or Territorial Units - bands of guerrillas living in the mangrove swamps and other remote areas.

   b. The Local Guerrilla - the part-time fighter who is a farmer by day and a guerrilla by night.

C. The Communist Party of South Viet-Nam, known in the South as the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP); its junior organization is the People's Revolutionary Party Youth League (PRPYL).
D. People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN), soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army serving in the South, number currently 105,000 (known in NVN, as Vietnam People's Army).

Other major terms used in Viet-Nam follow:

**ARVN** - Army of (South) Viet-Nam.

**Big-Unit War** - The war so far fought chiefly in the highlands and along the 17th parallel that separates North from South Viet-Nam.

**Binh Van** - The NLF troop proselytizing program; literally, action among the enemy troops.

**Cao Dai** - Religious sect unique to Viet-Nam; a blend of all major world religions; claims membership of one million.

**Chieu Hoi** - The GVN's surrender or amnesty program; usually called in English the open arms program.

**CIDG** - Civilian Irregular Defense Groups - Guerrilla-type units of the GVN.

**Civil Guard** - Early GVN para-military organization, now called Regional Forces.

**CORDS** - Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support; the U.S. element supporting the "pacification" program in terms of logistics and advice.

**COSVN** - Central Office for South Viet-Nam. Communist Operational headquarters in the South.

**Dang Lao Dong** - Workers Party, the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam.

**Dau Tranh** - Literally, struggle; the golden word in the communist lexicon. Essentially a series of social disorders in rural areas designed chiefly to raise revolutionary consciousness among villagers and lead to the General Uprising.
DMZ - Demilitarized Zone - The three-mile wide zone along the 17th parallel separating North from South Viet-Nam.

Doan Ket - (See National Reconciliation)

DRV - Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, i.e., North Viet-Nam.

Dong - Vietnamese unit of money, usually termed "piaster" by foreigners.

First, Second and Third Stages - The three phases of revolutionary guerrilla war as outlined by:

Mao: 1) The enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive.
      2) The enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive.
      3) Our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat.

Truong Chinh: 1) Defensive
               2) Equilibrium of forces
               3) General counter-offensive.

Giap: 1) Contention (consisting of "many years of more and more intense and generalized guerrilla fighting")
      2) Equilibrium
      3) Counter-offensive ("first by a series of local operations, then by others on a larger scale, which were to lead to the decisive victory of Dien Bien Phu")

GVN - Government of (South) Viet-Nam.

General Uprising (Tong Khoi Nghia) - Major social myth of the Vietnamese communists, similar to the early communist social myth of the general strike. Also used is noi day dong loat, which means essentially the same thing.

Hoa Hao - Religious sect unique to South Viet-Nam; a Buddhist variant differing chiefly from other Buddhist sects in its militancy.
Hoi Chanh - Term for a person who comes in under the GVN Chieu Hoi or National Reconciliation program.

ICC or ICSC - The International Control Commission or the International Control and Surveillance Commission - the international organization (Canada, India, Poland) created to supervise the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Accords in Indochina.

Kiem Thao - Communist institution: criticism and self-criticism sessions.

Liberation Army -(See above)

National Reconciliation - The broad GVN amnesty program. In Vietnamese, Dai Doan Ket.

NLF, NLFSV, NLFSVN, NFLSVN - (See above)

Pacification - (See National Reconciliation and Revolutionary Development)

PAVN - (See D above)

PFF - Police Field Force; GVN.

PLAF - (See B above)

PSDF - People's Self Defense Force. The static home-guard militia in the Vietnamese villages; in effect the lowest echelon of the GVN's defense structure.

Popular Forces (PF) - GVN's district level para-military force, formerly called Self-Defense Force (Dan Ve).

PRP - (See C above)

PRP Youth League - (See C above)

Protracted Conflict - Communist doctrinal thesis, highly deterministic, which holds that time, especially in terms of decades, is on the side of the communists; that inevitably they will succeed in communizing the world.
**Revolutionary Development** - Name for GVN "pacification" program designed to improve at a highly accelerated rate the socio-economic-political lot of the SVN countryside.

**Regional Force (RF)** - GVN's para-military force standing between ARVN as a national army and the Popular Force; found at province level.

**Resistance (The)** - Communist name for the French-Viet Minh War, 1946-54.

**RGW** - Revolutionary Guerrilla War; type of war being fought in Viet-Nam. (See First, Second, Third stages).

**RVNAF** - Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces (South Vietnamese armed forces).

**Self-Defense Force** - Former name of GVN village militia.

**Special War** - Name used by the communists for the type of war being fought in South Viet-Nam. They define it as an imperialist war for the purpose of colonization but in which the fighting is done by "comprador natives" or "lackeys" rather than by soldiers of the colonizing nation.

**Strategic Hamlet** - Diem government's program to develop a system of defended villages as part of its resources control program. After Diem, it became known as the New Life Hamlet. Elements were later incorporated in Revolutionary Development Program.

**Struggle Movement** - See Dau Tranh

**Tong Khoi Nghia** - See General Uprising

**Viet Cong** - Imprecise but now universally employed term for the communist forces in South Viet-Nam.

**VNAF** - (South) Viet-Nam Air Force.

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Born in Minnesota in 1925, Douglas Pike was educated at the University of California (Berkeley) (AB); American University in Washington, D.C. (MA) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1964-65).

During World War II Mr. Pike served with the United States Army in the South Pacific, the Philippines and Japan. He has spent most of his adult life in Asia, including residence in Viet-Nam, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and the Philippines, with frequent travel in other countries of the area.

He has worked as a journalist in the United States and Asia, and for the United Nations as a civilian during the Korean war. He has been an officer of the United States Information Agency since 1958 when he covered the White House for the Voice of America. Subsequent assignments have taken him to Viet-Nam and to Tokyo where he is currently serving as the Special Assistant for Political Military Affairs to the director of the United States Information Service in Japan.


Mr. Pike is married and the father of three children.